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ABSTRACT
MUSTAFA ONUR KABUL: Essays on Selling to Strategic Customers
with a Supply Chain Perspective (Under the direction of Ali K. Parlaktu¨rk and Nilay Tanık
Argon)
We consider a decentralized supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier that serves
forward-looking consumers in two periods. In each period, the supplier and the retailer dynamically
set the wholesale and retail price to maximize their own profits. The consumers are heterogeneous
in their evaluations of the product and are strategic in deciding whether and when to buy the
product, choosing the option that maximizes their utility, including waiting for a price mark-down.
We derive the equilibrium and study the value of price and quantity commitments from both
the retailer’s and the supplier’s perspective. We consider not only unilateral commitments but
also simultaneous and concurrent commitments. We find that, while a centralized system always
benefits from making price and quantity commitments, this is not true for a firm in a decentralized
supply chain due to how the other firm responds to these commitments. We show that the retailer
suffers from making a price or quantity commitment and that, similarly, the supplier does not
benefit from making a price commitment. In these cases, commitments can harm not only the
firm itself but also profitability of the other firm in the supply chain, thereby disadvantaging the
entire supply chain. This happens because such commitments aggravate double-marginalization
inefficiency in the supply chain. We strengthen our results with extensive robustness checks by
altering key modeling assumptions. We find that majority of our results remain the same. In
addition, we show eliminating this inefficiency through a coordinating contract (e.g., a two part
tariff or quantity discount) makes commitments beneficial.
Furthermore, we extend our model by introducing demand uncertainty to explore the effects of
uncertainty to firm profits, prices and quantities in a decentralized setting when selling to forward
looking customers. We find that demand uncertainty intensifies the strategic behavior. In addition
we find that supplier’s loss due the demand uncertainty is bigger than that of retailer’s and retailer’s
iii
loss due to customers’ strategic behavior is bigger than that of supplier’s. Moreover we show that
while in a centralized system demand uncertainty decreases the strategic loss it has a bi-model
affect on the decentralized supply chain’s loss such that when volatility in demand is smaller than
a threshold value it increases the loss beyond that level it decreases it.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Firms are dealing with increasingly sophisticated and better informed consumers who are be-
coming more prudent in their purchasing decisions. In one example of consumer savvy, many
consumers strategically postpone their purchases, anticipating price mark-downs. Indeed recent
reports show that a larger portion of sales are made at discount prices in each succeeding year
(Rozhon 2004, O’Donnell 2006).
Existing work has shown that making commitments can be effective in dealing with strategic
customer behavior (cf. Tirole 1988, Bulow 1982, Butz 1990). These studies show that committing
to future prices (e.g., no mark-downs) or availability (e.g., no more than a limited quantity) can
deter customers from waiting for price mark-downs. However, in spite of their assumed benefits,
such commitments are not too prevalent in practice.
In this dissertation, we start with studying the value of commitments to all parties in a decen-
tralized supply chain. We find that supply chain relations constitute one reason why firms may shy
away from making these commitments. It is well known that supply chains suffer from a lack of
coordination (Cachon 2003). Wholesale price contracts, commonly used on account of their sim-
plicity, are especially vulnerable to double-marginalization inefficiency (Arrow 1985, Lariviere and
Porteus 2001, Cachon 2003, Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003). We show that commitments can further
exacerbate the inefficiency of wholesale price contracts and hurt firm profitability, illustrating how
commitments can be undesirable.
Our work demonstrates that the inefficiencies that result from a lack of coordination and of
strategic customer behavior are related. When double marginalization inefficiency is not addressed,
commitments, which aim to address strategic customer behavior, generally backfire and intensify
double marginalization inefficiency. However, when double marginalization inefficiency is eliminated
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through a more sophisticated contract (e.g., a two-part tariff), commitments can reduce the loss
due to strategic customer behavior and improve supply chain profits.
We explicitly model the interaction between the retailer and its supplier in addition to the
relation between consumers and the retailer. Our model is closest to that of Besanko and Winston
(1990). They consider a single seller; we extend their model to a supply chain. Specifically, we
consider a supply chain that consists of a supplier and a retailer selling a product to consumers over
two periods. In each period, first, the supplier sets its wholesale price; the retailer then decides
its procurement quantity and sets its retail price; finally, the consumers make their purchasing
decisions. While the supplier and the retailer set wholesale and retail prices dynamically to maxi-
mize their individual profits given the remaining consumers in the market, each consumer decides
whether and when to buy the product to maximize her own utility based on her expectation of
future prices. Customers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the product and they are willing
to pay more to purchase a product in the first period, rather than wait to buy it in the second
period. In particular, the product’s value decreases over time. This may result, for example, from
declining popularity (common for technology and fashion products) or seasonality (common for
apparel). In addition to our base (no-commitment) model, we study alternative models in which
the retailer or the supplier can make price or quantity commitments. We also consider the vertically
integrated centralized system as a benchmark. Comparing these models allows us to tease out the
value of commitments to both the supplier and the retailer; we also characterize the impact of these
commitments on the other supply chain partner, as well as on the whole supply chain.
As expected, the centralized system benefits from its ability to make price and quantity com-
mitments. Using these commitments, the centralized system limits the sale of its product to a single
period, which in turn eliminates the opportunity for strategic customer behavior. In contrast, we
show that, in a decentralized supply chain, the impact of commitments is more intricate because of
how they affect the interactions between the retailer and the supplier. In particular, ignoring the
relations within a supply chain can lead to overestimating the benefits of commitments.
We find that the retailer becomes worse off from its ability to make a quantity commitment
in a decentralized supply chain. This happens because of how the quantity commitment affect the
supplier’s pricing. For example, had the supplier’s wholesale price stayed the same, the retailer
would have benefited from making a quantity commitment at the expense of the supplier by limiting
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sales to only a single period, as in the centralized system. However, the supplier responds to this
threat by increasing its period 1 wholesale price to force the retailer to sell the product in both
periods, which in turn harms the retailer’s profitability.
In our model the power lies with the supplier, as it moves first and sets a take-it-or- leave-it
wholesale price. Therefore, one would expect the supplier to benefit from its commitments. Indeed,
the supplier benefits from its ability to make a quantity commitment. Intuitively, the supplier can
always nullify its commitment by choosing an arbitrarily large commitment quantity, ensuring that
it never becomes worse off. We also consider period specific quantity commitment models. We show
that the supplier can do better by committing only to period 2 quantity rather than to the total
quantity. Intuitively, limiting period 2 sales is more aligned with the supplier’s objective of pushing
sales to period 1, which enables setting a higher wholesale price. Furthermore, when both the
supplier and the retailer can make simultaneous but independent commitments, their profitability
continues to suffer, showing that the problem is due not to unilateral nature of commitments, but
rather to a lack coordination.
Similar, to the quantity commitment case retailer becomes worse off when it can make a price
commitment. This time the supplier sets a higher period 1 wholesale price, which hurts the retailer.
In contrast to quantity commitment, we find that the supplier, can become worse off by making a
price commitment because of how this commitment affects the retailer’s ordering policy. When the
supplier does not commit to a period 2 wholesale price, the retailer has an incentive to buy more in
period 1, as it results in a lower period 2 wholesale price. However, price commitment eliminates
this incentive.
Interestingly, the retailer’s commitments hurt not only itself but also the supplier, thus leaving
the whole supply chain worse off. We find that the supplier’s price commitment hurts the retailer
and the whole supply chain as well.
In these examples, commitments hurt profitability as they amplify existing double marginal-
ization inefficiency. However, we show that eliminating this inefficiency through a two-part tariff
or a quantity discount contract can make the commitments beneficial.
Some previous studies have also observed that making commitments can hurt profitability
(e.g., Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009). These papers, however, do not consider
the relation between the retailer and its supplier; instead, demand uncertainty is the driver of
3
their results as making commitments impairs a firm’s ability to deal with demand uncertainty. In
contrast, demand is deterministic in our model, and the inefficiency caused by the vertical relation
between the retailer and the supplier drives our results.
After an extensive investigation about commitments we shift our focus to the implications of
uncertainty. We extend our base model by introducing demand variability. Specifically, we consider
two demand scenarios, either high or low and we capture the uncertainty by varying the total
market size. This allows us to explicitly formulate the equilibrium. We analyze the implications of
uncertainty on the firm profits by considering different values of model parameters. In particular
we show how uncertainty affects the fraction of customers that delay their purchase strategically.
In contrast to current work on strategic customers that considers a stochastic demand model we
find that demand volatility increases the fraction of such customers.
Dealing with uncertainty in a decentralized supply chain is already a hard problem, strategic
consumers add more complexity to this. By explicitly modeling the interactions between supply
chain parties, the level of demand variability and the level of customer patience we provide insights
we provide insights such that when the level of customer patience and the volatility in demand
has more impact on the firms’ profits. In addition to this decentralized supply chain with demand
uncertainty we analyze the vertically integrated system as a benchmark. We find that while de-
centralized supply chain has a smaller loss than the centralized system its loss increases up until a
threshold when demand volatility increases, however centralized firm’s loss decreases as the demand
becomes more variable.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: In the next Section we review the relevant
literature, in Chapter 2 we introduce our main model and provide the baseline equilibrium. In
Chapter 3 we investigate the value of various quantity commitments made by retailer and supplier
unilaterally or simultaneously. Similarly, in Chapter 4 we analyze the value of price commitments.
Next in Chapter 5, we provide comparison for those commitments and further extend with concur-
rent commitment models. Chapter 6 is devoted for evaluating the robustness of our results in terms
of the changes in underlying modelling assumptions. We provide alternatives to two key modelling
choices and show that our main results about the value of commitments continue to hold. To com-
plete our investigation about the commitments in Chapter 7, we introduce a coordinating contract
into our decentralized supply chain design and show that under such an arrangement commitments
4
are beneficial. Next in Chapter 8, we extend our main model to investigate the implications of de-
mand uncertainty in a decentralized supply chain when selling to strategic customers. We conclude
and comment on the future work in Chapter 9.
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1.2 Literature Review
A growing body of research dating back to Coase (1972) examines the effects of the forward-
looking behavior of consumers. Coase (1972) points out that a durable goods monopolist loses
monopoly power and ends up pricing at marginal cost when faced with strategic customers. Coase
(1972) notes that the monopolist can avoid this problem if it can make some contractual agreements
that include price and quantity commitments. Bulow (1982) notes that the ability to make binding
quantity commitments alleviates the loss to the monopolist caused by strategic customer behavior.
Likewise, Stokey (1979) finds that a firm benefits from its ability to make quantity commitments.
In this case, the firm gives up the opportunity to exercise inter-temporal price discrimination and
limits the sale of its product to a single period to eliminate the opportunity for strategic customers
to await for mark-downs.
Butz (1990) shows that making price commitments in the form of best-price provisions increases
a firm’s profitability. With a best-price provision, the firm promises to refund the price difference
between the original price and the sale price, if ever the firm decreases the price of its product.
Similarly, Besanko and Winston (1990) and Aviv and Pazgal (2008) show that a firm facing strategic
consumers can benefit from a commitment to a price path, as opposed to setting prices dynamically.
Liu and Zhang (2013) find that committing to a price path has even greater benefits in a competitive
environment.
In contrast to the findings of the above papers, we show that firms may not necessarily benefit
from their ability to make quantity and price commitments; we find that, on the contrary, such
commitments can hurt firms’ profitability. The key difference between these papers and ours is
that, while these papers consider only the interactions between consumers and a single seller, ours,
in addition, considers the vertical relationship between supplier and retailer.
We should note that Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Cachon and Swinney (2009) and Dasu and Tong
(2010) also observed that commitments can hurt a firm’s profitability. However, the drivers of
their results are entirely different. Inability to respond to demand variability (or supply-demand
imbalance) is the key driver in these papers; they do not consider the relation between retailer and
supplier. In contrast, we consider deterministic demand and the vertical relation between retailer
and supplier drives our result.
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Strategic consumer behavior has recently attracted increasing interest in operations manage-
ment literature. The various mechanisms studied in the context of strategic customers include ca-
pacity rationing (Liu and van Ryzin 2008, Zhang and Cooper 2008, Lai et al. 2010); quick response
(Cachon and Swinney 2009, Swinney 2011); inventory display format (Yin et al. 2009); product
improvement (Kim and Swinney 2009); resale (Su 2009); product variety (Parlakturk 2009); avail-
ability guarantees (Su and Zhang 2009); reservations (Alexandrov and Lariviere 2012); and price
and quantity commitments (Elmaghraby et al. 2008, Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Lai et al. 2009). Shen
and Su (2007) survey and Netessine and Tang (2009) book provide many other examples. While
the above papers study the optimal policy of a single seller facing strategic consumers, our work
differs in that we consider a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, and
we explicitly model the interactions between them. This approach allows us to address our key
research question –the value of commitments to both the retailer and the supplier.
Su and Zhang (2008), Arya and Mittendorf (2006) and Desai et al. (2004) find that a decen-
tralized supply chain can do better than a centralized supply chain due to strategic consumers. Su
and Zhang (2008) show that in a decentralized supply chain some contracts can mimic the price
and quantity commitments of a centralized supply chain. Our work complements this result in
that we find actual price and quantity commitments in a decentralized supply chain may not be
beneficial with a wholesale price contract. Our model differs from Su and Zhang (2008) in impor-
tant ways. In Su and Zhang (2008), wholesale price and marked-down retail price are exogenously
set. Supply-demand mismatch due to demand uncertainty –which, in turn, creates availability risk
at marked-down price– generates the strategic customer behavior. When demand uncertainty is
removed, the strategic behavior vanishes because the retailer never has available units at marked-
down price. In contrast, demand is deterministic, and endogenously chosen wholesale and retail
prices are critical in our model, because how commitments affect these prices drive our finding.
These modeling differences can lead to opposite results: While we show that price and quantity
commitments may harm profitability, such commitments are always beneficial in Su and Zhang
(2008). Furthermore, customers have the same valuation of the product in Su and Zhang (2008);
therefore, they all either buy at full price or wait for mark-down. In contrast, heterogeneity in
customers’ valuations in our model may cause them to choose different actions (buy now or wait).
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Both Arya and Mittendorf (2006) and Desai et al. (2004) consider durable goods with second-
hand markets. They show that decentralization through the addition of a retailer in a distribution
channel can increase a manufacturer’s profit if the product is sufficiently durable, i.e., lasting more
than two periods (Arya and Mittendorf 2006) or if the manufacturer can commit to future wholesale
prices (Desai et al. 2004). In other words, they show that a decentralized system can outperform
a centralized system. These papers, however, do not address our key research question about the
value of commitments in a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, in Desai et al. (2004), a more
durable product that retains more of its value in the next period makes purchasing it sooner rel-
atively more attractive. In our paper, when the product retains more of its value (i.e., customers
are more patient), waiting for period 2 becomes relatively more attractive.
Finally, Jerath et al. (2009) is also relevant for our paper. They show that, when facing strategic
customers, selling through opaque intermediaries that hide the exact product specifications (e.g.,
departure times for airlines) can enhance profitability.
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CHAPTER 2
The Model
In the following, we first introduce the supply side of our model; we then discuss how customers
make their buying decisions resulting in strategic customer behavior. We finally describe the
structure of the equilibrium. We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer
selling a product over two periods. The supplier and the retailer set their prices dynamically to
maximize their individual profits over two periods. Specifically, before the start of each period
i, the supplier sets its wholesale price ci, and the retailer decides its procurement quantity Qi,
which is delivered at the beginning of the period. The retailer then sets the retail price pi, and
consumers decide whether to buy the product in that period. The sequence of events is summarized
in Figure 2.1. We assume that the supplier has unlimited capacity and its production costs are
normalized to zero. Furthermore, the retailer does not incur any cost for holding inventory, however
the salvage value of any unsold unit at the end of period 2 is zero.
All consumers are present at time zero and they leave the market when they make a purchase.
Each consumer buys at most one unit of inventory. Dynamic retail prices provide an opportunity
for strategic consumers. They decide whether to buy the product and when to buy it, choosing
the option that maximizes their utility. Thus, in period 1 each consumer decides whether to
buy a product in that period or wait for period 2. The consumers do not observe the retailer’s
procurement quantities Qi, thus they rely on their beliefs Qˆi when making their decisions. In most
settings, consumers indeed do not observe a firm’s order quantities. Note, however, that all of our
key insights carry over when consumers can observe order quantities.
The consumer evaluations decrease over time, that is, everything else being equal, each customer
prefers buying the product sooner rather than later. Specifically, the value of the product decreases
by 1− δ in period 2. Thus 1− δ indicates perishability of the product value for consumers and is a
measure of customer impatience. Hence, its complement δ shows the degree of customer patience.
The assumption that valuations decline over time seems to be common in the sales of fashion,
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Supplier sets c1 Retailer orders
Q1 sets p1
Consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait
Supplier sets c2 Retailer orders
Q2 sets p2
Remaining consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
technology, and seasonal products (Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Cachon and Swinney 2009, Lai et al.
2009, Desiraju and Shugan 1999). Throughout the paper, we assume that 0 < δ ≤ 4/5, that
is, the value of a product decreases by at least 20% in period 2. This approach preserves the
concavity of profit functions and helps us focus on more interesting cases. Our analysis carries over
to 4/5 < δ ≤ 1 as well; however, this extension requires considering many additional equilibrium
regions that would needlessly complicate our exposition without contributing to our insights.
The customers differ in their willingness to pay. Specifically, when type θ customer buys the
product at price pi in period i, her utility is equal to
Ui(θ, pi) = δ
i−1θ − pi, i : 1, 2. (2.1)
Thus, the value of the product for type θ customer is θ and δθ in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
Not buying a product yields zero utility. An alternative discounting assumption is discussed in
Section 6.1, where the discount factor δ applies to both the product value and the payment.
Customer types θ are uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1] and have a total mass of
1. The distribution of customer types is common knowledge. However, the retailer does not know
the type of any particular customer, hence perfect price discrimination is not feasible. Note that
as is common in models of strategic customer behavior (e.g. Besanko and Winston 1990, Su 2007,
Liu and van Ryzin 2008, Elmaghraby et al. 2008, Liu and Zhang 2013), the total market size is
deterministic in our model, however its allocation to no purchase option and demand in each period
depends on the retailer’s pricing policy.
We analyze the above game between the supplier, the retailer, and consumers by looking for
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) (Selten 1975).We restrict our analysis to only pure
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strategies. To explicitly define the equilibrium, we introduce additional notation. Let θ¯ show the
type of marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying in periods 1 and 2. We make use
of the fact that if type-θ¯ consumer finds it attractive to buy in period 1 then all consumers with
higher valuations also find it attractive to buy in period 1.
Even though the demand is deterministic in our model, the retailer may choose to carry in-
ventory because of its impact on the supplier’s period 2 wholesale price c2. This is called strategic
inventory in Anand et al. (2008). An alternative model in which the retailer cannot carry over
inventory is considered in Section 6.2.
An SPNE in our model is defined by the solutions of the following equations. Note that ∗
denotes SPNE strategies.
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = arg max
(p2,Q2)∈S2
[p2(θ¯ − p2/δ)− c2Q2], (2.2)
c∗2 = arg maxc2
c2Q
∗
2, (2.3)
θ¯∗ = inf{θ : θ − p1 ≥ δθ − p∗2(Qˆ1)}, (2.4)
(p∗1, Q
∗
1) = arg max
(p1,Q1)∈S1
[p1(1− θ¯∗)− c1Q1 + p∗2(θ¯∗ − p∗2/δ)− c∗2Q∗2], (2.5)
Qˆ1 = Q
∗
1, (2.6)
c∗1 = arg maxc1
[c1Q
∗
1 + c
∗
2Q
∗
2]. (2.7)
where the retailer’s feasible strategy sets Si in each period are given by
S1 = {(p1, Q1) : Q1 ≥ 1− θ¯∗(p1) ≥ 0}, (2.8)
S2 = {(p2, Q2) : Q1 +Q2 ≥ 1− p2/δ}. (2.9)
Basically, (2.2) states that the retailer chooses its order quantity Q2 and price p2 in period 2
to maximize its profit in that period, given the remaining consumer segment [0, θ¯), the wholesale
price c2, and its carry-over inventory. The constraint (p2, Q2) ∈ S2 ensures that the retailer does
not sell more than it has on-hand. Because the demand is deterministic, the retailer always sells
all of its remaining inventory in period 2 in equilibrium. The supplier chooses its wholesale price
c2 to maximize its profit in period 2 in (2.3). The optimal c
∗
2 takes into account its impact on the
retailer’s optimal order quantity Q∗2. Each consumer chooses her best option in period 1, given her
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conjecture of period 2 price, p∗2(Qˆ1), which depends on her belief Qˆ1 about how many units the
retailer procured in period 1. Because the difference between period 1 and 2 utilities is monotone
in θ, a threshold-type purchasing policy emerges in equilibrium. In particular, (2.4) states that it is
optimal to wait for period 2 for all consumers with lower valuations than the marginal customer θ¯.
As a result of monotonicity, (2.4) also implies that it is optimal to buy in period 1 for all consumers
with higher valuations than the marginal customer θ¯. Therefore, the marginal customer θ¯ shows
indifference between buying in period 1 and waiting for period 2.
Furthermore, (2.5) shows that the retailer chooses its period 1 order quantity Q1 and price p1
to maximize its total profit over two periods given the wholesale price c1 in period 1. The condition
(p1, Q1) ∈ S1 states that the retailer’s sales quantity in period 1 cannot exceed Q1 units, its on-hand
inventory.
The equilibrium requires the consumers to share the same belief on retailer period 1 order
quantity and this belief to be consistent with the actual outcome as stated in (2.6). Note that
consumers’ beliefs on period 2 order quantity is not relevant since period 2 is the last period.
Finally, (2.7) states that the supplier chooses its period 1 wholesale price, c1, to maximize its total
profit, taking into account its impact on the retailer’s period 1 and 2 actions.
2.1 Equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium using backward induction. Essentially, we follow the order in
equations (2.2-2.7). First, we find the retailer’s optimal price in period 2, then we derive the
supplier’s optimal wholesale price in that period. Next, we characterize the consumers’ optimal
choice in period 1 (buy in period 1 vs. wait for period 2). Then, we solve for the retailer’s optimal
price in period 1. Finally, we determine the supplier’s optimal wholesale price in period 1, which
fully characterizes the equilibrium. Note that all proofs are in Appendix B of the online supplement.
In period 2, the supplier sets its wholesale price c2 to extract maximum profit from the retailer
while the retailer sets its price p2 to extract maximum profit from the remaining consumers [0, θ¯).
Because period 2 is the last period, the consumers do not have the strategic option of delaying their
purchases further. They decide whether or not to buy the product. Specifically, there exist θ2 ≤ θ¯,
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such that consumers in [θ2, θ¯) buy the product and the remaining consumers do not buy it. The
following Lemma describes the retailer’s and supplier’s optimal policy in period 2.
Lemma 1. Suppose the retailer orders Q1 units in period 1, and consumer segment [0, θ¯) remains
in the market in period 2.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = max(
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c2
2δ , 0) units and
sets p∗2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q∗2) in period 2.
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 =
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)
2 in period 2.
This yields profits ΠR,2 =
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)2
16 +δ(1−Q1)(Q1−1+ θ¯) and ΠS,2 = δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)
2
8 for the retailer
and supplier respectively.
Next, we consider the consumers’ choices in period 1. The consumers conjecture period 2 price,
given their beliefs about the retailer’s inventory level Qˆ1. Specifically, following Lemma 1, they
expect p∗2(Qˆ1) =
δ(2−2Qˆ1+θ¯)
4 . The marginal consumer θ¯, who is indifferent about whether to buy in
period 1 or wait for period 2, is given by the solution of θ¯ − p1 = δθ¯ − p∗2(Qˆ1), where the left and
right hand sides correspond to the utility of buying in periods 1 and 2, respectively. This leads to
θ¯ =
4p1 − 2δ(1− Qˆ1)
4− 3δ . (2.10)
Thus, consumers in [θ¯, 1] buy the product in period 1, and the remaining consumers wait for period
2.
Now, consider the retailer’s period 1 problem. To determine the retailer’s optimal price, we can
equivalently solve for the optimal consumer segment that it should entice in period 1. Following
(2.10), in order to induce consumers in [θ¯, 1] to buy the product in period 1, the retailer needs to
set the following price:
p1(θ¯, Qˆ1) = θ¯ − δ(2(Qˆ1 − (1− θ¯)) + θ¯)
4
. (2.11)
Setting price p1 equal to θ¯ would be sufficient to attract consumer segment [θ¯, 1] if the consumers
were myopic, i.e., if they were not considering a future option in their decision making. The terms
in parentheses are non-negative in (2.11) since Qˆ1 − (1 − θ¯) corresponds to the consumers’ belief
about the retailer’s inventory level at the end of period 1. Therefore, the retailer suffers a margin
13
loss from price θ¯ that results from strategic customer behavior. Observe that this loss increases in
Qˆ1, that is, when customers believe that the retailer has a higher inventory level, the retailer needs
to set a lower price to convince the customer to buy in period 1 rather than to wait for sales in
period 2. Because the actual order quantity Q1 is unobservable, it does not have a direct impact on
this loss. By definition, the retailer can conjecture the equilibrium choices. Therefore, it predicts
Qˆ1, which is equal to the equilibrium order quantity in period 1.
We can now reformulate the retailer’s total profit in terms of its order quantity Q1 and target
consumer segment [θ¯, 1] in period 1:
ΠR(Q1, θ¯, Qˆ1) = [1− θ¯]p1(θ¯, Qˆ1)−Q1c1 + ΠR,2(Q1, θ¯). (2.12)
Note that ΠR,2(Q1, θ¯) is given in Lemma 1. The retailer’s optimal policy in equilibrium then
satisfies the following:
(Q∗1, θ¯
∗) = arg max
(Q1,θ¯)∈S′1
ΠR(Q1, θ¯, Qˆ1) (2.13)
Qˆ1 = Q
∗
1, (2.14)
where
S
′
1 = {(Q1, θ¯) : Q1 ≥ 1− θ¯ ≥ 0}. (2.15)
Here, the restriction to set S
′
1 ensures that the retailer does not sell a negative quantity, or more
than its on-hand inventory in period 1. The solution of (2.13-2.14) gives the retailer’s optimal order
quantity and price in period 1, which are stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. The SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal
customer θ¯∗ in period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 <
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) , the retailer sells the product in both periods, and it carries inventory be-
tween periods, where Q∗1 =
11
14− c1(112−91δ)+6δ21δ(8−7δ) , p∗1 = 12− 4(5−4δ)c1−9δ(1−δ)6(8−7δ) , and θ¯∗ = 3(4−3δ)+2c13(8−7δ) .
(ii) When 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) ≤ c1 < 8−3δ8 , the retailer sells the product in both periods and it does not carry
inventory between periods, where Q∗1 =
8(1−c1)−3δ
16−9δ , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4+4c1−3δ)
2(16−9δ) , and θ¯
∗ = 8(1+c1)−6δ16−9δ .
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Regions in Proposition 1.
(iii) When c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 , the retailer sells the product only in period 2, and it does not carry inventory
between periods, where Q∗1 = 0, and θ¯∗ = 1.
In part (i), Q∗1 > 1− θ¯∗, that is, the retailer sells less than it orders in period 1, thus it carries
inventory into the next period. In contrast, in parts (ii) and (iii), Q∗1 = 1− θ¯∗, so the upper bound
in (2.15) binds, and the retailer sells exactly what it orders in period 1, and, therefore, does not
have any remaining inventory at the end of period 1. Furthermore, in part (iii), θ¯∗ = 1, thus, the
lower bound in (2.15) also binds, and the retailer does not sell any units in period 1. The regions
characterized in parts (i)-(iii) are depicted in Figure 2.2
Finally, let us consider the supplier’s pricing problem in period 1. The supplier chooses c1 to
maximize its total profit:
ΠS = c1Q
∗
1 + ΠS,2(c1, Q
∗
1, θ¯
∗), (2.16)
where Q∗1 and θ¯∗ are given by Proposition 1 and ΠS,2 follows from Lemma 1. The following
Proposition describes the supplier’s optimal policy.
Proposition 2. The SPNE wholesale price c1 in period 1 is as follows.
(i) When δ ≤ 1621 , c∗1 = 16−3δ32 .
(ii) When 1621 < δ, c
∗
1 =
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) .
Propositions 1 and 2 state the firms’ optimal policy in period 1. Recall that Lemma 1 de-
scribes their optimal policy in period 2 and (2.10) identifies the marginal customer. Therefore,
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the equilibrium of the game between the supplier, retailer and consumers is fully characterized by
Propositions 1 and 2, Lemma 1 and (2.10). Note, because our analysis follows backward induction,
period 2 equilibrium decisions are stated in terms of period 1 outcomes in all scenarios. They can
be stated explicitly by plugging in equilibrium values of these period 1 actions. These expressions
are provided in Appendix A.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the supplier’s pricing in period 1 makes carrying inventory
into the next period unattractive for the retailer. In other words, the supplier sets its period 1
wholesale price c1 sufficiently high so that the retailer can not use inventories to get a better period
2 wholesale price c2. In part (ii) of Proposition 2, the solution is at the boundary; any lower
wholesale price c1 will result in the retailer carrying inventory into period 2.
It is well known that strategic customer behavior leads to profit loss (cf. Besanko and Winston
1990, Cachon and Swinney 2009, Su and Zhang 2008). Indeed, in our setup, strategic customer
behavior hurts the profits of both the supplier and retailer; that is, their profits would be higher if
the customers were myopic, i.e., not considering their future pay-offs. We formally state this result
in the following where we provide the myopic consumers benchmark.
2.2 Myopic Consumers Benchmark
When customers are myopic they buy the product whenever their value exceeds its retail price.
Specifically, they do not consider second period price when they make their purchasing decision in
period 1. Note that since myopic consumers do not consider waiting for the second period they
do not need to make beliefs about the second period quantity. The SPNE is then defined by the
following equations.
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = arg max
(p2,Q2)∈S2
[p2(p1 − p2/δ)− c2Q2], (2.17)
c∗2 = arg maxc2
c2Q
∗
2
(p∗1, Q
∗
1) = arg max
(p1,Q1)∈SM1
[p1(1− p1)− c1Q1 + p∗2(p∗1 − p∗2/δ)− c∗2Q∗2], (2.18)
c∗1 = arg maxc1
[c1Q
∗
1 + c
∗
2Q
∗
2].
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where the retailer’s feasible strategy sets Si in each period are given by
SM1 = {(p1, Q1) : Q1 ≥ 1− p∗1 ≥ 0} , (2.19)
S2 = {(p2, Q2) : Q1 +Q2 ≥ 1− p2/δ} .
The following lemma then describes the supplier’s and retailer’s second period optimal policy.
Lemma 2. Suppose the retailer orders Q1 units and and charges p1 in period 1.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = max(
δ(2(1−Q1)−p1)−c2
2δ , 0) units and
sets p∗2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q∗2) in period 2.
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 =
δ
2(2(1−Q1)− p1) in period 2.
This yields profits ΠR,2 =
δ
16
(
p21 + 12p1(1−Q1)− 12(1−Q1)2
)
and ΠS,2 =
δ
8(2(1−Q1)− p1)2 for
the retailer and supplier respectively.
Since customer’s are myopic the consumer segment in [1− p1] stays in the market and we can
solve for retailer’s optimization problem by plugging the values in Lemma 2 into equation (2.18).
The following proposition describes retailer’s optimal policy in period 1.
Proposition 3. The SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 in period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 <
6δ
16−7δ the retailer sells the product in both periods, and in carries inventory between
periods, where Q∗1 = 1− 2+c12(4−δ) and p∗1 = 2+c14−δ .
(ii) When 6δ16−7δ ≤ c1 ≤ 1 − δ8 the retailer sells the product in both periods and it does not carry
inventory between periods where Q∗1 = 1− 8(1+c1)16−δ , p∗1 = 8(1+c1)16−δ .
When c1 > 1− δ8 retailer does not sell the product in period 1.
To fully characterize the equilibrium we solve the supplier’s optimization problem in period 1,
which is stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The SPNE wholesale price c1 is c
∗
1 =
4
8−δ − δ32 .
Wholesale price in Proposition 4 corresponds to part (ii) of Proposition 3. Hence in equilibrium
the retailer serves the market in both periods and does not carry inventory.
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It is a well established result that strategic customers cause firms to loose profit. The following
corollary formally states this result. Let NCM denote the no commitment scenario when customers
are myopic.
Corollary 1. (i) ΠNC
M
S > Π
NC
S .
(ii) ΠNC
M
S + Π
NCM
R > Π
NC
S + Π
NC
R .
(iii) ΠNC
M
R > Π
NC
R .
Recall that we assume δ > 0. However, at the extreme, when δ = 0, strategic and myopic models
become identical as strategic customers do not benefit from waiting at all since the product’s value
in period 2 becomes 0. As δ increases the loss due to strategic customers increases.
2.3 Centralized System Benchmark
In this section, we consider a centralized supply chain as a benchmark. Similar to our main
model, the centralized system sets the retail price pi in each period i : 1, 2 and consumers decide
whether to buy the product in that period. The resulting equilibrium is given by the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a centralized supply chain. The SPNE is as follows. The centralized firm
sells the product in both periods, setting p∗1 =
(2−δ)2
2(4−3δ) in period 1 and p
∗
2 =
(2−δ)δ
2(4−3δ) in period 2, and
the marginal customer is given by θ¯∗ = 2−δ4−3δ .
For completeness let’s provide the centralized system with myopic consumers.
Lemma 4. Consider a centralized supply chain with myopic customers. The SPNE is as follows.
The centralized firm sell sells the product in both periods, setting p∗1 =
2
4−δ in period 1 and p
∗
2 =
δ
4−δ
in period 2.
The following corollary formally states the result that the strategic customers hurt the profit
of the centralized supply chain as they do in the decentralized version.
Corollary 2. ΠNC
M
C > Π
NC
C
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CHAPTER 3
Quantity Commitments
In this chapter we discuss quantity commitment policies implemented by retailer and supplier
unilaterally or simultaneously by both of the supply chain parties and the impact these commit-
ments on firm profits. Quantity commitment (keeping quantities low) is one of the polices that
are recommended in supply chain literature to induce customers to buy early ie. scare away from
strategic waiting. This can be in the form of limited editions of various consumer goods or oc-
casional stock-outs to create scarcity. For example whenever Apple introduces a newer version of
iPhone or iPad it always is out of stock and customers have to pre-order. It is also common that
popular toys or electronics to go out of stock during the holiday season (Wingfield and Guth 2005).
Throughout this chapter we assume that the supply chain member who is making the quantity
commitment has in its disposition some sort of a commitment device, which convinces customers
that no more than the committed quantity will be available in the relevant periods. This could be
through a long term relationship of the seller and buyers or through the reputation of the seller.
However, the specific form and the details of the commitment device is beyond the scope of this
study. Our model captures the relationship between the supplier and retailer explicitly. Although
quantity commitments are assumed to be beneficial when customers are strategic we provide one
explanation to why they are not widely adopted, by demonstrating the inefficiencies that result
from lack of coordination and the strategic customer behavior in a decentralized supply chain.
In the following sections we first introduce the vertically integrated firm’s quantity commitment
benchmark, then we provide retailer’s and supplier’s maximum and period specific quantity com-
mitment scenarios. We also discuss the simultaneous quantity commitment model. We address our
main research question whether the quantity commitments are valuable when selling to strategic
customers in a decentralized supply chain.
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Supplier sets c1. Retailer sets p1,
commits to Qmax,
orders Q1
subject to Qmax.
Consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait.
Supplier sets c2 Retailer orders
Q2 subject to
Qmax sets p2.
Remaining consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait.
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events for retailer’s aggregate quantity commitment.
3.1 Centralized System Quantity Commitment Benchmark
Suppose that the vertically integrated firm that we introduced in Section 2.3 can make quantity
commitments. When the firm commits to sell a limited quantity, it does not sell more than the
committed quantity even when doing so would increase its profit.
Lemma 5. Suppose a centralized firm can make quantity commitment to sell no more than Qmax
units in two periods. In equilibrium, the firm sells its product only in period 1 at price p∗1 =
1
2 and
sets Q∗max =
1
2 .
When the firm can make a quantity commitment, it limits its sale to a single period to eliminate
the strategic behavior. Let ΠjC j : NC,QC show the centralized system’s profit when it cannot make
any commitments (NC) and when it can make quantity (QC) commitments. The following Theorem
compares the centralized firm’s profit in these scenarios.
Theorem 1. ΠNCC < Π
QC
C .
The Theorem shows that quantity commitments increase the centralized system’s profit. In the
rest of this chapter, we study the impact of such commitments for a decentralized system.
3.2 Retailer’s Quantity Commitment
Suppose that the retailer can credibly convince customers that it will not sell more units than its
committed quantity. The order of events is similar to our no-commitment model and summarized
in Figure 3.1.
When determining its period 1 procurement quantity Q1, the retailer commits not to sell more
than a total of Qmax units in two periods. Therefore, the retailer’s period 2 procurement quantity
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Q2 needs to satisfy Q2 ≤ Qmax − Q1. Otherwise, the order of events is the same as in our no-
commitment model shown in Figure 2.1. Note we show period-specific quantity commitments
rather than an aggregate commitment by the retailer lead to the same outcome (see Section 3.3).
We exploit the following Lemma for deriving the equilibrium.
Lemma 6. For any SPNE in which retailer’s quantity commitment does not bind, i.e., Q∗1 +Q∗2 <
Q∗max, there is an equivalent SPNE with the same outcome (wholesale and retail prices, quantities
and supplier and retailer profits) in which the retailer’s quantity commitment binds, i.e., Q∗1 +Q∗2 =
Q∗max.
Therefore, we can assume that the retailer’s quantity commitment binds in equilibrium with-
out loss of generality. This is because the retailer can always match the profit of a non-binding
commitment with a binding commitment by simply setting Q
′
max = Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2.
Let us define the critical period 2 wholesale price c¯2 below which the retailer finds it attractive
to procure all of its committed quantity. Thus, c¯2 solves Q
∗
2(c2) = Qmax − Q1. In order for the
retailer’s quantity commitment to bind, the following condition needs to be satisfied
dΠR,2
dQ2
∣∣∣∣
Q2=Qmax−Q1
≥ 0, and dΠS,2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
c2=c¯2
≤ 0. (3.1)
Basically, (3.1) ensures that it is optimal for the retailer to procure all of its committed quantity
given the supplier’s period 2 wholesale price, and it is not optimal for the supplier to increase
this price. Note that decreasing its wholesale price does not benefit the supplier in this case, as
the retailer cannot procure more than its committed quantity. The solution of (3.1) leads to the
following Lemma, which characterizes the firms’ equilibrium strategies in period 2.
Lemma 7. When the retailer’s quantity commitment binds, Q∗2 = Qmax−Q1, p∗2 = δ(1−Qmax) and
c∗2 = δ(2(1−Qmax)− θ¯) in a SPNE in period 2. This yields ΠR,2 = p∗2(Qmax− (1− θ¯))− c∗2Q∗2 and
ΠS,2 = c
∗
2Q
∗
2. Furthermore, the retailer quantity commitment binds if and only if Qmax ≤ Q1+12 − θ¯4 .
The Lemma shows that for the supplier to set a low enough wholesale price to persuade the
retailer to procure all of its remaining committed quantities in period 2, the retailer’s period 1
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price, quantity and commitment choices should satisfy Qmax ≤ Q1+12 − θ¯4 . Otherwise, given the
supplier’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s quantity commitment does not bind.
When the retailer’s commitment binds, it essentially dictates period 2 retail price p∗2 = δ(1 −
Qmax); therefore, customers do not need to form beliefs about the retailer’s order quantities to
conjecture its period 2 price p2. The marginal customer θ¯, who is indifferent between buying in
period 1 and waiting for period 2 then solves θ¯ − p1 = δθ¯ − p∗2 leading to
p1(θ¯, Qmax) = θ¯ − δ(Qmax − (1− θ¯)). (3.2)
The retailer’s margin loss resulting from strategic customer behavior, which is given by δ(Qmax −
(1−θ¯)), increases in the number of units the firm will sell in the second period, that is, Qmax−(1−θ¯).
Following Lemmas 6 and 7 and (3.2), we can now state the retailer’s period 1 problem in terms of
its order quantity Q1, commitment Qmax and target consumer segment [θ¯, 1] in period 1:
max
Q1,Qmax,θ¯
[1− θ¯] p1(θ¯, Qmax)−Q1c1 + ΠR,2(Q1, Qmax, θ¯) (3.3)
s.t. Qmax ≤ Q1 + 1
2
− θ¯
4
, (3.4)
Q1 ≤ Qmax, (3.5)
(Q1, θ¯) ∈ S′1. (3.6)
Note that S
′
1 is defined in (2.15). Lemmas 6 and 7 leads to condition (3.4) which ensures that the
quantity commitment binds in period 2. Condition (3.5) ensures that the quantity commitment is
honored in period 1. Similarly, (3.6) ensures that the sales quantity in period 1 is non-negative,
and it cannot be more than the retailer’s period 1 order quantity Q1. The solution of the retailer’s
problem in (3.3-3.6) leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment. Its SPNE order quantity
Q∗1, quantity commitment Q∗max, retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal customer θ¯∗ in
period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 <
√
16−5δ−1
5 , the retailer sells the product only in period 1 and the quantity commit-
ment binds strictly, where Q∗1 =
1−c1
2 , Q
∗
max =
1−c1
2 , p
∗
1 =
1+c1
2 and θ¯
∗ = 1+c12 .
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Regions in Proposition 5.
(ii) When
√
16−5δ−1
5 ≤ c1 < 8−3δ8 , the retailer sells the product in both periods, it does not carry
inventory between periods and the quantity commitment binds weakly, where Q∗1 =
8(1−c1)−3δ
16−5δ ,
Q∗max =
2(10−6c1)−7δ
2(16−5δ) , p
∗
1 =
(4(1+c1)−δ)(4−δ)
2(16−5δ) , and θ¯
∗ = 8(1+c1)−2δ16−5δ .
(iii) When c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 , the retailer sells the product only in period 2, it does not carry inventory
between periods and the quantity commitment binds weakly, where Q∗1 = 0, Q∗max =
1
4 , and
θ¯∗ = 1.
We say that the quantity commitment binds strictly (weakly) when the first inequality in (3.1)
holds strictly (weakly). In other words, when the commitment binds strictly, ordering more units
than its committed quantity would increase the retailer’s profit. In contrast, when the commitment
binds weakly, the retailer does not want to exceed its committed quantity. Figure 3.2 shows the
regions characterized by parts (i)-(iii). When period 1 wholesale price c1 is small enough as in part
(i), the quantity commitment enables the retailer to limit sales of the product to only period 1
similar to the centralized benchmark. However, when c1 is sufficiently high, the retailer sells the
product in period 2 as well and the quantity commitment does not bind strictly.
Finally, the supplier chooses c1 to maximize its total profit:
ΠS = c1Q
∗
1 + ΠS,2(c1, Q
∗
1, Q
∗
max, θ¯
∗),
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where Q∗1, Q∗max and θ¯∗ are given by Proposition 5 and ΠS,2 follows from Lemma 7. The follow-
ing Proposition describes the supplier’s optimal policy and completes the characterization of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment. The supplier’s SPNE
wholesale price c1 in period 1 is as follows. There exists δ¯1 ≈ 0.249 such that
(i) when δ ≤ δ¯1, c∗1 = 12 , and
(ii) when δ > δ¯1, c1 =
√
16−5δ−1
5 .
Note that δ¯1 is explicitly characterized in the proof of the proposition. Parts (i) and (ii) of
Proposition 6 map to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 5 respectively. Specifically, when δ is small,
the retailer’s quantity commitment binds strictly and the product is sold only in period 1, while
when δ is big, the commitment binds weakly and the product is sold in both periods.
These findings prepare us to address our key research question: How does the commitment
affect the retailer, the supplier and the whole supply chain? The following theorem answers this
question. Note that superscripts NC and RQC stand for no commitment and retailer’s quantity
commitment respectively.
Theorem 2. There exists δ¯2 ≈ 0.799 such that
(i) ΠNCS > Π
RQC
S ,
(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R > Π
RQC
S + Π
RQC
R ,
(iii) ΠNCR > Π
RQC
R when δ ≤ δ¯2.
Here, δ¯2 is explicitly characterized in the proof. The Theorem shows that, unlike the centralized
benchmark, the retailer can become worse off when it makes a quantity commitment. Furthermore,
this hurts the supplier as well as the whole supply chain. Similar to the centralized system bench-
mark, the retailer would have benefited from its quantity commitment if the supplier’s wholesale
prices were given exogenously, that is, if the supplier’s wholesale price stayed the same after the
retailer’s commitment. However, the retailer would benefit at the expense of the supplier in this
case as it will decrease its order quantity.
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Comparisons of Propositions 2 and 6 show that the supplier increases its period 1 wholesale
price when the retailer can make a quantity commitment, which exacerbates double marginalization
hurting both the retailer and supplier. In this case, if the supplier sets a relatively low price, the
retailer would restrict its sales to only period 1 using the quantity commitment and not buy any
units from the supplier in period 2. Because of this threat, the supplier sets a high price in period
1 to force the retailer to sell the product in both periods. As a result, both the supplier and the
retailer lose compared to no-commitment scenario. A high wholesale price in period 1 means that
the retailer can serve only the higher end of the market making the remaining customer segment
in period 2 attractive, which in turn, prevents the retailer from limiting its sale to only period 1.
Note, when δ > δ¯2, the retailer can benefit from its quantity commitment. Everything else being
equal, a high δ encourages customers to wait for period 2. Therefore, commitment can become more
attractive in that case as it discourages customers from waiting for a price mark-down.
3.3 Retailer’s Period Specific Quantity Commitment
In Section 3.2 retailer commits to Qmax, which limits the aggregate quantity that can be sold
over two periods. Here, we allow period-specific quantity commitments. Specifically, the retailer
can commit to Q1max and Q2max, which limit the quantities that can be sold in periods 1 and 2.
However, it is straightforward to show that aggregate and period-specific quantity commitments
by the retailer lead to the same outcome. Simply, any equilibrium outcome with an aggregate
quantity commitment Qmax can be replicated by period-specific quantity commitments (and vice
versa) by setting Q1max = Q1 and Q2max = Qmax−Q1. This happens because both Q1 and Q1max
are chosen by the retailer. Although period specific quantity commitment for retailer is the same
for retailer this can lead to different outcomes for supplier, which we will provide in the coming
sections.
3.4 Supplier’s Quantity Commitment
We now consider the supplier’s quantity commitment. In Section 3.2, we have seen that the
retailer’s quantity commitment always hurts the supplier. The next question becomes whether the
supplier can benefit from its own quantity commitment in a decentralized supply chain. Note that
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Supplier sets c1,
commits to Qmax.
Retailer sets p1,
orders Q1,
subject to Qmax.
Consumers
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to buy or wait.
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Qmax and
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Remaining consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait.
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 3.3: Sequence of events for supplier’s aggregate quantity commitment.
the supplier moves first and sets a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price; in other words the power
lies with the supplier in our model. One would expect the supplier to benefit, therefore, from its
quantity commitment. Indeed, here, we show that the supplier always benefits from a quantity
commitment.
Suppose that the supplier can commit to not selling more than a committed quantity. Specifi-
cally, before setting its wholesale price in period 1, the supplier announces that it will not sell more
than Qmax units in two periods. The order of events is shown in Figure 3.3.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our analysis to Qmax ∈ [1/4, 1/2], as is formally
stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose the supplier can commit to sell not more than Qmax units in two periods.
Qmax ≥ 14 in all equilibria. Furthermore, for any equilibrium with Qmax > 12 , there is an equivalent
equilibrium with Qmax =
1
2 , which yields the same payoffs to all parties (supplier, retailer and
customers).
We follow backward induction to characterize the equilibrium starting with period 2. Following
Lemma 7, the quantity commitment binds; that is, the retailer buys all of the supplier’s committed
quantity in period 2, if and only if
Qmax ≤ Q1 + 1
2
− θ¯
4
. (3.7)
Thus, when (3.7) holds, period 2 equilibrium is given by Lemma 7. On the other hand, when
(3.7) does not hold, the commitment is ineffective, and period 2 equilibrium is the same as in a
no-commitment scenario, which is given by Lemma 1.
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Note that the retailer’s period 1 choices determine whether the commitment will bind in period
2, that is, whether (3.7) will hold. When the commitment binds, i.e., (3.7) holds, the retailer’s
profit is given by (3.3). In contrast, when the commitment does not bind, i.e., (3.7) does not hold,
the retailer’s profit is given by (2.12). Solving the retailer’s maximum profit for both cases and
comparing them, we determine the retailer’s optimal policy in period 1. However, overall profit
function for the retailer is not quasiconcave. In addition, the profit for the case when commitment
binds is not a concave function. This lack of concavity leads to many cases of the following
Proposition where we describe the optimal policy in period 1.
Proposition 7. Suppose the supplier commits to sell not more than Qmax ∈ [1/4, 1/2] units in two
periods. The retailer’s SPNE policy is characterized as follows.
(i) The quantity commitment binds strictly, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
carries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1−c1−3δQmax
2(1−2δ) , p
∗
1 =
1+δ(1−c1)+δ(Qmax(1+δ)−3)
2(1−2δ) and
θ¯∗ = 1+c1−δ(4−3Qmax)2(1−2δ) , when δ < 1/2,
1−c1
2−δ < Qmax <
5−3c1−4δ
8−7δ .
(ii) The quantity commitment binds strictly, the retailer sells the product only in period 1 with
Q∗1 = Qmax and p∗1 = θ¯∗ = 1−Qmax, when
a) δ < 1/2, Qmax ≤ 1−c12−δ ,
b.1) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 ≤ 2(1−δ)(5δ−1)23−25δ , Qmax < K1,
b.2) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 > 2(1−δ)(5δ−1)23−25δ , Qmax ≤ 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ .
(iii) The quantity commitment binds weakly, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1
3(4Qmax − 1), p∗1 = 13(4− δ)(1−Qmax),
and θ¯∗ = 43(1−Qmax), when
a) δ < 1/2, 5−3c1−4δ8−7δ ≤ Qmax ≤ 12 + 2(1−3c1)16−9δ ,
b.1) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 ≤ Kc, 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ < Qmax < 10+3c1−14δ4(4−5δ) ,
b.2) δ ≥ 1/2, Kc < c1 ≤ 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) , 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ < Qmax < K2,
b.3) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 > 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) , 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ < Qmax ≤ 12 + 2(1−3c1)16−9δ .
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(iv) The quantity commitment binds weakly, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it car-
ries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
4Qmax(4−3δ)−6(1−δ)
4(2−δ) , p
∗
1 =
2+(1−δ)(4δ−c1)−2δ(4−3δ)Qmax
2(2−δ)
and θ¯∗ = 2−c1+2δ(1−2Qmax)2(2−δ) , when max(K1,
10+3c1−14δ
4(4−5δ) ) ≤ Qmax ≤ K3.
(v) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
carries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
11
14 − c1(112−91δ)+6δ21δ(8−7δ) , p∗1 = 12 − 4(5−4δ)c1−9δ(1−δ)6(8−7δ) ,
and θ¯∗ = 3(4−3δ)+2c13(8−7δ) , when
a) c1 ≤ Kc,Qmax ≥ K3,
b) Kc < c1 ≤ 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) , Qmax ≥ K2.
(vi) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both periods and
it does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
8(1−c1)−3δ
16−9δ , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4+4c1−3δ)
2(16−9δ) , and
θ¯∗ = 8(1+c1)−6δ16−9δ , when
a) δ < 1/2, c1 ≤ 8−3δ8 , Qmax ≥ 12 + 2(1−3c1)16−9δ ,
b) δ ≥ 1/2, 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) < c1 ≤ 8−3δ8 , Qmax ≥ 12 + 2(1−3c1)16−9δ .
When c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 , the retailer does not procure any units in period 1. The thresholds K1,K2,K3
and Kc are defined as follows.
K1 =
4 + 4c1 − 14δ
4(2− 5δ) +
√
(2− δ)
(
3c21
2(1−δ) + δ − 2c1
)
2(2− 5δ) (3.8)
K2 =
20− 12c1 − 7δ
2(16− 5δ) +
√
2δ(K2a −K2b)
2δ(16− 5δ)(8− 7δ) (3.9)
K2a = 3c1δ(512− 992δ + 496δ2 − 13δ3) + 9δ2(32− 88δ + 68δ2 − 13δ3)
K2b = 2c
2
1(3072− 8576δ + 7980δ2 − 2479δ3)
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K3 =
δ(6(1− δ)− c1)
√
2(2− δ)(16− 13δ) + 6δ(8− 7δ)2 − c1(192− δ(312− 126δ))
12δ(6− 5δ)(8− 7δ) (3.10)
Kc =
6δ
(
1024− 2496δ + 2128δ2 − 783δ3 + 130δ4 + (4− 5δ)(8− 7δ)(8− 9δ)√2(2− δ)(16− 13δ))
49152− δ(161792− δ(196288− 5δ(20672− 3943δ)))
(3.11)
Next, we study the supplier’s optimal wholesale price and commitment quantity in period 1,
which completes the analysis of the equilibrium. The next proposition describes the supplier’s
optimal policy. Let ΠS(Qmax, c1) show the supplier’s total profit when it commits to Qmax and
sets the wholesale price c1 in period 1.
Proposition 8. The supplier’s SPNE wholesale price c∗1 and quantity commitment Q∗max are as
follows.
(i) When δ < 1/2, Q∗max =
1
2(2−δ) and c
∗
1 = 1/2.
(ii) When 1/2 ≤ δ < 199−3
√
137
218 , Q
∗
max =
2−δ
7−5δ and c
∗
1 =
2−δ
3 .
(iii) When 199−3
√
137
218 ≤ δ < δ¯3, Q∗max = 716 and c∗1 = 16−3δ32 .
(iv) When δ¯3 ≤ δ, Q∗max = K2 and c∗1 = arg maxc1 ΠS(K2, c1),
where δ¯3 ≈ 0.754 and it is given by the solution of (B.26) in Appendix B.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 8 map to part (ii) of Proposition 7; in this case, quantity
commitment binds strictly. Similarly, parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 8 map to part (iii) of
Proposition 7; in this case, quantity commitment binds weakly. Thus, the supplier always finds it
attractive to choose a binding (weakly or strictly) quantity commitment. Note that the supplier
can always match the outcome of a no-commitment scenario by committing to non-binding arbi-
trarily large quantity. Thus, the supplier should always benefit from its ability to make a quantity
commitment. This is formally stated in the following Theorem. Let superscripts NC and SQC
denote no commitment and supplier’s quantity commitment respectively.
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Theorem 3. (i) ΠNCS ≤ ΠSQCS .
(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R ≤ ΠSQCS + ΠSQCR .
(iii) ΠNCR ≥ ΠSQCR when δ < δ¯4.
Note δ¯4 ≈ 0.674 and it is explicitly characterized in the proof of this theorem. Because the
supplier moves first, it can always match the outcome of a no-commitment scenario by committing
to a non-binding arbitrarily large quantity. Thus, the supplier always benefits from its ability to
make a quantity commitment. Furthermore, when the quantity commitment binds strictly, the
supplier’s profit increases strictly. In this case, the product is sold only in period 1. However,
the supplier’s commitment can hurt the retailer. This happens because the supplier commits to a
smaller quantity than that of the centralized benchmark in order to keep a high wholesale price.
Because quantity commitment discourages customers from waiting for a price mark-down, this
benefit would be more valuable when they are more inclined to wait, i.e., when δ is high. Therefore,
similar to Theorem 2, supplier’s commitment can also help the retailer when δ is sufficiently high.
While the supplier’s quantity commitment improves the total supply chain profit, it does not
eliminate the loss due to forward-looking customers: The myopic consumers benchmark in Sec-
tion 2.2 results in a higher profit. Similarly, double marginalization inefficiency is not eliminated;
the centralized benchmark also results in a higher profit.
3.5 Supplier’s Period-specific Quantity Commitment
In Section 3.4 the supplier makes a maximum quantity commitment where it does not sell more
than a pre-announced quantity. In this section we analyze the policy where supplier is allowed to
make one quantity commitment for each period. The sequence of events is shown in Figure 3.4.
Recall that when retailer implements this policy it is not different than its maximum quantity
commitment.
Lemma 9. Suppose the supplier can make period-specific quantity commitments Q1max and Q2max.
It is never optimal for the supplier to make a strictly binding commitment in period 1.
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Figure 3.4: Sequence of events for supplier’s period specific quantity commitment.
Essentially, it is more profitable for the supplier to sell in period 1, thus it does not want to limit
the sales in that period. On the other hand, the sales quantity in period 2 is critical for consumers’
tendency to wait for mark-down, therefore limiting the sales in period 2 can be beneficial.
Following Lemma 9 supplier makes a binding quantity commitment only in period 2. Similar to
(3.1) let us define the critical period 2 whole sale price c¯2 below which retailer finds it attractive to
procure all of this quantity. Thus, c¯2 solves Q
∗
2(c2) = Q2max. In order for supplier’s second period
quantity commitment to bind, the following conditions need to be satisfied.
dΠR,2
dQ2
∣∣∣∣
Q2=Q2max
≥ 0, and dΠS,2
dc2
∣∣∣∣
c2=c¯2
≤ 0. (3.12)
Basically, (3.12) ensures that retailer procures all of the commitment quantity given supplier’s
second period wholesale price and it is not optimal for supplier to increase this price. The solution
of (3.12) leads to the following Lemma, which characterizes the firms’ equilibrium strategies in
period 2.
Lemma 10. When supplier’s period 2 quantity commitment binds, Q∗2 = Q2max, p∗2 = δ(1 −
Q1 − Q2max) and c∗2 = δ(2(1 − Q1 − Q2max) − θ¯) in a SPNE in period 2. This yields ΠR,2 =
p∗2(Q1 + Q2max − (1 − θ¯)) − c∗2Q∗2 and ΠS,2 = c∗2Q∗2. Furthermore, the supplier’s second period
quantity commitment binds if and only if Q2max ≤ 14(2(1−Q1)− θ¯).
Following lemma 10 retailer buys all of supplier’s commitment quantity in period 2, if and only
if
Q2max ≤ 1
4
(2(1−Q1)− θ¯). (3.13)
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Thus, when (3.13) holds, period 2 equilibrium is given by lemma 10. On the other hand, when
(3.13) does not hold the commitment is ineffective, and period 2 equilibrium is the same as the
no-commitment scenario, which is given by lemma 1. Retailer’s period 1 choices determine whether
the commitment in period 2 will bind. When the commitment binds i.e. (3.13) holds the retailer’s
objective function is given by the equation below.
[1− θ¯]p1(θ¯, Qˆ1, Q2max)−Q1c1 + ΠR,2(θ¯, Q1, Q2max) (3.14)
On the other hand, when the commitment does not bind, i.e., (3.13) does not hold, the retailer’s
profit is given by (2.12). We determine the retailer’s optimal policy in period 1 by solving for both
of the cases, which is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose the supplier commits to sell not more than Q2max units in period 2. The
retailer’s SPNE policy is characterized as follows.
(i) The quantity commitment binds, the retailer sells the product in both periods and
it carries inventory in between periods with Q∗1 =
1
4
(
3− 2c1δ − δQ2max1−δ
)
, p∗1 =
1
4
(
2 + 2c1 − δ − (2−3δ)δQ2max1−δ
)
and θ¯∗ = 1−δ(1−Q2max)2(1−δ) when
(2c1−δ)(1−δ)
δ2
< Q2max <
c1
4δ .
(ii) The quantity commitment binds, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it does
not carry inventory in between periods with Q∗1 =
1−c1−δQ2max
2−δ , p
∗
1 =
c1+(1−δ)(1−δQ2max)
2−δ and
θ¯∗ = 1+c1−δ(1−Q2max)2−δ when Q2max ≤ min
(
(2c1−δ)(1−δ)
δ2
, 1+c1−δ8−5δ ,
1−c1
δ
)
.
(iii) The quantity commitment binds, the retailer sells the product only in period 2 and it does not
procure any units in period 1 with Q∗1 = 0 and θ¯∗ = 1 when
1−c1
δ < Q2max.
(iv) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both peri-
ods and it carries inventory in between periods with Q∗1 =
6−c1−δ(6−18Q2max)−16Q2max
8(1−δ) ,
p∗1 =
(2+c1−2δ)(2−δ)+2δ(2−3δ)Q2max
8(1−δ) and θ¯
∗ = 2(1−δ(1+Q2max))+c14(1−δ) when
c1
4δ ≤ Q2max <
min
(
c1
3δ ,
2(1−δ)+c1
2(8−7δ)
)
.
(v) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory in between periods with Q∗1 = 1 − 4Q2max, p∗1 = (4 − δ)Q2max and
θ¯∗ = 4Q2max when max
(
2(1−δ)+c1
2(8−7δ) ,
1+c1−δ
8−5δ
)
≤ Q2max < min
(
c1
3δ ,
4(1+c1)−3δ
2(16−9δ)
)
.
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(vi) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
carries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
11
14 − c1(112−91δ)+6δ21δ(8−7δ) , p∗1 = 12 − 4(5−4δ)c1−9δ(1−δ)6(8−7δ) ,
and θ¯∗ = 3(4−3δ)+2c13(8−7δ) , when c1 <
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) and Q2max ≥ c13δ .
(vii) The quantity commitment does not bind, the retailer sells the product in both periods and
it does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
8(1−c1)−3δ
16−9δ , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4+4c1−3δ)
2(16−9δ) , and
θ¯∗ = 8(1+c1)−6δ16−9δ , when
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) ≤ c1 and Q2max ≥ 4(1+c1)−3δ2(16−9δ)
Next we solve the supplier’s optimization problem to completely characterize the equilibrium.
The supplier maximizes c1Q
∗
1+c
∗
2Q2max, where Q
∗
1 and c
∗
2 are given by Proposition 9 and Lemma 10.
The following proposition gives the solution to this problem.
Proposition 10. Suppose the supplier commits to sell not more than Q2max units in period 2. The
equilibrium whole sale price c∗1 =
1
2 and the commitment quantity Q
∗
2max =
1−δ
2(4−3δ) , which yields
c∗2 =
δ
2 , p
∗
2 =
δ(5−4δ)
2(4−3δ) and Q
∗
2 =
1−δ
2(4−3δ) .
The equilibrium solution corresponds to part (ii) of Proposition 9, hence in equilibrium supplier
sets a first period wholesale price and commits to a second period quantity such that retailer buys
and sells in both periods but does not carry inventory. Next we discuss the impact of this policy
on profits. Let ΠSQC2S show the supplier’s profit when it commits to not selling more than Q2max
units in period 2.
Theorem 4. (i) ΠNCS < Π
SQC2
S .
(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R < Π
SQC2
S + Π
SQC2
R .
(iii) ΠNCR > Π
SQC2
R .
Similar to maximum quantity commitment, the supplier’s period specific quantity commitment
hurts the retailer while benefiting itself (see Theorem 3). The only difference is that the retailer
always suffers from the supplier’s period-specific quantity commitment whereas the retailer may
benefit from the supplier’s aggregate quantity commitments when discount factor δ is sufficiently
high. This happens because when the supplier commits to the aggregate quantity, the retailer has
the flexibility to allocate this quantity over the two periods and it can manipulate period 2 wholesale
price through carrying inventory. In contrast the supplier’s period-specific quantity commitment
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takes away the retailer’s flexibility and reduces its ability to manipulate wholesale price. Because of
this benefit, the supplier achieves a higher profit by committing only to a period 2 quantity instead
of making an aggregate quantity commitment as formally stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3. ΠSQC2S > Π
SQC
S .
Interestingly, the Corollary shows that the supplier can do better by limiting only its last period
sales rather than trying to control its total sales. Intuitively, limiting period 2 sales is more aligned
with the supplier’s objective of pushing sales to period 1, which enables setting a higher wholesale
price.
3.6 Simultaneous Quantity Commitment
In Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, the supplier and retailer make unilateral quantity quantity
commitments. Here, we consider their simultaneous commitments. In particular, we illustrate that
they continue to suffer from commitments showing that the problem is due to lack of coordination
and is not resolved by concurrent commitments.
Suppose both the supplier and the retailer can make independent quantity commitments fol-
lowing the same sequence of events as in Sections 3.2 and 3.4. Let ΠsQCi , i : S,R show the supplier’s
and retailer’s profit under this scenario. In equilibrium, either the supplier’s or the retailer’s quan-
tity commitment would dominate. For example, if the supplier sets a more stringent quantity
commitment, the retailer’s quantity commitment becomes irrelevant and vice versa. The following
theorem shows the impact of these commitments on their profitability.
Theorem 5. There exists δ¯1 ≈ 0.249 and δ¯4 ≈ 0.674 such that
(i) ΠNCS > Π
sQC
S when δ ≤ δ¯1.
(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R > Π
sQC
S + Π
sQC
R when δ ≤ δ¯1.
(iii) ΠsNCR ≥ ΠsQCR when δ < δ¯4.
Note δ¯1 and δ¯4 are given by the solutions of (B.16) and (B.28) in Appendix B.
The Theorem illustrates that the supplier and the retailer as well as the entire supply chain can
get worse off due to simultaneous quantity commitments. Recall that the supplier always benefits
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from its own unilateral quantity commitments. However, simultaneous quantity commitment can
hurt its profitability when δ < δ¯1, because the retailer’s quantity commitment dominates in this
case.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we provided analysis of several quantity commitment polices in a supply chain
selling to strategic customers. We first presented the vertically integrated supply chain and showed
that a quantity commitment strategy works well to prevent forward looking customers to wait for
a price markdown. Motivated by this result we implemented the same policy on a decentralized
system, which makes quantity commitments either by the retailer or the supplier unilaterally as well
as simultaneously. We find that contrary to the centralized system result, in a decentralized supply
chain unilateral or the simultaneous quantity commitments exacerbate the coordination problem
even further. When compared to the no-commitment scenario retailer’s quantity commitments not
only hurts itself but also the supplier and the supply chain. For the supplier, however, since it has
the first mover advantage in our model, it can always match the no-commitment outcome with
a quantity commitment. Therefore, its quantity commitment profit is expected to be at least as
good as the no-commitment scenario. Indeed we show that this is the case. However, we show
that this happens in the expense of retailer as retailer’s profit gets worse off when supplier makes
either an aggregate or period specific quantity commitments. We also show that supplier would
benefit more from a period specific quantity commitment rather than an aggregate version since this
policy gives better control on how to allocate the commitment quantity to each period. As expected
though this increase in supplier’s profit is again in the expense of the retailer’s profit. We conclude
the chapter by analyzing the simultaneous commitments and show that the decentralized system
still suffers from coordination problem and the supplier, although in its own quantity commitment
always benefits can get worse off this time when the retailer’s quantity commitment dominates in
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 4
Price Commitments
In this chapter we discuss price commitment policies implemented by retailer, supplier or both
of the supply chain parties and the impact of these policies on firms’ profits. Strategic customer
behavior has been recognized in the retail industry for the last decade. For example Best Buy’s
former CEO has labeled some customers as “devils” since they were constantly searching for clear-
ance prices. This segment of the customers are not profitable and he said in an interview that these
customers could wreak enormous economic havoc (McWilliams 2004). Markdown optimization is
one of the tools retailers have widely adopted to prevent this kind of profit loss. They help dy-
namically adjusting prices in an hope for eliminating deep price cuts. When customers are forward
looking price commitments are the recommended practice in the literature that might prove useful.
Price commitment can eliminate the markdown opportunity completely or restrict the degree of
price drop. However, although the assumed benefits,s price commitments are not widely seen in
the industry. Firms dynamically adjust their prices but they usually do not pre-announce their
price path through the selling period. In this chapter we model the price commitment policies in a
decentralized supply chain by explicitly showing the interactions between the supplier and retailer.
We show that when the coordination problem in a supply chain is not addressed price commitments
alone do not provide the benefits that they are promised.
In the following sections we first introduce the vertically integrated firm’s price commitment
benchmark, then we provide retailer’s and supplier’s unilateral price commitment models. We also
analyze the simultaneous price commitment. We address our main research question whether the
price commitments are valuable when selling to strategic customers in a decentralized supply chain.
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4.1 Centralized System Price Commitment Benchmark
Suppose that the vertically integrated firm that we introduced in Section 2.3 can make price
commitments. When the firm credibly commits to a future price p2, which can be different than
p1, it does not change its committed price in period 2 even when this deviation would increase its
profit. When the centralized firm makes a price commitment it restricts the sales to the first period.
Therefore, the equilibrium with the price commitment is actually not different than the equilibrium
with the quantity commitment. For completeness we repeat the price commitment version of the
results provided in Section 3.1.
Lemma 11. Suppose a centralized firm can commit to future price. In equilibrium, the firm sells
its product only in period 1 at price p∗1 =
1
2 .
When the firm can make a price commitment, it limits its sale to a single period to eliminate
the strategic behavior. Let ΠjC j : NC,PC show the centralized system’s profit when it cannot make
any commitments (NC) and when it can make price (PC) commitments. The following Theorem
compares the centralized firm’s profit in these scenarios.
Theorem 6. ΠNCC < Π
PC
C .
The Theorem shows that price commitments increase the centralized system’s profit. In the
rest of this chapter, we study the impact of such commitments for a decentralized system.
4.2 Retailer’s Price Commitment
Suppose that the retailer can credibly commit to a future retail price. This means that when
setting the retail price p1 in period 1, the retailer also commits to period 2 retail price p2. The
order of events is shown in Figure 4.1. We derive the equilibrium using backward induction. The
following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium in period 2.
Lemma 12. When the retailer commits to a future retail price, it does not procure any units in
period 2 in equilibrium, that is, Q∗2 = 0.
Because the retailer already commits to period 2 price p2 before the supplier sets its period 2
wholesale price c2, the supplier has no incentive to set a wholesale price c2 smaller than p2. Because
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Supplier sets c1. Retailer orders
Q1 sets p1 and
commits to p2.
Consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait.
Supplier sets c2 Retailer orders
Q2.
Remaining consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait.
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 4.1: Sequence of events when retailer commits to prices.
the retailer’s sales quantity in period 2 and its order quantity Q2 do not depend on c2 as long as
c2 ≤ p2. Anticipating this response, the retailer procures all of its needed units in period 1.
Following Lemma 12, similar to the centralized system benchmark, the retailer limits its sales to
only period 1 by committing that period 2 retail price will not be attractive. The next proposition
characterizes the resulting equilibrium.
Proposition 11. Suppose the retailer can commit to a future retail price. The SPNE is as follows.
(i) Given the wholesale price c1, the retailer orders Q
∗
1 =
1−c1
2 , sets p
∗
1 =
1+c1
2 in period 1 and it
does not sell the product in period 2 by committing to a sufficiently high p2 in period 1.
(ii) The supplier chooses c∗1 =
1
2 .
It is straightforward to show that the retailer would benefit from limiting its sales to only period
1, which eliminates the strategic customer behavior, if the supplier’s wholesale prices stay the same
as in the no-commitment scenario. How do the changes in supplier’s wholesale prices impact the
value of commitment? This is addressed by the next Theorem. Note that superscripts NC and
RPC stand for no commitment and retailer’s price commitment respectively.
Theorem 7. (i) ΠNCS > Π
RPC
S .
(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R > Π
RPC
S + Π
RPC
R .
(iii) ΠNCR > Π
RPC
R .
Similar to quantity commitment, committing to a future retail price hurts the retailer’s prof-
itability due to how it affects supplier’s pricing. This also makes the supplier as well as the whole
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decide whether
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Figure 4.2: Sequence of events when supplier commits to prices.
supply chain worse off. The retailer’s price commitment amplifies double marginalization ineffi-
ciency as a result of two factors. First, absent any commitments the retailer procures units in both
periods where period 2 wholesale price is always cheaper than that of period 1. In contrast, with
price commitment, the retailer procures units only in period 1 at a single wholesale price. When
the supplier sells the product at two different prices, double marginalization is alleviated. This
benefit vanishes with retailer’s price commitment. Second, a comparison of Propositions 2 and 11
shows that the supplier sets a higher wholesale price c1 when the retailer can commit to prices.
The supplier sets a higher c1 anticipating that the retailer is going to limit its sales to only period
1.
Overall, Theorems 2 and 7 show that retailer’s price and quantity commitments can hurt
profitability of both itself and its supplier. The vertical relation between the retailer and the
supplier, which leads to double-marginalization, is the key driver of this result. In particular,
endogenous wholesale price is critical. Commitments would be beneficial if the wholesale price
was exogenous (so the supplier does not react to retailer’s commitments) or if the model did not
consider the supplier at all as in the centralized benchmark (see Theorem 1).
4.3 Supplier’s Price Commitment
In this section, we discuss what happens when the supplier commits to future wholesale prices.
In particular, while setting period 1 wholesale price c1 before the beginning of period 1, the supplier
also commits to period 2 wholesale price c2. The order of events is shown in Figure 4.2.
We derive the equilibrium following backward induction. The following Lemma describes the
equilibrium in period 2.
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Lemma 13. Suppose that the supplier commits to wholesale prices c1 and c2, the retailer orders
Q1 in period 1 and consumer segment [0, θ¯) remain in the market in period 2. The retailer then
orders Q∗2 = max(
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c2
2δ , 0) units and sets p
∗
2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q∗2) in period 2.
The marginal customer θ¯, who is indifferent about whether to buy in period 1 or to wait for
period 2, solves the following equation
θ¯ − p1 = δθ¯ − p∗2,
where the left and right hand sides correspond to the utility of buying in period 1 and 2 respectively.
Following Lemma 13, this leads to
θ¯ =
2p1 − c2
2− δ . (4.1)
Note that (4.1) is independent of the retailer’s period 1 order quantity Q1; in other words, in
their purchasing decisions in period 1, customers do not need to rely on their beliefs about Q1.
Intuitively, when the supplier already commits to a period 2 wholesale price in period 1, the retailer
has no incentive to carry inventory into period 2. Recall that, in our model, the retailer carries
inventory only to get a better wholesale price in period 2. Therefore, to conjecture period 2 retail
price in period 1, customers do not need to know Q1. Rearranging (4.1), we get
p1(θ¯) =
(2− δ)θ¯ + c2
2
. (4.2)
The retailer then in period 1 solves the following problem to maximize his total profit in two periods
max
(Q1,θ¯)∈S′1
[(1− θ¯)p1(θ¯)−Q1c1 +Q∗2(p∗2 − c2)], (4.3)
where Q∗2 and p∗2 are given in Lemma 13 and S
′
1 is defined in (2.15), which states that the retailer’s
sales quantity in period 1 should be non-negative and cannot exceed Q1. The solution of (4.3) leads
to the following Proposition.
Proposition 12. Suppose the supplier commits to wholesale prices c1 and c2. The retailer’s SPNE
order quantity Q∗1, and retail price p∗1 in period 1 are as follows.
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(i) When c2 ≤ c1 + δ − 1, the retailer sells the product only in period 2, where Q∗1 = 0 and
p∗1 = 1 +
c2−δ
2 .
(ii) When c1 + δ − 1 < c2 < δ(2+2c1−δ)4−δ , the retailer sells the product in both periods, where
Q∗1 =
2(1−c1+c2−δ)
4−3δ and p
∗
1 =
4+2c1(2−δ)−(4+c2−δ)δ
2(4−3δ) .
(iii) When δ(2+2c1−δ)4−δ ≤ c2 < δ(1+c1)2 , the retailer sells the product only in period 1, where Q∗1 =
1− c2δ and p∗1 = c2δ .
(iv) When c2 ≥ δ(1+c1)2 , the retailer sells the product only in period 1, where Q∗1 = 1−c12 and
p∗1 =
1+c1
2 .
The retailer does not carry inventory between periods in all cases, thus the marginal customer is
given by θ¯∗ = 1−Q∗1.
Note that c1− c2 difference decreases going from part (i) to (iv), which, as expected, shifts the
retailer’s sales from the second period to the first period.
Finally, we need to solve the supplier’s problem to completely characterize the equilibrium.
The supplier maximizes c1Q
∗
1 + c2Q
∗
2 where Q
∗
1 and Q
∗
2 are given by Proposition 12 and Lemma 13.
The solution of this problem is given by the next Proposition.
Proposition 13. Suppose the supplier can commit to future wholesale prices. The equilibrium
wholesale prices c1 and c2 are as follows.
(i) When δ ≤ 1− 1√
17
, c∗1 =
16−(14−δ)δ
2(16−13δ) and c
∗
2 =
2δ(5−4δ)
16−13δ .
(ii) When δ > 1− 1√
17
, c∗1 = c∗2 =
δ(6−5δ)
2(4−3δ) .
Both parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 13 correspond to part (ii) of Proposition 12; that is, in
equilibrium the supplier commits to wholesale prices that induces the retailer to buy and sell the
product in both periods.
The next theorem addresses our key research question. What is the value of the supplier’s
commitment for the supplier itself, for the retailer and for the whole supply chain? Note that
superscripts NC and SPC stand for no commitment and supplier’s price commitment respectively.
Theorem 8. (i) ΠNCS > Π
SPC
S .
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(ii) ΠNCS + Π
NC
R > Π
SPC
S + Π
SPC
R .
(iii) ΠNCR > Π
SPC
R .
The Theorem shows that similar to the retailer’s commitments, the supplier need not benefit
from its ability to make price commitments. Furthermore, the supplier’s price commitment not only
hurts its own profitability but also that of the retailer, making the whole supply chain worse off. This
happens because the supplier’s price commitment increases the inefficiency due to decentralization.
When the supplier does not make price commitments, its period 2 wholesale price c2 decreases in
the retailer’s period 1 procurement quantity Q1, as seen in Lemma 1.ii. In other words, buying
a larger quantity in period 1 allows the retailer to receive a lower wholesale price in period 2.
This mimics a quantity discount mechanism and alleviates the double marginalization inefficiency.
However, when the supplier already commits to a period 2 wholesale price in period 1, the retailer’s
incentive to buy more to pay less later vanishes. Knowing this, the supplier sets a higher period 1
wholesale price (see Propositions 2 and 13) which increases the double marginalization inefficiency.
Note that the supplier’s quantity commitment, on the other hand, maintains the retailer’s incentive
by preserving the relation between period 1 order quantity and period 2 wholesale price.
The impact of supplier’s price commitment on retailer’s ordering policy is the key driver of
Theorem 8. Dynamic wholesale pricing in our base model is critical for this result because dynamic
wholesale prices encourages the retailer to act strategically by buying a larger quantity in period
1 in order to receive a lower wholesale price in period 2. As explained above, wholesale price
commitment hurts the supply chain because it eliminates the retailer’s incentive to buy more early
on.
4.4 Simultaneous Price Commitment
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the supplier and retailer make unilateral price commitments. Here, we
consider their simultaneous commitments. In particular, we illustrate that they continue to suffer
from price commitments unless the coordination problem is resolved.
Suppose both the supplier and retailer can make price commitments following the same sequence
of events as in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The following proposition shows that the retailer’s price
commitment always dominates in this case.
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Proposition 14. When both the retailer and the supplier can make price commitments, the result-
ing equilibrium is same as that of the retailer’s unilateral price commitment.
Essentially, the retailer restricts its sales to only period 1 in equilibrium, therefore, the sup-
plier’s price commitment (to period 2 wholesale price) becomes irrelevant. Because the resulting
equilibrium is identical to the retailer’s unilateral price commitment, both the supplier and the
retailer get worse off compared to no commitment scenario as shown in Theorem 7.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we looked into unilateral and simultaneous price commitments implemented by
the retailer and supplier in a decentralized supply chain with forward looking customers. We first
provided the result that price commitments when made by a vertically integrated firm increase
the profit. We then analyze price commitment policy on the decentralized system by explicitly
modeling the interactions between the supply chain members. We find that price commitments
cause the double marginalization problem to become even worse when either the retailer or the
supplier makes the price commitment. In addition the whole supply chain gets worse off. Note that
in Chapter 3 we saw that supplier’s quantity commitment helps itself. However, here we showed
that it is not the case with price commitment. We also provided the simultaneous price commitment
scenario and showed that the result would not be different than retailer’s price commitment since
in equilibrium retailer restricts the sale to only period 1.
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CHAPTER 5
Quantity vs. Price Commitments: A Comparison
In this chapter we compare the equilibrium profits of retailer and supplier under different
commitment strategies. This provides insights about different commitment scenarios and how they
perform for various levels of strategic behavior of customers.
5.1 Retailer’s Profit Under Different Commitment Scenarios
We present the retailer profit comparison in figure 5.1. Since retailer sells only in first period
when δ ≤ δ¯1 price and quantity commitments result in the same profit for retailer. For medium δ
range retailer prefers committing to price rather than quantity, however for very large δ it prefers
committing to quantity. Note that as δ increases the level of strategic behavior of customers
as well as the value of the product in second period increases. When the retailer commits to a
maximum quantity, the supplier can still manipulate the total sales quantity and its allocation to
two periods through its choice of wholesale prices. In contrast, the retailer’s price commitments
directly determine the sales quantity in each period. When retailer commits to quantity and sells
the product in both periods, ie. in medium δ range supplier’s wholesale price choices hurts retailer.
However, when product is sufficiently valuable in second period, quantity commitment performs
better than price commitment due to the additional profit retailer can get from second period and
still can sustain a sufficiently high price.
Retailer prefers committing to price itself rather than supplier for every δ value. Note that
the supplier’s and retailer’s dynamic pricing have different effects. The retailer’s dynamic pricing
encourages consumers to wait for a mark-down, thereby shifting consumer demand to period 2.
In contrast, the supplier’s dynamic pricing encourages the retailer to buy more early on, thereby
shifting retailer demand to period 1. When supplier commits to wholesale prices it keeps the second
period price sufficiently low that retailer always replenishes, which increases the total quantity sold.
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Figure 5.1: Retailer profits comparison under every commitment scenario.
However, this helps supplier to extract more of retailer’s profit therefore supplier’s price commitment
hurts retailer more than its own price commitment. For high δ, specifically when δ > 0.58 supplier’s
aggregate quantity commitment is the best commitment scenario for retailer. However, supplier’s
period specific quantity commitment hurts the retailer the most.
Next we study the policy when retailer can make not only a quantity but also a price commit-
ment concurrently. This will answer the question whether retailer would benefit from committing
to price when it can also commit to quantity.
5.2 Retailer’s Concurrent Price and Quantity Commitment
In this section we provide the equilibrium for the retailer’s concurrent price and quantity
commitments. In this case when retailer tells the first period retail price, he not only tells the
second period price but also commits to a maximum quantity to sell over two periods. The following
lemma describes the second period values.
Lemma 14. When retailer commits to both price and quantity then Q∗2 = Qmax − Q1, p∗2 =
δ(1−Qmax) and c∗2 = p∗2.
Note that similar to retailer’s price commitment in Section 4.2, since retailer tells the second
period price before supplier announces the second period wholesale price supplier has no incentive
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to set c2 lower than p2, which drives the above result. In the following proposition we provide the
equilibrium values in period 1.
Proposition 15. Suppose the retailer can commit to both future price and a maximum quantity.
The SPNE is as follows. Given the wholesale price c1, the retailer orders Q
∗
max = Q
∗
1 =
1−c1
2 and
sets p∗1 =
1+c1
2 in period 1. The supplier chooses c
∗
1 =
1
2 .
In equilibrium retailer restricts the sale only to the first period. Note that this is possible only
during δ ≤ δ¯1 when retailer commits to quantity alone. Committing to prices also makes this
strategy optimal in equilibrium for every δ value. However, this takes away the benefit of making
sales in second period when the product value is high with high δ values, where retailer’s quantity
commitments performs better than its price commitment.
Note that equilibrium is the same as retailer’s price commitment therefore Theorem 7 follows.
Although quantity commitment provides more flexibility for retailer the benefits are offset by sup-
plier pricing. When retailer commits to quantity it chooses a less aggressive strategy to prevent
strategic waiting than it price commitment; where it completely takes away the strategic waiting
possibility, which does not leave any room for supplier reaction. Hence, for majority of delta values
price commitment performs better for retailer than quantity commitment. Therefore, committing
to both price and quantity results in the same equilibrium as its price commitment.
5.3 Supplier’s Profit Under Different Commitment Scenarios
We present the supplier profit comparison in figure 5.2. Supplier profits show a nice ordering
such that it prefers making a commitment itself rather than retailer making a commitment; either
price or quantity. In addition supplier prefers a quantity commitment over a price commitment.
As we stated earlier supplier has a first mover advantage in our model. Therefore it is expected
that it would benefit from its commitments more than retailer’s commitments. When supplier
makes a commitment it not only manipulates the retail prices through wholesale prices but also it
controls the availability in each period maximizing its own interest. However, when retailer makes
a commitment in order to counter act the potential profit loss by limited sales it has to increase
the first period price, which in turn amplifies the double marginalization inefficiency.
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Figure 5.2: Supplier profits comparison under every commitment scenario.
5.4 Supplier’s Concurrent Price and Quantity Commitment
Similar to retailer’s concurrent commitment in this section we look into supplier’s concurrent
commitments. Our main research question in this section is whether supplier would benefit from
committing to prices when it can also make a quantity commitment.
We first consider supplier’s aggregate quantity commitment. The following Theorem formally
answers our research question.
Theorem 9. When supplier commits to a maximum quantity Qmax to sell over two periods, it does
not benefit from committing to wholesale prices c1 and c2.
Here instead of fully characterizing the equilibrium we derive the result by showing that any
equilibrium profit where all of the commitments bind is dominated by the aggregate quantity
commitment profit presented in Section 3.4.
The following Theorem formally answers our research question for the supplier’s period specific
quantity commitment policy.
Theorem 10. When supplier commits to a maximum second period quantity Q2max, it does not
benefit from committing to wholesale prices c1 and c2.
Again to show this result instead of fully solving for the equilibrium we first find the retailer’s
response when all the commitments bind. Then we find supplier’s best response to these retailer
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strategies. We show that this solution may not be the equilibrium strategy, however any equilib-
rium strategy is not better than the solution presented. Finally we drive the result by comparing
supplier’s corresponding profit to its period specific quantity commitment equilibrium, which was
presented in Section 3.5.
For supplier, quantity commitment is a more flexible tool than its price commitment in terms
of how it reacts with retailer pricing and strategic waiting of the customers. Rather than indirectly
determining the availability in second period through retailer prices as in price commitment; quan-
tity commitment sends a stronger signal to customers to encourage them to buy in first period.
However, this happens in the expense of retailer as we showed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. Therefore,
supplier does not benefit from committing to wholesale prices when it can also commit to quantity
either a maximum or period specific.
48
CHAPTER 6
Alternative Modeling Assumptions
In this chapter, we consider two alternative modeling assumptions and discuss the robustness
of our results.
6.1 Utility Discounting
In our main model, product value diminishes by 1−δ in period 2, thus, δ captures the degree of
customer patience. The payment term in period 2 is not discounted as seen in (2.1). This approach
assumes the loss in customer’s utility due to delayed product use is significantly higher than the
benefit of a delayed payment. In contrast, in this section we assume the product value and the
payment are discounted at the same rate in customer utility. Specifically, the following replaces the
customer utility function in (2.1):
Ui(θ, pi) = δ
i−1(θ − pi), i : 1, 2. (6.1)
Note that with this assumption total demand increases because the set S2 in equation (2.9) is
replaced with
{(p2, Q2) : Q1 +Q2 ≥ 1− p2}. (6.2)
In addition customers’ willingness to pay in period 2 increases, which is reflected in the marginal
customer’s decision given by the following equation.
θ¯∗ = inf{θ : θ¯ − p1 ≥ δ(θ¯ − p∗2(Qˆ1))}. (6.3)
The following Lemma describes the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal policy in period 2.
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Lemma 15. Suppose the retailer orders Q1 units in period 1, and consumer segment [0, θ¯) remains
in the market in period 2.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = max(
1
2(2− 2Q1 − θ¯ − c2), 0) units
and sets p∗2 = 1−Q1 −Q∗2 in period 2.
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 = 1−Q1 − θ¯2 in period 2.
This yields profits ΠR,2 =
1
16(θ¯
2 + 12(1 − Q1)(Q1 − 1 + θ¯)) and ΠS,2 = (2−2Q1−θ¯)
2
8 for the retailer
and supplier respectively.
Customers conjecture the second period price and they expect p∗2(Qˆ1) =
2−2Qˆ1+θ¯
4 . Note that
both Q∗2, c∗2 and p∗2 increase in comparison to the base model. The marginal customer θ¯ in equa-
tion (6.3) leads to θ¯ = 4p1−2δ(1−Qˆ1)4−δ , which is the same as equation (2.10) in the base model.
After reformulating the retailer’s total profit in terms of the order quantity Q1 and target
consumer segment [θ¯, 1] in period 1 we can solve for the retailer’s optimal policy.
Proposition 16. The SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal
customer θ¯∗ in period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 < min(
3(4−3δ)
2(9−8δ) ,
3(1−δ)
3−2δ ) the retailer sells the product in both periods, and it carries
inventory between periods, where Q∗1 =
8−7δ−2c1(5−4δ)
2(6−5δ) , p
∗
1 =
3(2−δ)(4−3δ)−2c1(3δ2+δ−6)
6(6−5δ) , and
θ¯∗ = 3(4−3δ)+2c1(3−2δ)3(6−5δ) .
(ii) When 3(1−δ)3−2δ ≤ c1 ≤ 34 the retailer sells the product only second period and carries inventory,
where Q∗1 =
1
6(3− 4c1), p∗1 = 1− δ6(3− 2c1), and θ¯∗ = 1.
(iii) When 3(4−3δ)2(9−8δ) ≤ c1 ≤ 18(7 − 2δ) the retailer sells the product in both periods, and it does
not carry inventory between periods, where Q∗1 =
7−8c1−2δ
15−8δ , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4(1+c1)−3δ)
2(15−8δ) , and θ¯
∗ =
2(4+4c1−3δ)
15−8δ .
When c1 > max(
1
8(7− 2δ), 34) the retailer does not buy the product in first period.
Note that the region in which the retailer carries inventory increases in comparison to the base
model, which is due to the fact that the second period demand increases when customers discount
not only their valuations but also the retail price.
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To find the equilibrium whole sale price we need to solve the supplier’s optimization problem.
The following Proposition describes the solution.
Proposition 17. The SPNE whole sale price c1 in period 1 is as follows.
(i) When δ ≤ 1132(127−
√
817), c∗1 =
9(8−7δ)
4(33−26δ) .
(ii) When δ > 1132(127−
√
817), c∗1 =
9
16 .
Parts (i), (ii) of Proposition 17 map to the parts (i), (ii) of Proposition 16. Hence, the supplier
allows the retailer to carry inventory in between periods. In addition, c∗1 also increases compared
to the base model.
6.1.1 Retailer’s Quantity Commitment when Customers Discount Net Utility
In this section we analyze the retailer’s quantity commitment when customer utility function
is given by (6.1). Analysis is similar to that of Section 3.2, specifically Lemma 6 continues to hold.
Following equation (3.1), we obtain the following Lemma that describes the optimal policies in the
second period.
Lemma 16. When the retailer’s quantity commitment binds, Q∗2 = Qmax−Q1, p∗2 = 1−Qmax and
c∗2 = 2(1 − Qmax) − θ¯ in a SPNE in period 2. This yields ΠR,2 = p∗2(Qmax − (1 − θ¯)) − c∗2Q∗2 and
ΠS,2 = c
∗
2Q
∗
2. Furthermore, the retailer quantity commitment binds if and only if Qmax ≤ Q1+12 − θ¯4 .
The marginal customer θ¯, who is indifferent between buying in period 1 or waiting for period 2
then solves θ¯ − p1 = δ(θ¯ − p∗2) which gives p1( ¯θ,Qmax) = θ¯ − δ(Qmax − (1− θ¯)). Following Lemma
16 and the expression for marginal customer we can state retailer’s period 1 problem similar to
equations (3.3 - 3.6), which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment. Its SPNE order quantity
Q∗1, quantity commitment Q∗max, retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal customer θ¯∗ in
period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 < Kc2, the retailer sells the product in both periods, it carries inventory in between
periods and the quantity commitment binds strictly, where Q∗1 =
2(1−c1)
3+d , Q
∗
max =
2(1−c1)
3+δ ,
p∗1 =
2+c1(1+δ)
3+δ and θ¯
∗ = 2+c1+δ3+δ .
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(ii) When Kc2 ≤ c1 < min( (3−δ)(2−δ)9−8δ , 3(1−δ)3−2δ ), the retailer sells the product in both periods,
it carries inventory in between periods and the quantity commitment binds weakly, where
Q∗1 =
12−(11−δ)δ−3c1(5−4δ)
2(9−δ(6+δ)) , Q
∗
max =
3(4−3c1)−10δ+7c1δ
2(9−δ(6+δ)) , p
∗
1 =
2(6−(6−δ)δ)−c1(3δ2+δ−6)
2(9−δ(6+δ)) and
θ¯∗ = 6−δ(3+δ)+c1(3−2δ)9−δ(6+δ) .
(iii) When 3(1−δ)3−2δ ) ≤ c1 < 34 , the retailer sells the product only in period 2, it carries inventory
between periods and the quantity commitment binds weakly, where Q∗1 =
1
6(3− 4c1), Q∗max =
1
6(3− 2c1), and θ¯∗ = 1.
(iv) When (3−δ)(2−δ)9−8δ ≤ c1 ≤ 18(7−2δ), the retailer sells the product in both periods, it does not carry
inventory between periods and the quantity commitment binds weakly, where Q∗1 =
7−8c1−2δ
15−4δ ,
Q∗max =
6(3−2c1)−5δ
2(15−4δ) , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4(1+c1)−δ)
2(15−4δ) , and θ¯
∗ = 8(1+c1)−2δ15−4δ .
(v) When c1 ≥ max(18(7 − 2δ), 34), the retailer does not procure the product in first period com-
mitment binds weakly where, Q∗1 = 0, Q∗max =
1
4 , and θ¯
∗ = 1.
The threshold Kc2 is defined as follows.
Kc2 =
(3− δ)(1− δ)δ +√δ2(27− 36δ + 8δ3 + δ4)
9 + (3− 8δ)δ (6.4)
Recall that weak and strict commitments are defined in section 3.2. Finally following Lemma 16
and Proposition 18, we can characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 19. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment, the supplier’s SPNE
wholesale price c1 in period 1 is as follows. There exists δ¯5 ≈ 0.735 such that
(i) When δ ≤ δ¯5, c∗1 = 108−δ(159−δ(41+(15−δ)δ))198−4δ(69−2δ(8+3δ)) .
(ii) When δ > δ¯5, c
∗
1 =
9
16 .
Here δ¯5 is explicitly characterized in the proof of this proposition. Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposi-
tion 19 map to parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 18. Specifically the retailer’s quantity commitment
always binds weakly and the retailer always carries inventory.
6.1.2 Supplier’s Quantity Commitment when Customers Discount Net Utility
Our results for this section are based on numerical examples and they are stated in Section 6.1.5.
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6.1.3 Retailer’s Price Commitment when Customers Discount Net Utility
Suppose the retailer can credibly commit to future prices then similar to the reasoning in
Section 4.2 retailer procures all of its needed quantity in period 1. Hence, although customers
discount the second period price as well as their valuation of the product, the equilibrium does not
change since retailer does not sell in period 2. Therefore, Lemma 12 and Proposition 11 continue
to hold.
6.1.4 Supplier’s Price Commitment when Customers Discount Net Utility
Similar to Section 4.3, the following Lemma describes the equilibrium in period 2.
Lemma 17. Suppose that the supplier commits to wholesale prices c1 and c2, the retailer orders
Q1 in period 1 and consumer segment [0, θ¯) remain in the market in period 2. The retailer then
orders Q∗2 = max(
1
2(2− 2Q1 − θ¯ − c2), 0) units and sets p∗2 = 1−Q1 −Q∗2 in period 2.
The marginal customer θ¯ solves the following equation θ¯ − p1 = δ(θ¯ − p∗2), which leads to
θ¯ = 2p1−δc22−δ . Note that similar to the base model the marginal customer in this case is also
independent from Q1. Then we can formulate the retailer’s optimization problem in period 1 using
equation (4.3), which leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 20. Suppose the supplier commits to wholesale prices c1 and c2. The retailer’s SPNE
order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 in period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c2 ≤ 2c1+δ−11+δ , the retailer sells the product only in period 2, where Q∗1 = 0.
(ii) When 2c1+δ−11+δ < c2, the retailer sells the product in both periods, where Q
∗
1 =
1−2c1+c2−(1−c2)δ
3−2δ
and p∗1 =
2c1(2−δ)+(2−δ)2−c2(2−(2−δ)δ)
2(3−2δ) .
The retailer does not carry inventory between periods, thus the marginal customer is given by
θ¯∗ = 1−Q∗1, in addition without loss of generality c2 ≤ c1 in both of the cases.
To fully characterize the equilibrium, we solve the supplier’s problem.
Proposition 21. Suppose the supplier can commit to future wholesale prices. The equilibrium
wholesale prices c1 and c2 are as follows. c
∗
1 = c
∗
2 =
1
2 .
53
Proposition 21 corresponds to part (ii) of Proposition 20, hence in equilibrium the supplier
commits to wholesale prices such that the retailer buys and sells in both periods.
6.1.5 Value of Commitments when Customers Discount Net Utility
The following Theorem shows that the retailer’s commitments can continue to hurt the prof-
itability of both the retailer and the supplier.
Theorem 11. Suppose customer utility function is as in (6.1).
(i) ΠNCS ≥ ΠRQCS ; ΠNCS + ΠNCR ≥ ΠRQCS + ΠRQCR ; ΠNCR ≥ ΠRQCR .
(ii) ΠNCS > Π
RPC
S ; Π
NC
S + Π
NC
R > Π
RPC
S + Π
RPC
R ; Π
NC
R > Π
RPC
R .
Inequalities in part (i) are strict when δ < 1132(127 −
√
817) ≈ 0.745. Similarly, the supplier’s
price commitments can make the retailer and the supplier worse off.
Theorem 12. Suppose customer utility function is as in (6.1). There exists δ¯6 ≈ 0.659 such that
ΠNCS > Π
SPC
S when δ < δ¯6; Π
NC
R > Π
SPC
R ; Π
NC
S + Π
NC
R > Π
SPC
S + Π
SPC
R .
Note that δ¯6 is explicitly characterized in the proof of this Theorem.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the supplier never gets worse off from its quan-
tity commitment as in Theorem 3, since it can always nullify this commitment by choosing an
arbitrarily large quantity. However, the retailer may not suffer from the supplier’s quantity com-
mitment with the alternative customer utility function in (6.1). We find that ΠNCR ≤ ΠSQCR when
δ ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. The equilibrium of supplier’s quantity commitment involves several regions
similar to our main model (see Section 3.4), thus instead of characterizing equilibrium for all sce-
narios, we resort to numerical examples in this extension.
It is worthwhile to highlight the differences between the results of our main model and this
extension. While in our main model the supplier’s price commitment always hurts its profitability
(Theorem 8), the supplier can benefit from its price commitment in this extension when δ is
sufficiently high (Theorem 12). Intuitively, when the discount factor applies to both product value
and retail price in period 2 as in (6.1) (as opposed to only product value as in (2.1)), consumers are
willing to pay higher prices in period 2, which enables the retailer and the supplier to set higher
prices in period 2. Thus, the supplier can commit to a higher price in period 2, which allows setting
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a higher price in period 1. Similarly, the supplier’s quantity commitment can be more beneficial to
the retailer with the alternative utility function in (6.1): While the retailer in our main model may
suffer from the supplier’s quantity commitment, our numerical examples in this extension show
that the supplier’s quantity commitment does not hurt the retailer. Because the supplier can set
a higher wholesale price in period 2, it does not excessively limit its quantity, which in turn helps
the retailer.
6.2 No-Inventory Carryover
Our main model assumes the retailer does not incur inventory holding cost. Here, we consider
the other extreme assuming that carrying inventory is prohibitively costly or infeasible so the
retailer cannot carry over inventory.
Since retailer cannot carry inventory, it sells all the quantity that it buys in the first period,
hence Q1 is always 1− θ¯. The following Lemma describes the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal policy
in period 2.
Lemma 18. Suppose consumer segment [0, θ¯) remains in the market in period 2.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = max(
1
2(θ¯ − c2δ ), 0) units and sets
p∗2 = δ
(
1− θ¯ −Q∗2
)
in period 2.
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 =
δθ¯
2 in period 2.
This yields profits ΠR,2 =
δθ¯2
16 and ΠS,2 =
δθ¯2
8 for the retailer and supplier respectively.
Following Lemma 18, the marginal customer is given by θ¯ = 4p14−δ . Rearranging this equality,
we get p1(θ¯) = (1 − δ4)θ¯. We can now solve for retailer’s optimization problem in period 1, which
is given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 22. The SPNE retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal customer θ¯∗ in period
1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 <
8−3δ
8 the retailer sells the product in both periods, where p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4(1+c1)−δ)
2(16−5δ) , and
θ¯∗ = 8(1+c1)−2δ16−5δ .
(ii) When c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 the retailer does not buy the product in first period.
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Observe that parts (i) and (ii) of above proposition is the same as the parts (ii) and (iii)
of Proposition 5. Hence by not being able to carry inventory retailer is actually making a weak
quantity commitment. The equilibrium is described by the following Proposition.
Proposition 23. Supplier sets the SPNE wholesale price as c∗1 =
4(3−δ)
24−9δ − 11δ96 .
In equilibrium supplier sets the price so that retailer always sells the product in period 1.
6.2.1 Retailer’s Quantity Commitment with No-Inventory Carry Over
When retailer makes a quantity commitment under the condition that it cannot carry inventory
the Lemma 6 continues to hold. In addition Lemma 7 also continues to hold since it is for every Q1,
but now Q1 = 1 − θ¯. Moreover, note that the optimal strategies and the prices for retailer’s first
period optimization problem given in Proposition 5 do not involve carrying inventory. Hence, when
retailer is not allowed to carry inventory it can replicate the best response given in Proposition 5.
Therefore Propositions 5 and 6 also continue to hold.
6.2.2 Supplier’s Quantity Commitment with No-Inventory Carry Over
When supplier makes a quantity commitment under the condition that retailer cannot carry
inventory the Lemma 8 in Section 3.4 continue to hold. In addition, following the discussion in
Section 6.2.1, the commitment condition that follows from the Lemma 7 also continues to hold.
Similar to the analysis for supplier’s quantity commitment in Section 3.4, the retailer’s profit
function exhibits a piecewise structure where it is given by (3.3) when the commitment binds; on
the other hand, when the commitment does not bind, it is given by the no commitment objective
that is studied in Section 6.2. Since overall retailer objective function is not quasiconcave we solve
for each part and compare in order to find the optimal retail price, order quantity and the marginal
customer in period 1, which is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 24. Suppose the supplier commits to sell not more than Qmax ∈ [1/4, 1/2] units in
two periods. The retailer’s SPNE policy is characterized as follows.
(i) The quantity commitment binds strictly and the retailer sells the product in both periods with
p∗1 =
1+(1−δ)c1−δ(3−(1+δ)Qmax)
2(1−2δ) and θ¯
∗ = 1+c1−δ(4−3Qmax)2(1−2δ) , when δ < 1/2,
1−c1
2−δ < Qmax <
5−3c1−4δ
8−7δ .
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(ii) The quantity commitment binds strictly, the retailer sells the product only in period 1 with
p∗1 = θ¯∗ = 1−Qmax, when
a) δ < 1/2, Qmax ≤ 1−c12−δ ,
b.1) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 ≤ 5(3−δ)δ−42(2+5δ) , Qmax ≤ K4,
b.2) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 > 5(3−δ)δ−42(2+5δ) , Qmax < 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ .
(iii) The quantity commitment binds weakly and the retailer sells the product in both periods with
p∗1 =
1
3(4 − δ)(1 − Qmax) and θ¯∗ = 43(1 − Qmax) when max
(
5−3c1−4δ
8−7δ ,
4−3c1−2δ
7−5δ
)
≤ Qmax ≤
4(5−3c1)−7δ
2(16−5δ) .
(iv) The quantity commitment does not bind and the retailer sells the product in both periods with
p∗1 =
(4−δ)(4(1+c1)−δ)
2(16−5δ) , and θ¯
∗ = 8(1+c1)−2δ16−5δ , when
a) δ < 1/2, c1 < 1− 3δ8 , Qmax > 4(5−3c1)−7δ2(16−5δ)
b.1) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 < 5(3−δ)δ−42(2+5δ) , K4 < Qmax
b.2) δ ≥ 1/2, 5(3−δ)δ−42(2+5δ) ≤ c1 < 1− 3δ8 , Qmax > 4(5−3c1)−7δ2(16−5δ)
When c1 ≥ 1 − 3δ8 , the retailer does not procure any units in period 1. Note that in all the cases
above optimal quantity Q∗1 = 1− θ¯∗. The threshold is given by K4 = 12
(
1− c1 +
√
δ(3−c1(2+5c1)−δ)
16−5δ
)
and is the point when the profits from the cases (ii) and (iv) are equal.
Given above optimal retailer strategies, supplier maximizes its first period profit. However,
again the overall supplier objective function is not quasiconcave and we find the optimal strategies
by considering each of the above cases separately, which is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 25. The supplier’s SPNE wholesale price c∗1 and quantity commitment Q∗max are as
follows.
(i) When δ < 1/2, c∗1 = 1/2, Q∗max =
1
2(2−δ) .
(ii) When δ ≥ 1/2, c∗1 = 2−δ3 , Qmax = 2−δ7−5δ .
Both of the above optimal supplier strategies correspond to the case (ii) of Proposition 24.
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6.2.3 Retailer’s Price Commitment with No-Inventory Carry Over
When retailer commits to future prices it commits not to sell in period 2, which does not change
whether it can carry inventory or not. Hence, the analysis in section 4.2 and the Proposition 11
continue to hold.
6.2.4 Supplier’s Price Commitment with No-Inventory Carry Over
When supplier commits to wholesale prices retailer has no incentive to carry inventory since
carrying inventory does not change c2. Therefore when inventory carrying is not allowed the
retailer’s actions does not change and the analysis in section 4.3 holds. Specifically the Propositions
12 and 13 continue to hold.
6.2.5 Value of Commitments with No-Inventory Carry Over
The following Theorem shows that the retailer’s and the supplier’s commitments can continue
to hurt either themselves or their supply chain partners.
Theorem 13. Suppose the retailer cannot carry over inventory.
(i) ΠNCS > Π
RQC
S ; Π
NC
R > Π
RQC
R .
(ii) ΠNCS > Π
RPC
S ; Π
NC
R > Π
RPC
R .
(iii) ΠNCS < Π
SQC
S ; Π
NC
S + Π
NC
R < Π
SQC
S + Π
SQC
R ; Π
NC
R ≥ ΠSQCR when δ ≤ δ¯7.
(iv) ΠNCS < Π
SPC
S ; Π
NC
S + Π
NC
R ≥ ΠSPCS + ΠSPCR when δ ≤ δ¯8; ΠNCR > ΠSPCR .
Note δ¯7 ≈ 0.694 and δ¯8 ≈ 0.592, and they are explicitly characterized in the proof of this
theorem.
Different from our main model, the supplier benefits from its price commitment when the
retailer cannot carry over inventory. In our main model, the supplier’s price commitment hurts its
profitability because it eliminates the retailer’s incentive to buy more in period 1 to pay less in
period 2. However, this incentive is dampened in the no-commitment scenario when the retailer
cannot carry over inventory. In other words, the supplier’s price commitment does not decrease
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its profitability mainly because its no-commitment profit is lower when the retailer cannot hold
inventory.
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CHAPTER 7
Commitments under a Coordinating Contract
We have shown that commitments can aggravate existing coordination inefficiency under a
wholesale price contract making the supplier and/or the retailer worse off. In contrast, now we
will show that under a coordinating contract, commitments never hurt the supplier and the retailer
and always improve the profitability of a supply chain by eliminating strategic customer behavior.
Specifically, we show that a two-part tariff achieves the profit of the centralized benchmark and
commitments are always beneficial with a two-part tariff. When the supplier offers a two-part tariff
to the retailer, in each period the supplier charges a lump-sum fee Fi in addition to the wholesale
price ci per unit of product. Then the SPNE can be written as:
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = arg max
(p2,Q2)∈S2
[p2(θ¯ − p2/δ)− c2Q2 − F2], (7.1)
(c∗2, F
∗
2 ) = arg max
c2,F2
c2Q
∗
2 + F2, (7.2)
θ¯∗ = inf{θ : θ¯ − p1 ≥ δθ¯ − p∗2(Qˆ1)},
(p∗1, Q
∗
1) = arg max
(p1,Q1)∈S1
[p1(1− θ¯)− c1Q1 − F1 + p∗2(θ¯∗ − p∗2/δ)− c∗2Q∗2 − F ∗2 ], (7.3)
Qˆ1 = Q
∗
1,
(c∗1, F
∗
1 ) = arg max
c1,F1
[c1Q
∗
1 + F1 + c
∗
2Q
∗
2 + F
∗
2 ]. (7.4)
where the retailer’s feasible strategy sets S1 and S2 are given by
S1 = {(p1, Q1) : Q1 ≥ 1− θ¯∗(p1) ≥ 0},
S2 = {(p2, Q2) : Q1 +Q2 ≥ 1− p2/δ}.
The following Lemma describes the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal policy in period 2.
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Lemma 19. Suppose the retailer orders Q1 units in period 1, and consumer segment [0, θ¯) remains
in the market in period 2.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = max(
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c2
2δ , 0) units and
sets p∗2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q∗2) in period 2.
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 = 0 and F ∗2 =
δθ¯2
4 in period 2.
This yields profits ΠR,2 = 0 and ΠS,2 =
δθ¯2
4 for the retailer and supplier respectively.
Consumers conjecture second period price and they expect p∗2 =
δθ¯
2 . Note that second period
price no longer depends on the customers’ belief about first period quantity since supplier offers a
zero second period wholesale price and there is no incentive for retailer to carry inventory.
The marginal consumer θ¯, who is indifferent about whether to buy in period 1 or wait for period
2, is given by the solution of
θ¯ − p1 = δθ¯ − p∗2,
where the left and right hand sides correspond to the utility of buying in periods 1 and 2, respec-
tively. This leads to
θ¯ =
2p1
2− δ .
Now let’s consider retailer’s first period problem. Following (2.10), in order to induce consumers
in [θ¯, 1] to buy the product in period 1, the retailer needs to set the following price:
p1(θ¯) = θ¯
(
1− δ
2
)
.
Note that retailer’s margin loss from the price θ¯ increases as the value of product increases in second
period due to strategic customer behavior.
After reformulating the retailer’s total profit in terms of the order quantity Q1 and target
consumer segment [θ¯, 1] in period 1 we can solve for the retailer’s optimal policy, which is presented
in the following proposition.
Proposition 26. The SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal
customer θ¯∗ in period 1 are as follows.
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(i) When c1 ≤ 1 − δ2 , the retailer sells the product in both periods and does not carry inventory
between periods, where Q∗1 =
1
2 − c12−δ , p∗1 = 14(2(1 + c1)− δ) and θ¯∗ = 12 + c12−δ .
(ii) When c1 > 1− δ2 , the retailer sells the product only in period 2, and it does not carry inventory
between periods, where Q∗1 = 0 and θ¯∗ = 1.
Note that unlike the wholesale price contract retailer never carries inventory to second period,
due the fact that second period wholesale price is zero.
To find the equilibrium whole sale price we need to solve the suppliers optimization problem.
The following Proposition describes that.
Proposition 27. The SPNE unit price c1 and the entrance fee F1 in period 1 are as follows.
c∗1 =
δ(2−δ)
2(4−3δ) , F
∗
1 =
2(2−δ)(1−δ)2
(4−3δ)2 .
Supplier’s equilibrium unit price corresponds to part (i) of Proposition 26. Hence in equilibrium
retailer serves the market in both periods. In addition equilibrium supplier profit is ΠS =
(2−δ)2
4(4−3δ) ,
which is the same as the centralized profit given in section 2.3 and equilibrium retailer profit is 0.
Therefore, with two part tariff contract supplier can extract all retailer profit and coordinate the
supply chain.
7.1 Retailer’s Quantity Commitment with Two-Part Tariff Contract
In this section we analyze the scenario when retailer can make an aggregate quantity commit-
ment when supplier offers a two-part tariff contract. Analysis is similar to section 3.2, specifically
Lemma 6 holds. Following equation (3.1) we have the following Lemma that describes the optimal
values in second period.
Lemma 20. When the retailer’s quantity commitment binds, Q∗2 = Qmax − Q1, p∗2 = 1 − Qmax,
c∗2 = 2(1 − Qmax) − θ¯ and F ∗2 = δ
(
Q2max + θ¯ +Q1(2(1−Qmax)− θ¯)− 1
)
in a SPNE in period 2.
This yields ΠR,2 = 0 and ΠS,2 = c
∗
2Q
∗
2 + F
∗
2 . Furthermore, the retailer quantity commitment binds
if and only if Qmax ≤ Q1+12 − θ¯4 .
62
Following Lemma 20 and the expression for marginal customer we can state retailer’s period 1
problem as follows.
max
Q1,Qmax,θ¯
[1− θ¯] p1(θ¯, Qmax)−Q1c1 − F1 + ΠR,2(Q1, Qmax, θ¯) (7.5)
s.t. Qmax ≤ Q1 + 1
2
− θ¯
4
,
Q1 ≤ Qmax,
(Q1, θ¯) ∈ S′1.
Note that S
′
1 is defined in (2.15). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 28. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment. Its SPNE order quantity
Q∗1, quantity commitment Q∗max, retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal customer θ¯∗ in
period 1 are as follows. The retailer sells the product only in period 1 and the quantity commitment
binds strictly, where Q∗1 =
1−c1
2 , Q
∗
max =
1−c1
2 , p
∗
1 =
1+c1
2 , θ¯
∗ = 1+c12 .
Note that unlike other models we presented so far commitment always binds strictly when
retailer makes a quantity commitment under two-part tariff contract.
Following Lemma 20 and Proposition 28 we can characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 29. Suppose the retailer can make a quantity commitment, the supplier’s SPNE unit
price c1 and the entrance fee F1 in period 1 are as follows. c
∗
1 = 0, F
∗
1 =
1
4 .
At equilibrium supplier offers a zero unit price but extracts all retailer profit with the lump sum
fee. Next theorem describes the value of the commitment. Let ΠN̂CS and Π
R̂QC
S be the supplier’s
equilibrium profit with no commitment and retailer’s quantity commitment under two-part tariff
contract respectively.
Theorem 14. ΠR̂QCS > Π
N̂C
S .
Theorem states that supplier benefits from retailer’s quantity commitment. Note that supplier’s
equilibrium profit is 14 , which is equal to the centralized commitment profit that is presented in
section 2.3. It extracts all the retailer profit hence in equilibrium retailer’s profit is zero. Therefore,
retailer’s quantity commitment coordinates the supply chain.
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7.2 Supplier’s Quantity Commitment with Two-Part Tariff Contract
Similar to Section 3.4, when (3.7) holds, period 2 equilibrium is given by Lemma 20. On the
other hand, when (3.7) does not hold, the commitment is ineffective, and period 2 equilibrium is
the same as in a no-commitment scenario, which is given by Lemma 19.
When the commitment binds, ie., (3.7) holds, the retailer’s profit is given by (7.5). On the other
hand, when the commitment does not bind, i.e., (3.7) does not hold, the retailer’s profit is given
by (7.3). Solving the retailer’s maximum profit for both cases and comparing them, we determine
the retailer’s optimal policy in period 1, which is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 30. Suppose supplier commits to sell not more than Qmax ≤ 12 units in two periods.
The retailer’s SPNE policy is characterized as follows.
(i) The quantity commitment binds strictly the retailer sells the product only in period 1 with
Q∗1 = Qmax and p∗1 = θ¯∗ = 1−Qmax when Qmax ≤ 1−c12−δ .
(ii) The quantity commitment binds strictly the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1−c1−δQmax
2(1−δ) , p
∗
1 =
1
2(1 + c1 − δQmax) and
θ¯∗ = 1+c1−δ(2−Qmax)2(1−δ) when,
1−c1
2−δ < Qmax < min
(
5−3c1−2δ
8−5δ ,
1−c1
δ
)
.
(iii) The quantity commitment binds strictly and the retailer does not procure any products in
period 1 with Q∗1 = 0, p∗1 = θ¯∗ = 1 when
1−c1
δ ≤ Qmax < 14 .
(iv) The quantity commitment binds weekly the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1
3(4Qmax − 1), p∗1 = 13(4− δ)(1−Qmax)
and θ¯∗ = 43(1−Qmax), when
(a) c1 ≤ 1− δ2 , 5−3c1−2δ8−5δ ≤ Qmax ≤ K5
(b) c1 > 1− δ2 , max
(
5−3c1−2δ
8−5δ ,
1
4
)
≤ Qmax.
(v) The quantity commitment does not bind the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1
2 − c12−δ , p∗1 = 14(2(1 + c1) − δ) and
θ¯∗ = 12 +
c1
2−δ , when c1 ≤ 1− δ2 , K5 < Qmax.
The threshold K5 is defined as K5 =
5(4−δ)−3
(
4c1−
√
δ(8(1−c21)−δ(6−δ))
2−δ
)
8(4−δ) .
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To characterize the equilibrium we solve for the supplier’s period 1 problem, which is presented
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 31. Suppose the supplier can make a quantity commitment, the supplier’s SPNE unit
price c1, commitment quantity Qmax and the entrance fee F1 in period 1 are as follows. c
∗
1 =
δ
2 ,
Qmax =
1
2 and F
∗
1 =
1−δ
4 .
The equilibrium strategy comes from the boundary between parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 30,
hence at equilibrium supplier sets the price fee and the commitment quantity such that retailer
sells the product only in period 1. Next theorem gives the value of commitment.
Theorem 15. ΠŜQCS > Π
N̂C
S .
Similar to retailer’s commitments with two-part tariff contract supplier’s quantity commitment
also helps itself. In addition it coordinates the supply chain by allocating all retailer profit to
supplier and replicating the centralized benchmark.
7.3 Retailer’s Price Commitment with Two-Part Tariff Contract
Suppose retailer can credibly commit to future prices then similar to the reasoning in the
section 4.2 retailer procures all of its needed quantity in period 1. Therefore Lemma 12 follows.
The following proposition describes the equilibrium in period 1.
Proposition 32. Suppose the retailer can commit to future prices under two-part tariff contract.
The SPNE is as follows.
(i) Given the unit price c1, the retailer orders Q
∗
1 =
1−c1
2 , and sets p
∗
1 =
1+c1
2 in period 1 and it
does not sell the product in period 2 by committing to a sufficiently high p2 in period 1.
(ii) The supplier chooses c∗1 = 0 and F ∗1 =
1
4 . Π
∗
S =
1
4 .
Next we look at the value of commitment.
Theorem 16. ΠR̂PCS > Π
N̂C
S .
Similar to retailer’s quantity commitment under two-part tariff contract, retailer’s price com-
mitment also helps supplier. Specifically it can extract all retailer profit by letting it ending up
with zero profit and it earns the commitment benchmark profit, which is equal to 14 .
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7.4 Supplier’s Price Commitment with Two-Part Tariff Contract
When supplier commits to future prices it commits to period 2 unit price and the entrance fee
when it sets the period 1 unit price and entrance fee. Given c1, F1, c2 and F2 the retailer’s actions
and strategies are the same as in the case of wholesale price contract described in section 4.3.
Specifically, Lemma 13 and Proposition 12 follows.
To find the equilibrium we need to solve for supplier’s optimization problem. Supplier maxi-
mizes
c1Q
∗
1 + F1 + c2Q
∗
2 + F2,
where Q∗1 and Q∗2 are given by Proposition 12 and Lemma 13. The following proposition describes
the equilibrium.
Proposition 33. Suppose supplier can commit to future prices and fees then equilibrium unit prices
and the fees are as follows. c∗1 = 0, F ∗1 =
1
4 , c
∗
2 = 0 and F
∗
2 = 0.
Proposition 33 corresponds to part (iv) of Proposition 12. So in equilibrium supplier sets the
prices and fees such that she induces retailer to sell only in period 1.
Next we look at the value of commitment.
Theorem 17. ΠŜPCS > Π
N̂C
S .
Like all the commitment scenarios under two-part tariff contract we presented so far supplier’s
price commitment also helps supplier. In addition it coordinates the supply chain by allocating all
retailer profit to supplier and attaining the centralized benchmark commitment profit.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
In both the supplier’s and retailer’s price and quantity commitments, the supplier attains the
profit of the centralized system leaving no profit to the retailer. Furthermore, the sales are restricted
to only period 1 in these examples similar to the commitments of the centralized system.
Note that the supplier can replicate any outcome of a two-part tariff by a quantity discount
contract. This can be achieved by simply including the lump-sum fee Fi in the wholesale price
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of the first unit in the quantity discount contract. Therefore, with a quantity discount, the sup-
plier can extract the entire surplus achieving profit of the centralized system and ensure that the
commitments are always beneficial as in Theorems in previous sections.
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CHAPTER 8
Implications of Uncertainty when Selling to Strategic Customers
8.1 Introduction
Demand uncertainty is one of the main problems firms face. It makes the already hard planning
problem more complicated. Variability in demand causing shortages or excessive production can
be a source of profit loss. To mitigate variability in demand and better match with the supply,
companies need to implement sophisticated policies. However, such techniques can be quite costly;
involving investments in information technology, customer relationship management and advanced
analytical capabilities for accurately forecasting the demand. In addition, with the recent devel-
opments in on-line retailing and reduced search costs consumers are more price aware. Rather
than buying the products on the spot, they strategically time their purchase decisions to maximize
their own utility. It is a well established result that forward looking customers, ie. customers that
wait for future price markdowns harm the firm profits. This adds another layer of complexity to
the operating environment for firms because the interactions between the fluctuations in demand
and the customer patience may not be obvious. When demand is highly volatile one may expect
customers being forward looking may not be an important issue, since the uncertainty in the late
season availability might prevent them from waiting strategically. However, customers may also
expect a higher left over quantity since they may believe the demand might be low and may choose
to wait longer. Similarly, when customers are highly patient initial observations of sales quantity
may not give an accurate picture about the actual demand level. Therefore, it is important to
investigate the effects of the forward looking customer behavior together with the volatility in the
demand so that we can have a better understanding about the interplay between these two factors.
Given the limited resources it is important for decision makers to asses the relative severity of
the demand variability and the strategic customers. When firms make decisions about policies to
reverse the implications of these factors they need to be able to evaluate the relative importance of
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each of these elements. For example, an extra replenishment within the selling season may help to
alleviate potential loss sales, however it may also signal forward looking customers a higher level
of inventory availability later in the season with a reduced price. Hence, encouraging customers
to delay purchases. In addition, commitments such as fixed price path or limited quantities may
benefit firms in terms of inducing customers to buy early with high price, however such policies
may also restrict the flexibility against the changes in the demand levels and may leave the firm
vulnerable to fluctuations; causing loss sales or overstocking. Moreover, depending on how closely
firms can observe these factors and which decisions they may control may have an affect on how they
might want to react. For example a manufacturer selling directly to customers can observe both the
changes in demand levels and the customer behavior directly. Hence, its priorities in mitigating the
loss due to these elements may vary greatly than a retailer in a decentralized supply chain which
also can observe both of the factors directly but has a more restricted set of decisions that it can
control. Similarly, a supplier selling through a retailer may not be able to observe the customer
patience directly but is affected by it through the order decisions made by its retailer. Hence, it still
needs to take into account the relative importance of such customer behavior when making decisions
about the policies to reduce the affects of the uncertainty in the order quantities. In addition, the
interactions between the volatility in demand and the customer patience adds another layer of
complexity to the interplay between the up and downstream members in a decentralized supply
chain. One might argue that both might intensify the coordination problem the supply chain
already experiences. However, it might also be the case that actions taken by one of the supply
chain members might have a decreasing affect on one of the losses due either to the volatility in
demand or the strategic behavior for the other member. In order to be able to better understand
these interactions we need a model that captures the necessary aspects of this problem so that we
can draw relevant insights.
In this chapter of the thesis we consider a decentralized supply chain selling to strategic cus-
tomers with an uncertain demand for the product. We consider two demand scenarios; either high
or low and capture the uncertainty by varying the total market size. We determine the level of
strategic behavior by the customer patience parameter, which affects the utility a customer will
receive if it waits for a price drop. By driving demand uncertainty and the customer patience
independently we are able to draw insights about the relative effects of the two on the profit per-
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formance. In addition we explicitly model the interactions between the supplier and retailer, which
give us the opportunity to compare the implications of uncertainty and customer patience on the
up and down stream of the supply chain. Specifically, we introduce metrics such as loss due to
uncertainty and loss due to strategic behavior.
We show that demand variability intensifies the strategic behavior in a decentralized supply
chain. This is interesting since increasing levels of uncertainty also creates availability or price risks
for the customers. However, we find that the price and quantity choices made by the supply chain
members causes customers to delay their purchase.
We show that both the uncertainty and the strategic customer behavior are damaging for
the supply chain members’ profit performance. More interestingly we find that the severity of
these factors in terms of how they impact the profit differ when considered from supplier’s or the
retailer’s point of view. We observe that unless there is very little variability in demand or the
customers are significantly patient, uncertainty has more impact on the supplier’s total loss than the
strategic behavior. In contrast, unless there is very little customer patience or the demand is very
volatile strategic behavior is more detrimental to retailer’s profit than the uncertainty. In addition,
we quantify the impacts of these factors on the supply chain members’ profits and compare their
performance. We find that uncertainty generates a bigger loss for supplier than the retailer, however
customer patience hurts retailer more than it damages the supplier. These observations form the
evidence that supply chain members may have different priorities for loss mitigating strategies. For
example while supplier might want to install policies to control the fluctuations in order quantities;
retailer might want to improve on measures that would induce customers to buy earlier with higher
prices, which in turn might aggravate coordination problem in the decentralized supply chain.
We also investigate the centralized benchmark and contrast against the decentralized system
to better our insights about the decentralized supply chain’s performance. We find that similar
to the decentralized supply chain, demand variability intensifies the strategic waiting behavior in
the centralized system. Moreover this is even stronger than the decentralized supply chain. This
suggests that the interaction between the decentralized supply chain members in terms of how one’s
price and quantity decisions affect the other one’s choices, discourages some of the customers from
delaying their purchases, which does not exist in a centralized system.
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In addition centralized firm and the retailer are similar when we compare the impact of the
strategic behavior and the demand volatility on each one’s total loss such that forward looking
customer behavior has a bigger impact than the demand uncertainty. However, recall that demand
uncertainty has more impact on the supplier’s loss than the customer patience. This suggests
that the effect of customer behavior is dump on the demand volatility by the retailer through
the changes in order quantities. In other words, since supplier is unable to observe the strategic
behavior directly, the repercussion of such behavior appears as fluctuations in order quantities,
which intensifies the impact of demand uncertainty on the supplier’s profit loss.
We also compare centralized system’s price and quantity decisions against the decentralized sup-
ply chain to shed light on the driving factors of the specific choices made by each of its members.
We find that different dynamics are at play when firms are making optimal decisions, which lead
to different characteristics for the resulting profit performances. We show that demand uncertainty
decreases centralized system’s loss due to strategic customers. When demand is highly volatile
the centralized firm keeps the availability low early in the selling season to limit the exposure to
uncertainty risk and provides a bigger service level later in the season when it has a better under-
standing of the demand level. In addition when the customers are sufficiently patient they want
to delay the purchase, hoping for a reduced price. This alignment in the firm’s and the customers’
preferences provides the necessary ingredient for such a result. In contrast, demand uncertainty
has a bimodal effect on the decentralized supply chain’s loss in the presence of strategic customers.
As the volatility in the demand increases up to a certain level, the decentralized supply chain’s
loss due to customer patience increases. However, beyond that threshold any further increase in
variability actually decreases the decentralized supply chain’s loss due to strategic customer be-
havior. This result is due to how supplier pricing manipulates the retailer quantity decisions in a
decentralized supply chain selling to strategic customers. When supplier makes pricing decisions it
prevents retailer to take advantage of the potential alignment in its preferences with the customers’
choices, which in turn, amplifies the coordination problem that increases the loss due to strate-
gic customers. However, when uncertainty is significantly high supplier’s leverage on the retailer
quantities decreases, which causes the loss to decrease as well. These results provide important
insights about the implications of the demand volatility especially when designing mechanisms to
mitigate the adverse affects of these factors. For example policies to reduce the profit loss due to
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Supplier sets c1 Retailer orders
Q1 sets p1
Consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait
Uncertainty resolves
Supplier sets c2 Retailer orders
Q2 sets p2
Remaining consumers
decide whether
to buy or wait
Period 1 Period 2
Figure 8.1: Sequence of events with demand uncertainty.
forward looking customers such as commitments might be effective in a centralized system even
when there is demand uncertainty, although the value of the commitment is likely to decrease with
higher levels of uncertainty. However, it might be a better idea to deal with the uncertainty in a
decentralized supply chain even with low levels of variability when customers are strategic since it
is likely that a bigger strategic loss is being observed due to volatility in the demand.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; in Section 8.2 we introduce our model and in 8.3
the decentralized equilibrium. Using the equilibrium we evaluate the supply chain performance in
Section 8.4. Next we provide the decentralized equilibrium in 8.5 and in Section 8.6 we contrast
the two equilibriums to tease out the affects of decentralization. We conclude with Section 8.7.
8.2 The Model
The sequence of events is similar to the no-commitment model described in Section 2. Specif-
ically, before the start of each period i, the supplier sets its wholesale price ci, and the retailer
decides its procurement quantity Qi, which is delivered at the beginning of the period. When re-
tailer orders Q1 it faces a demand risk because of the uncertainty. The retailer then sets the retail
price pi, and consumers decide whether to buy the product in that period. Retailer may carry
the unsold inventory to second period. It incurs a holding cost h ∈ [1/4, 3/8] per unit inventory
carried over. Note that holding cost is critical in this model in order to avoid unrealistic strategies
in equilibrium.
We assume that after all the decisions made for period 1 uncertainty resolves before the start
of period 2. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 8.1.
72
We model the demand uncertainty as a discrete distribution. Let X be the market size. Then
the following defines the total mass of the customers.
X =

1 + α with probability β
1− α with probability 1− β
(8.1)
Note that in our model with deterministic demand the total mass of the customers is 1. To
keep the mean demand normalized at 1 we assume β = 1/2. In addition we assume that demand
variability is no bigger than half the mean demand so α ∈ [0, 1/2]. Throughout this chapter we
adopt the net utility discount as in Section 6.1, which is defined in Equation 6.1.
An SPNE in our model with demand uncertainty is defined by the solutions of the following
equations. We assume that retailer will order at least to satisfy the low market demand in period
1. Note that ∗ denotes SPNE strategies, ∧ denotes the minimum and ∨ denotes the maximum
operator.
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = arg max
(p2,Q2)∈S˜2
E
[
p2X(θ¯ − p2)− c2Q2
]
, (8.2)
c∗2 = arg maxc2
E [c2Q
∗
2] , (8.3)
θ¯∗ = inf
{
θ : θ − p1 ≥ δ
(
θ − E
[
p∗2(Qˆ1)
])}
, (8.4)
(p∗1, Q
∗
1) = arg max
(p1,Q1)∈S˜1
E
[
p1
(
Q1 ∧X(1− θ¯∗)
)− c1Q1 − h ((Q1 −X(1− θ¯∗) ∨ 0))+ Π∗R,2] ,
(8.5)
Π∗R,2 = p
∗
2X(θ¯
∗ − p∗2)− c∗2Q∗2, (8.6)
Qˆ1 = Q
∗
1, (8.7)
c∗1 = arg maxc1
E [c1Q
∗
1 + c
∗
2Q
∗
2] . (8.8)
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where the retailer’s feasible strategy sets S˜i in each period are given by
S˜1 =
{
(p1, Q1) : Q1 ≥ (1− α)
(
1− θ¯∗(p1)
) ≥ 0} , (8.9)
S˜2 = {(p2, Q2) : Q1 +Q2 ≥ X(1− p2)} . (8.10)
8.3 Equilibrium
We solve for equilibrium using backward induction following the order in equations (8.2-8.8).
In period 2 uncertainty has resolved and the market size is realized. Retailer orders Q2 and sets
p2 to extract maximum profit from customers. Note that if the demand is low retailer might have
ordered too much in period 1 therefore it may choose p2 in such a way that it does not sell all the
remaining inventory. Let χ be the market size realized, which is 1∓ α according to Equation 8.1.
Lemma 21. Suppose retailer orders Q1 in period 1 and the consumer segment [0, θ¯]) remains in
the market in period 2.
(i) For any given wholesale price c2, the retailer orders Q
∗
2 = χ
(
1− Q1χ − θ¯+c22
)
and sets p∗2 =
1− Q1+Q∗2χ , when Q1 ≤ χ
(
1− θ¯2
)
. Otherwise it does not order and sets p∗2 =
θ¯
2 .
(ii) The supplier sets c∗2 = 1− Q1χ − θ¯2 when Q∗2 > 0.
This yields profits ΠR,2 =
χ
16 θ¯
2 + 3(χ−Q1)4 θ¯ − 3(χ−Q1)
2
4χ and ΠS,2 =
(2Q1−(2−θ¯)χ)2
8χ , when Q1 ≤
χ
(
1− θ¯2
)
. Otherwise ΠR,2 =
θ¯2χ
4 and ΠS,2 = 0.
Next we analyze the consumers’ decision in period 1. The customers conjecture period 2
expected price, given their beliefs about the retailer’s inventory level Qˆ1. Specifically, following
Lemma 21 they expect
E
[
p∗2(Qˆ1)
]
=

1
2
(
1− Qˆ1
1−α2
)
+ θ¯4 when Qˆ1 ≤ (1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
1+a−Qˆ1
4(1+a) +
3θ¯
8 otherwise.
(8.11)
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The marginal customer θ¯, who is indifferent between buying in period 1 or waiting for period 2 is
given by the following, using Equations 8.4 and 8.11.
θ¯ =

2((1−α2)(2p1−δ)+δQˆ1)
(1−α2)(4−3δ) when Qˆ1 ≤ (1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
2((1+α)(4p1−δ)+δQˆ1)
(1+α)(8−5δ) otherwise.
(8.12)
Now, we consider retailer’s period 1 problem. We can determine retailer’s optimal price by
solving for the optimal consumer segment that it should target in period 1. Following Equation 8.12
the retailer needs to set the following price in order for the customers in [θ¯, 1] to buy in period 1.
p1(θ¯, Qˆ1) =

(
1− 3δ4
)
θ¯ + δ2
(
1− Qˆ1
1−α2
)
when Qˆ1 ≤ (1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
(
1− 5δ8
)
θ¯ + δ4
(
1− Qˆ11+α
)
otherwise.
(8.13)
Note that in both cases of the Equation 8.13 retailer has a margin loss from the marginal customer’s
valuation and this loss increases as the customers believe that there are more units purchased in
period 1.
We can now formulate retailer’s total expected profit in terms of first period quantity Q1 and
target consumer segment [θ¯, 1]. Note that retailer’s expected profit function constitutes a piecewise
nature. Feasible decision set is divided into four regions depending on whether first period order
quantity is enough to serve the high market first period demand and whether retailer replenishes
in second period. The following Definition formally describes these strategies and corresponding
regions.
Definition 1. Depending on the first period order quantity and the market size retailer’s strategies
and the corresponding feasible regions are as follows:
(i) The retailer orders enough only to serve the low market demand in period 1 and replenishes
in period 2 both in a high or low market, when
(1− α)(1− θ¯) ≤ Q1 ≤
(
(1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
∧ (1 + α)(1− θ¯)
)
.
(ii) The retailer orders enough only to serve the low market demand in period 1 and replenishes
in period 2 if the demand is high however does not replenish if the demand is low, when
(1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
≤ Q1 ≤ (1 + α)(1− θ¯).
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(iii) The retailer orders enough to serve the high market demand in period 1 and replenishes in
period 2 both in a high or low market, when (1 + α)(1− θ¯) ≤ Q1 ≤ (1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
.
(iv) The retailer orders enough to serve the high market in period 1 and replenishes in period 2 if
the demand is high however does not replenish if the demand is low, when (1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
∨
(1 + α)(1− θ¯) ≤ Q1.
Note that in the first two cases retailer runs out of product in the first period when the demand
is high. In addition in cases (ii) and (iv) it has a left over quantity in second period if the demand
is low. For every case we write the expected total profit for retailer in terms of Q1 and θ¯ using
the Equation 8.13 and Lemma 21. Then we optimize subject to the feasible regions in Definition 1
and belief consistency in Equation 8.7. We omit the details for clarity in here and characterize the
optimization problem in the proof of the next proposition, which describes the retailer’s first period
optimal actions.
Proposition 34. When c1 ≥ 3/10 the SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 and the corre-
sponding marginal customer θ¯∗ in period 1 are as follows.
(i) When c1 ≤ 7−2δ+2α(3−4h)8(1+α) , the retailer sells the product in both periods, and it carries in-
ventory in between periods if the demand is low, where Q∗1 =
(1−α2)(7−2δ+2α(3−4h)−8(1+α)c1)
15−8δ−3α(1−4(α+δ)) ,
p∗1 =
4(1+α)(4(1−α)−δ(1−3α))c1−(4(4−3δ)h−3(12−5δ))α2+α(4h(4−δ)−4+14δ−3δ2)+(4−δ)(4−3δ)
2(12α2−3(1−4δ)α+(15−8δ)) and θ¯
∗ =
2(4(1−α2)c1+(9−4h)α2−(1−5δ−4h)α+(4−3δ))
12α2−3(1−4δ)α+(15−8δ)
(ii) When c1 >
7−2δ+2α(3−4h)
8(1+α) , the retailer does not procure in period 1and sells only in period 2,
where Q∗1 = 0, p∗1 = 1− δ4 and θ¯ = 1.
Note that retailer’s best response strategy comes from the case (iii) in Definition 1. In part
(i), (1−α)(1− θ¯∗) < Q∗1 = (1 +α)(1− θ¯∗), where the lower bound of the feasible region is binding,
that is retailer sells less than it orders if the demand is low, thus it carries inventory into the next
period. However, in part (ii) first period wholesale price is too high that it becomes non-profitable
to purchase and sell in period 1. Note that we provide the best response strategies for retailer only
for c1 ≥ 3/10. The strategies when c1 < 3/10 needlessly complicate the exposition since they are
off the equilibrium path. However, in the proof of this proposition we show that there does not
exist any equilibrium solution where c∗1 < 3/10.
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Finally, we consider the supplier’s period 1 problem. The supplier chooses c1 to maximize its
total expected profit:
ΠS = c1Q
∗
1 + E
[
ΠS,2(c1, Q
∗
1, θ¯
∗)
]
, (8.14)
where Q∗1 and θ¯∗ are given by Proposition 34 and ΠS,2 follows from Lemma 34. The following
Proposition describes the supplier’s optimal policy.
Proposition 35. The SPNE wholesale price in period 1 is given by
c1 =
8(9−4h)α3+(16(7−6h)δ−2(7−36h))α2−(24δ2−2(23+32h)δ−(69−104h))α+(16δ2−98δ+121)
32(4α3+(1+6δ)α2+2(2+δ)α+(7−4δ)) .
Firms’ optimal policies in period 1 are described by Propositions 34 and 35. Lemma 21 de-
fines the second period optimal decisions and (8.12) gives the marginal customer. Therefore, the
equilibrium of the game between the supplier, retailer and consumers is fully characterized by
Propositions 34 and 35, Lemma 21 and (8.12).
Propositions 34 and 35 show that supplier set the first period wholesale price sufficiently low
that retailer always buys in both periods. However, first period wholesale price is not as low as
that it is never feasible to carry inventory to second period when the demand is high. Indeed the
equilibrium first period wholesale price is not lower than 3/10.
Now that we have fully characterized the equilibrium we can analyze the optimal decisions and
the corresponding expected profit values for supplier and retailer to figure out the implications
of demand uncertainty and the customer patience. Specifically, we want to understand how the
strategic customer behavior changes, how the supply chain parties’ optimal decisions are made and
what the implications are on the supply chain performance as the demand uncertainty changes
when the supply chain faces forward looking customers.
8.4 Supply Chain Performance
It is worthwhile to investigate the optimal decisions to better understand the inner workings
of the equilibrium. We are especially interested in how the changes in the demand uncertainty
changes the equilibrium values. From customers’ point of view while in a low demand market
there is an opportunity for deep cuts in retailer price, in a high demand market there is a risk of
not being able to afford the product. On one hand we might think that high demand variability
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should prevent customers from waiting but on the other hand there could be a good chance of
receiving a much lower price in period two. Therefore, it is not trivial to determine how customer
patience affects the equilibrium decisions when there is demand uncertainty. Specifically we would
like to find out how the market segments in equilibrium and how the portion of customers that
time their purchase changes when there is variability in demand. We need the following Definition
of equilibrium market composition to answer this question.
Definition 2. At equilibrium a customer with valuation θ belongs to the market segment:
(i) First period buyers when θ > θ¯∗,
(ii) Strategic waiters when θ¯∗ > θ > p∗1
(iii) Second period buyers when p∗1 > θ > p∗2
When uncertainty resolves if the demand is high some of the strategic waiters defined in case
(ii) above are actually rationed out since the realized second period optimal retail price is bigger
than first period price, which only happens when δ is sufficiently high. Note that this is not contrary
to the rational expectations equilibrium because the expected p2 is not higher than p1, hence these
customers would not deviate from their decisions.
Theorem 18. Let µ =
∫ θ¯∗
p∗1
dθ∫ 1
p∗2
dθ
be the fraction of customers that wait strategically for a price drop
in period two, then E[µ] increases as the demand becomes more volatile.
Theorem 18 states that in a supply chain selling to forward looking customers demand uncer-
tainty intensifies the strategic behavior. This suggests that equilibrium optimal values formed in
such a way that supply chain members are affected more from the variations in demand rather
than the customers. Specifically, we find that optimal choices by the supply chain members leave
them prone to customers’ strategic actions such that as the demand variability increases the market
composition moves to a more forward looking mix. Next we investigate the implications of these
on the supply chain performance.
So far we showed that demand uncertainty intensifies the strategic customer behavior. In the
following we investigate the implications of this on retailer and supplier profits separately. We are
particularly interested in how supplier and retailer experiences this change in market dynamics and
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how the supply chain profit is allocated. The following Corollary describes the affects on the firm
profits.
Corollary 4. Both supplier’s and retailer’s as well as the supply chain’s profit decreases when
demand becomes more volatile and/or customers become acting more strategically.
Corollary 4 tells us that both the demand uncertainty and the strategic customer behavior have
negative affects on the supply chain members’ profits. Although this result is expected we need
it to use as a basis for our main investigation about the relative severity of these two perils. The
following definition gives us a good measure that can be used for this purpose.
Definition 3. Let Πi (α, δ), i ∈ {S,R} be supplier’s and retailer’s profit respectively. Then Liδ =
(Πi(α,0)−Πi(α,δ))+(Πi(0,0)−Πi(0,δ))
2(Πi(0,0)−Πi(α,δ)) , i ∈ {S,R} defines the relative loss due to strategic behavior for
supplier and retailer. Similarly, Liα = (
Πi(0,δ)−Πi(α,δ))+(Πi(0,0)−Πi(α,0))
2(Πi(0,0)−Πi(α,δ)) , i ∈ {S,R} defines the
relative loss due to demand uncertainty for supplier and retailer.
Above measures of loss give us the fraction of the total decline in profit due to either of the
two factors, namely demand uncertainty and the strategic customer behavior. Note that Π also
depends on the holding cost h but we omit that dependence here for clarity of exposition. Following
Corollary 4 both of the relative loss measures are monotone, continuous and have values in (0, 1)
provided {α, δ} > 0. By comparing Lδ and Lα for supplier and retailer we can find out the regions
where either the demand uncertainty or the strategic behavior has a dominant effect on the supply
chain member’s profit loss. The following Lemma describes which of the factors has a dominant
impact on each of the supply chain members’ profit loss within our parameter space.
Lemma 22. For the relative loss measures defined in Definition 3
(i)
∫
1{LSδ>LSα}dδdα <
∫
1{LSδ<LSα)}dδdα
(ii)
∫
1{LRδ >LRα}dδdα >
∫
1{LRδ <LRα}dδdα
Lemma 22 says that while strategic customers have a bigger impact on the retailer’s profit loss,
demand uncertainty plays a bigger role on the supplier’s profit decline. This suggests that supplier
would not be affected by strategic customers as it would be affected from the demand uncertainty.
This is expected since the supplier does not observe the customers’ decisions directly but only
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through retailer’s order quantity, which are passed on to supplier as variability in demand. On the
other hand retailer not only deals with forward looking behavior directly but also has to have a
solution for demand uncertainty. Clearly, when demand is predictable but customers are forward
looking, strategic behavior will have more affect on the profit loss. Similarly, when demand is highly
uncertain but customers are acting myopically, demand variability will have a bigger impact. The
interesting case is when both of these factors are in the middle range where it is hard to determine
intuitively how to attribute the loss. In this case, our relative loss measures give us an important
insight as we formally state next.
Theorem 19. Given relative loss measures in Definition 3 then,
∫
1{LSδ<LSα
⋂LRδ >LRα}dδdα > 0.
Theorem 19 states that there exists a region where the relative loss priorities for the supply
chain firms differ from each other. We plot this region in Figure 8.2. In region (i) of Figure 8.2
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Figure 8.2: Relative importance regions for the loss factors when h = 1/4.
relative loss due to uncertainty is bigger than relative loss for strategic customer behavior for both
retailer and the supplier, ie. LSα > LSδ and LRα > LRδ . Similarly in region (iii) LSα < LSδ and
LRα < LRδ . Both of these are expected as we described above. However, in region (ii) when there
is moderate to high demand uncertainty and customer patience, while customer foresight has a
bigger impact on the retailer’s profit loss, demand uncertainty has a bigger affect on the supplier’s
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profit performance. This finding suggests that in a supply chain, companies would have different
incentives in dealing with these factors. We can see how this difference in relative importance of
the factors impacting the supply chain members’ profits plays a role in moving the equilibrium as
the underlying parameters change. This brings us to one of our main research questions. Do supply
chain parties alter their key decisions based on the level of demand uncertainty when the customers
are strategically timing their purchase decisions?
Corollary 5. For any value of α that determines the demand variability, as the customer patience
increases;
(i) c∗1 and p∗1 decrease monotonically,
(ii) Q∗1 increases, while θ¯∗, c∗2, p∗2 and Q∗2 decrease if and only if α < α¯1 =
√
2(32h2−4h+23)−4(2h+1)
2(5−12h) .
Corollary 5 describes the relationship between the uncertainty parameter and the holding cost
where the equilibrium is formed in such a way that the optimal decisions increase the number of
customers that buy in period one. Specifically, when α < α¯1 supplier’s optimal wholesale price
choices induce the retailer to move the sale towards first period by increasing the period one
quantity and decreasing the second period quantity. This makes more customers to buy in period
one instead of waiting for the second period. However, retailer’s margin loss also increases, which
means that retailer has to offer a much less price to make those customers buy in period one. In
addition retailer is able to react like this because demand uncertainty is still relatively low and
holding cost does not constitute a big issue. In contrast when α > α¯1 uncertainty becomes too
much of a risk for the retailer and it no longer can afford the same service level in the first period.
Instead, it decreases period one quantity and sells more in period two, which also increases the
marginal customer’s valuation.
In addition, following Corollary 5 we observe that when α < α¯1, supplier’s and retailer’s relative
loss priorities align in such a way that as the customer patience increases equilibrium decisions cause
less customers to delay purchase in period one. One can attribute these choices to the supplier’s
understanding of the main factor that drives its loss, ie. uncertainty. Since increasing the sale in
the first period is consistent with the goal towards decreasing loss due to uncertainty; it makes
sense for supplier to choose the equilibrium first period wholesale price that way. In addition more
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customers buying in period one instead of waiting for a reduced price in period two is a good
outcome for dealing with strategic customer loss. Therefore retailer’s optimal first period choice is
consistent with its incentive. However, the mismatch of the priorities in the decision choices fails to
prevent the loss for the supply chain. Moreover it exacerbates the coordination problem the supply
chain already is experiencing.
Up until now we tried to show that supplier and retailer have different understandings about
the main profit loss driver when operating in an environment when both demand uncertainty and
the strategic customer behavior are effective. Next we try to quantify the impact of these factors
on the supply chain profits by introducing the fractional loss measures.
Definition 4. Given Πi (α, δ), i ∈ {S,R} supplier’s and the retailer’s profit. The fractional loss
due to strategic customer behavior is defined as Ωiδ (α, δ) = 1− Π
i(α,δ)
Πi(α,0)
, i ∈ {S,R} and the fractional
loss due to demand uncertainty is defined as Ωiα (α, δ) = 1− Π
i(α,δ)
Πi(0,δ)
, i ∈ {S,R}.
Fractional loss measures Ωα and Ωδ take into account only the difference in objective along
the change in one of the factors that impact the profit by keeping the other constant. Note we
showed in Corollary 4 that profits decrease as variability in demand (α) or the customer patience
(δ) increases. Therefore, Ω is non-negative. In addition since it is normalized we can use it to
compare the impact of uncertainty and the strategic customers on the supplier and retailer profits,
which we present in the following Theorem.
Theorem 20. Let Ωij, i ∈ {S,R} and j ∈ {α, δ} be the fractional loss due to uncertainty and the
fractional loss due to strategic behavior for the supplier and the retailer respectively. Then for any
α and δ,
(i) ΩSα > Ω
R
α.
(ii) ΩSδ < Ω
R
δ .
Theorem 20 states that when demand variability increases while customer patience stays the
same, supplier’s percent decline in its profit would be bigger than that of retailer’s profit. Similarly
when customers’ strategic behavior intensifies while the demand uncertainty remains the same,
retailer’s percent loss in its profit will be higher than that of supplier’s profit. Note that this result
complements the insight we gathered through the relative loss measures and the Lemma 22, such
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that from supplier’s point of view demand uncertainty is not only a more important problem than
the strategic customer behavior but also it has a bigger impact on the supplier’s profit loss than
that of retailer’s. Similarly, having customers waiting for a price decrease constitutes a bigger issue
for retailer rather than the changes in the market size, in addition the impact of more patient
customers on the retailer’s profit is bigger than the supplier’s profit. Next we investigate how the
fractional loss due to uncertainty changes as the customer patience increases.
Corollary 6. For any α that drives the demand uncertainty as the customer patience increases
(i) ΩSα increases,
(ii) there exists δ¯9 such that Ω
R
α increases if and only if δ < δ¯9.
Corollary 6 says that supplier’s fractional loss increases as the customers become more pa-
tient. This is in line with our observation through the relative loss measures we provided in
Definition 3, such that the effects of the forward looking customers is passed on to the sup-
plier through the fluctuations in order quantities by the retailer, which increases the supplier’s
loss due to uncertainty. Moreover the increase in supplier’s uncertainty loss is bigger than re-
tailer’s loss; in fact when δ > δ¯9 retailer’s uncertainty loss decreases as the level of strategic
behavior increases. Note that δ¯9 is around the middle range; for example when h = 1/4 and
α = {1/20, 1/10, 3/20, 1/5, 1/4, 3/10, 7/20, 2/5, 9/20, 1/2} then
δ¯9 ≈ {0.59, 0.58, 0.57, 0.56, 0.55, 0.53, 0.51, 0.48, 0.45, 0.40}
Corollary 6 together with Theorem 20 provides further evidence that the supply chain’s coor-
dination problem intensifies with demand uncertainty when facing forward looking customers. If
either wants to mitigate its loss it will have a different priority in designing a policy. Therefore any
attempt to alleviate the affects of these factors without coordination might cause harm to the other
party. Furthermore any coordinating policy has to take into account both the demand uncertainty
and the affects of customer patience.
So far we focused on individual supply chain members to get an understanding of the impli-
cations of demand uncertainty separately. Next we introduce the centralized system to use as a
benchmark to further our insights about the supply chain as a whole.
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8.5 Centralized System Benchmark
In this section we consider centralized supply chain as a benchmark. For simplicity and to
be consistent with the decentralized system we normalize the production costs to zero. However,
centralized manufacturer also incurs a holding cost h per the units that are not sold in period
1. Similar to the decentralized model centralized system sets the retail prices pi in each period
i : 1, 2 and consumers decide whether to buy the product in that period. Next Lemma describes
the second period decisions. Similar to Section 8.3 let χ be the market size realized, which is 1∓α
according to Equation 8.1.
Lemma 23. Suppose centralized manufacturer produces Q1 in period 1 and the consumer segment
[0, θ¯]) remains in the market in period 2. Then the firm produces Q∗2 = χ
(
1− Q1χ − θ¯2
)
and sets
p∗2 = 1− Q1+Q
∗
2
χ , when Q1 ≤ χ
(
1− θ¯2
)
. Otherwise it does not produce and sets p∗2 =
θ¯
2 .
Following the same analysis in Section 8.3 we can formulate centralized firm’s expected first
period profit in terms of first period quantity Q1 and the target consumer segment. Manufac-
turer’s profit is also a piecewise function. The following Definition explains the regions and the
corresponding decisions.
Definition 5. Based on Q1 and the market size, centralized firm’s strategies and the corresponding
feasible regions are as follows:
(i) The firm produces enough to serve the low market demand in period 1 and produces more to
match the demand in period 2 both in a high or low market, when (1 − α)(1 − θ¯) ≤ Q1 ≤
(1 + α)(1− θ¯).
(ii) The firm produces enough to serve the high market demand in period 1 and produces more to
match the demand in period 2 both in a high or a low market, when (1 + α)(1 − θ¯) ≤ Q1 ≤
(1− α)
(
1− θ¯2
)
.
Note that in the first case above the firm may run out of product if the demand is high and in
second case it can carry inventory if the demand is low. Next Proposition defines the equilibrium.
Proposition 36. The SPNE order quantity Q∗1 and retail price p∗1 and the corresponding marginal
customer θ¯∗ in period 1 are as follows.
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(i) When δ ≤ 1 − 2hα the firm sells the product in both periods, and it carries inventory in
between periods if the demand is low, where Q∗1 =
(1+α)(1−2hα−δ)
3−2δ , p
∗
1 =
(2−δ)(1+hα− δ2)
3−2δ and
θ¯∗ = 2(1+hα−
δ
2)
3−2δ
(ii) When δ > 1− 2hα the firm sells the product only in period 2, where Q∗1 = 0 and θ¯∗ = 1.
Both of the cases in Proposition 36 comes from case (ii) of Definition 5, and the lower bound
on the Q1 constraint binds. Note that when the holding cost and / or the demand uncertainty is
unrealistically high centralized firm sell the product only in period 2. Although this case is part of
the equilibrium it is unlikely to happen in a real life scenario. Proposition 36 and Lemma 23 fully
characterize the centralized system equilibrium. Next we use the performance of the centralized
system as a benchmark to better understand the implications of decentralization when the system
is selling to forward looking customers and it suffers from demand variability.
8.6 Centralized vs. Decentralized System Performance
Recall that we discussed the customers’ trade off of buying in period one or waiting for a sale
through the variability in demand point of view in Section 8.4. Although same situation applies to
the customers in a centralized system; different dynamics are at play in terms of how the equilibrium
is attained. Therefore, it is important to analyze the equilibrium market composition and how it
changes with the uncertainty as well as contrasting against the centralized equilibrium market
mix to tease out how differently both systems react to strategic customer behavior. Following the
customer segments in Definition 2 the following Theorem answers this question.
Theorem 21. Let µC be the fraction of customers that wait strategically for a price drop in period
two in a centralized system, which is defined the same way as in Theorem 18 then,
(i) E[µC ] increases as the demand becomes more variable,
(ii) there exists δ¯10(h, α) such that E[µ] < E[µ
C ] if and only if δ < δ¯10.
Theorem 21 shows that, similar to the decentralized supply chain, in a centralized system
demand uncertainty intensifies the strategic customer behavior. Moreover, expected number of
customers that wait strategically at equilibrium is more in a centralized system than that of de-
centralized supply chain provided customers are sufficiently patient. This suggests that although
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the decentralized supply chain suffers from double marginalization and coordinating against the
forward looking customers it still is less prone to strategic behavior than the centralized system.
The following Corollary shows the affects on the centralized system’s profit.
Corollary 7. Unless the centralized firm sells the product only in period two in equilibrium, its
profit decreases when the demand becomes more volatile (a larger α) or the customers become more
patient (a larger δ).
Similar to decentralized supply chain centralized system is also adversely affected from both
the strategic behavior and the demand uncertainty. Next we utilize the relative loss measures given
in Definition 3 to give us an insight about the centralized manufacturer’s understanding of the loss
severity.
Lemma 24. Let LCj , j ∈ α, δ the relative loss measures for the centralized system defined the same
way as in Definition 3 then
∫
1{LCδ >LCα }dδdα >
∫
1{LCδ <LCα }dδdα.
Lemma 24 states that similar to decentralized retailer, strategic customers have a bigger impact
on the centralized profit than the demand uncertainty. This is expected according to our findings
from Theorem 21, where we show that volatility in demand increases the strategic waiting behavior.
The following theorem provides further insights about how the decentralization plays a role on the
relative loss due to customer patience by comparing decentralized supply chain’s and the centralized
manufacturer’s loss priority.
Theorem 22. Given Lij i ∈ {R,C, S} and j ∈ {α, δ} defined the same way as in Definition 3 then,
(i)
∫
1{LCδ >LCα }dδdα >
∫
1{LRδ >LRα}dδdα,
(ii)
∫
1{LCδ >LCα }dδdα >
∫
1{LSδ>LSα}dδdα.
Theorem 22 shows that the region where the centralized manufacturer experiences a bigger
loss from strategic behavior, ie. region where Lδ > Lα, is bigger than that of retailer and supplier,
which can be seen in Figure 8.3. For example, in region (i) of Figure 8.3a both Liδ < Liα, i ∈ {R,C}.
Similarly in region (iii), Liδ > Liα, i ∈ {R,C}. However, in region (ii), LRδ < LRα but LCδ > LCα .
Regions in Figure 8.3b have the same interpretation except they correspond to centralized firm
versus the decentralized supplier. These observations suggest that decentralization and particularly
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(b) Supplier vs. centralized firm.
Figure 8.3: Relative importance regions for the loss factors for a centralized firm and the decentralized
retailer and supplier, when h = 1/4.
the decisions at equilibrium protects supply chain members from further exposure to the adverse
affects of strategic customer behavior. This result shows further indication that decentralization
may provide some prevention from the disadvantages of selling to forward looking customers. We
can see that the centralized system suffers more when selling to strategic customers. Next we
investigate whether this is due to the way how centralized firm makes the key decisions.
Corollary 8. Given any α that determines the demand variability, then at equilibrium as the
customer patience increases centralized firm decreases p1, Q1 and increases p2, Q2. This increases
marginal customer’s valuation θ¯.
Corollary 8 shows that centralized system’s optimal decisions are monotone with respect to the
strategic customer behavior. In particular as the customers become more eager to wait for second
period the firm decreases the service level in period one and increases in period two. Recall we show
in Corollary 5 that in decentralized equilibrium when demand variability is low retailer actually
increases the period one quantity. Here, Corollary 8 shows that absent supplier pricing centralized
firm does not employ this strategy. Shifting sales from first period to second decreases the risk of
uncertainty. As δ increases, customers’ willingness to wait for second period and the firm’s incentive
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to sell in period two align. By decreasing period one quantity centralized firm decreases the risk
due to uncertainty, however it fails to address the strategic customer behavior as we show next.
Theorem 23. Let ΩSCδ , Ω
C
δ be the fractional loss due to strategic behavior for the decentralized
supply chain and the centralized system respectively. Unless the centralized firm sells the product
only in period two in equilibrium, ΩSCδ < Ω
C
δ .
Theorem 23 shows that although the decentralized supply chain suffers from lack of coordi-
nation, it is more efficient in terms of dealing with strategic customers. Note that decentralized
supply chain still suffers from double marginalization such that ΠSC < ΠC . However, information
disparity and the difference between the retailer and supplier in the decisions that they can control
creates the opportunity to make equilibrium decisions in such a way that the fractional loss due
to strategic behavior to become less than that of centralized system. From the retailer’s point of
view not only demand uncertainty but also the strategic customer behavior creates a profit risk.
However, retailer can only manipulate the demand by the retailer prices but cannot control the
availability directly because of the supplier pricing. So it does not have full power to act upon the
uncertainty risk. On the other hand centralized firm can control both the prices and the availabil-
ity. Centralized system makes decisions such that it reduces the cost due to demand variability
by carefully controlling the availability, however it fails to address the strategic customer behavior.
This can better be depicted by the Figure 8.4.
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(c) h = 1/2
Figure 8.4: Fractional loss due to uncertainty for centralized firm and decentralized supply chain.
We see that when there is little uncertainty in the demand and the customers are not patient
centralized firm’s uncertainty loss is bigger than the decentralized supply chain. However, as the
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uncertainty increases customers need to be very impatient for that to happen. When demand
is sufficiently volatile then centralized system always has less fractional uncertainty loss than the
decentralized supply chain.
Recall that in Section 8.4 we commented on the supply chain members’ decision choices given
in Corollary 5 that the supplier’s and retailer’s optimal decisions align with their understanding of
relative loss severity when α < α¯1. Here, centralized manufacturer’s decisions are not in line with
the loss priority we get through the relative loss measures. However, note that centralized system
lacks any leverage to make decisions as such. Since the only strategy that might decrease the loss due
to strategic customers can be either price or quantity commitments, which the centralized system
cannot implement without a credible commitment device. On the other hand decentralized system
achieves such an equilibrium because supplier moves first and determines the first period wholesale
price by which it can always manipulate the retailer’s first period quantity choice. Therefore,
it is not because supplier and retailer better coordinate when selling to strategic customers but
because the supplier’s pricing decisions provide means for retailer to act upon and better allocate
the quantities to both periods so that some of the strategic loss maybe prevented. Next we show
that while decentralized supply chain equilibrium has less fractional loss due to strategic behavior
than the centralized system, it is more susceptible to demand uncertainty.
Theorem 24. Let ΩSCδ the fractional loss due to strategic customers for the supply chain defined
the same way as in Definition 4 using the total profit, ie. ΠS + ΠR. For any δ that determines the
customer patience, as the variability in demand increases,
(i) ΩCδ decreases,
(ii) there exists an α¯2(h, δ) such that Ω
SC
δ increases if and only if α < α¯2.
Note that α¯2 is closer to the upper bound. When h = 1/4 and δ = {0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1} then
α¯2 ≈ {0.46, 0.43, 0.40, 0.37, 0.32}.
Theorem 24 provides us the chance to shed light on the interesting dynamics that are at
play when forming the decentralized and the centralized equilibriums. Below we first explain the
centralized result to form the basis for our explanation on the decentralized equilibrium. We then
introduce Corollary 9 to help us explain the second part of the Theorem.
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First part of Theorem 24 shows that a higher demand variability results in a lower fractional
loss due to strategic customers for the centralized system. To better understand why, it is helpful to
look into how the underlying fractional loss is given in Definition 4. Note that following Corollary 7
both the numerator and the denominator decreases as α increases. Here, the decline in the myopic
profit, ie. Π(α, 0) is faster than the profit with strategic behavior, ie. Π(α, δ). To understand
why the myopic profit decreases faster than the strategic profit the result in Corollary 8 is helpful.
Recall that when we investigate the centralized system’s equilibrium decisions in Corollary 8 we
observe that the firm’s and the customers’ incentives to move the sale towards the second period
align when customers are forward looking. However, when δ = 0, ie. customers are myopic this
alignment vanishes. Therefore, increasing demand variability has a higher impact on the equilibrium
with the myopic customers than that with strategic customers.
In contrast, second part of Theorem 24 says that unless the demand variability is sufficiently
high supply chain’s fractional loss due to strategic behavior increases. Following Corollary 4 both
the numerator and the denominator term in the fractional loss measure for supply chain decrease.
In this case when α < α¯2 and as the demand becomes more volatile strategic profit, Π(α, δ),
decreases faster than the myopic profit, Π(α, 0). To understand why there is this contrast between
centralized firm and the decentralized supply chain we need to look into how supplier’s first period
wholesale price decision affects retailer’s quantity choices. Clearly, if supplier increases c1 retailer
will decrease the first period quantity and increase the second period quantity. However, the level
of demand volatility determines how big of an impact supplier pricing will have on the retailer’s
quantity decisions. The following Corollary describes this relationship.
Corollary 9. Let Q1, Q
h
2 and Q
l
2 are the retailer’s first period, second period high and low market
best response quantities given in Proposition 34. Then as α increases,
(i) there exists α¯3(δ) such that
∣∣∣dQ1dc1 ∣∣∣ and dQh2dc1 increases if and only if α < α¯3,
(ii) there exists α¯4(δ) > α¯3 such that
dQl2
dc1
increases if and only if α < α¯4.
Corollary 9 shows that the impact of supplier’s first period wholesale price choice has an increas-
ing effect on the retailer’s quantity choices unless the uncertainty is sufficiently high. Otherwise
this impact weakens.
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Let’s first consider the case of low demand variability. When customers are myopic (δ = 0)
they want to buy in first period, which aligns with supplier’s preference of how the retailer allocates
quantity to both periods. In other words supplier wants retailer to sell in period one because of the
demand uncertainty. However, when customers are strategic (δ > 0) they want to wait for second
period, which does not align with the way how supplier manipulates the retailer quantities through
c1 choice. As α increases the supplier’s impact on the quantity choices intensifies, which amplifies
the misalignment in strategic case. Therefore the decline in the supply chain profit for the strategic
case is faster than the myopic case.
Now, when there is high volatility in demand as we showed in Corollary 9 supplier’s impact
on the retailer’s quantity choices weakens. Although the misalignment in the strategic case still
exists between the supplier’s and the customers’ choices, retailer’s tendency to sell in second period
becomes more effective similar to the centralized case. Therefore, the decline in Π(α, 0) becomes
bigger than the decline in Π(α, δ), which decreases the supply chain’s fractional loss due to strategic
behavior.
8.7 Concluding Remarks
There have been many work on the strategic customers recently answering questions about
dynamic pricing policies, commitments, supply chain performance with different contracts etc.,
showing that the forward looking behavior can be very harmful to the firm profits. In this research
we extend this line of work by considering, the selling to strategic customers problem in a supply
chain setting with demand uncertainty. Our careful modeling choices enable us to drive strategic
behavior independently from the demand uncertainty, ie. without customers facing a rationing
risk, which provides us mechanisms to quantify and compare both of these loss factors separately.
We find that supply chain members are not in agreement about the main causes of the loss they
observe in their profits. While this misalignment exacerbates the coordination problem, it provides
an equilibrium such that the expected customers strategically delaying the purchase is smaller than
that of the centralized system. In addition we show that the way uncertainty affects the firms’
equilibrium decisions and the loss metrics we provide is different within the decentralized supply
chain and across the decentralized and centralized systems.
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These insights have important implications. First, strategic customer behavior may not always
be the highest priority for a firm to deal with depending on how much variability in the demand it
observes and the supply chain structure. This has to be taken into account when making investment
decisions such as advanced analytical products. While it maybe more important for the supplier
to generate better forecast it maybe beneficial for the retailer to invest in customer relationship
management to mitigate forward looking behavior.
Second, our results show that when designing a coordinating contract for the decentralized
supply chain one has to take into account both the demand variability and the intensity of the
customer patience as they have different implications on the supplier and retailer.
Third, our findings show that centralized and decentralized equilibriums are driven by much
different dynamics when there is variability in demand and the system is facing strategic customers.
This provides evidence that policies that mitigate for example the adverse effects of demand variabil-
ity does not always apply to the decentralized system. This shows that there is need for designing
such policies that are special for the decentralized supply chain.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion and Future Research
In this dissertation we investigate the selling to strategic customers problem in a supply chain
setting composed of a supplier and a retailer. There have been some work where the supply chain
perspective is pursued as well, however our work differs from them in some significant ways. We
consider endogenous retailer and supplier pricing. This provides us the required richness in the
model to capture the interactions in a supply chain. We consider a two-period selling season and a
second replenishment opportunity for the retailer before period two. This provides further flexibility
to our model, which plays an important role in driving certain insights.
In our base model, in period one, the supplier sets the wholesale price, the retailer places
its order from the supplier and sets its retail price, and then forward-looking strategic customers
decide whether to buy the product in that period. Retailer can carry any of the unsold inventory to
period two. Before the second selling season supplier announces the second period wholesale price
and retailer decides the order quantity and the second period retail price considering its inventory
level and the remaining demand in the market. Then those customers who can afford the price
purchase the product. Here we consider the total market size as deterministic, which provides
a baseline for analytically tractable models that we investigate later. We provide the sub-game
perfect equilibrium of this model where in each period every decision is made optimally by each
player in the game given the global information and their beliefs about the unobserved parameters.
Next we focus our attention to various commitment scenarios. Previous studies have shown
that a firm’s ability to make commitments is effective in dealing with strategic customer behavior.
However, those studies consider only the interactions between a retailer and consumers. In this
dissertation, we study the value of commitments in a decentralized supply chain by also taking into
account how commitments affect the interactions between the retailer and its supplier. We start
with various quantity commitment scenarios where supplier and retailer declare decisions about the
quantities unilaterally or simultaneously and stick with them throughout the entire selling season.
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We next investigate many price commitment settings where either the supplier or the retailer
announces a predefined price path unilaterally or simultaneously. For each of the commitment
models we show the equilibrium optimal values, compare them to the baseline performance and we
provide the value of such commitments.
We find that while commitments always increase profitability of a centralized system, in a
decentralized supply chain, the retailer’s and supplier’s commitments do not necessarily improve
their profitability. Furthermore, they can hurt the other partner in the supply chain, thereby
making the whole supply chain worse off. This is because such commitments can exacerbate double-
marginalization inefficiency in a supply chain. Without addressing the coordination problem, then,
commitments cannot address the strategic customer problem in a decentralized supply chain.
Having shown that quantity and price commitments are not always profitable in a decentralized
supply chain in the next chapter we compare the performance of these models for the supplier and
retailer. In addition we analyze the scenarios where a supply chain member commits to both
quantity and price concurrently. We find that in general quantity commitment is a more flexible
tool when compared to price commitment in terms of how it provides responses to the counterpart
in the supply chain and how it helps in dealing with the strategic customers. However, committing
both the quantity and price takes way that flexibility.
After doing an extensive investigation about the value of several commitment scenarios in a
supply chain setting in order to evaluate the robustness of our results we alter two key modelling
choices we made initially and reevaluate our findings. We first provide the model with an alternative
utility discounting assumption where customers discount the net utility they gain in period two as
oppose to discounting only their valuation. With this change we reestablish the baseline equilibrium
and the corresponding quantity and price commitment equilibriums for the supplier and retailer.
Next we provide the model where it is not feasible for retailer to carry over the unsold inventory
to period two and the rest of the main commitment models with this assumption. We find that
in general, our main result about the commitments that they may not necessarily be valuable in
a decentralized supply chain continues to hold even when these key modelling assumptions are
altered. This provides the evidence that our results are not due to our modelling choices but rather
due to the interactions in a supply chain.
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Recall that the findings we have discussed so far are driven with a wholesale price contract in
a decentralized supply chain. A natural direction to analyze further is then a more sophisticated
mechanism that coordinates the supply chain members. Therefore we investigate the value of
commitments with the two part tariff contract. We show that under this contract commitments
never hurt the supplier and the retailer and always benefits the supply chain.
Note that the total market size is deterministic in the models that we analyze the commit-
ments, which enables analytical tractability. Earlier studies (e.g., Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Cachon
and Swinney 2009) show that demand uncertainty can make commitments less valuable in a cen-
tralized system. This is because making commitments impairs a firm’s ability to respond to demand
variability. However, in a decentralized supply chain, the effect of demand uncertainty may be more
intricate because of the vertical interactions between the retailer and the supplier. As the final in-
vestigation in this dissertation we extend our base model by introducing the demand variability.
We drive the volatility in the demand and the customer patience separately, which enables us to
evaluate the implications of uncertainty on the strategic customer behavior. We first provide the
equilibrium of the decentralized system. Using the optimal values at equilibrium we investigate the
effects of demand uncertainty on the equilibrium market composition, supply chain members’ profit
performance, relative importance of the demand volatility and the customer patience in terms of
how they affect the total loss of each of the supply chain members as well as the percent loss they
observe in the presence of forward looking customers. These comparisons within the decentralized
supply chain enables us to drive certain insights about the supply chain members’ loss mitigation
preferences.
In addition we analyze the centralized benchmark and compare the performance of the central-
ized and decentralized systems when selling to strategic customers with demand uncertainty. We
find that although decentralized system suffers from double marginalization inefficiency the fraction
of customers that delay their purchases in equilibrium and the corresponding loss in the presence of
strategic customers is smaller than those of the centralized system. After establishing these results
we then analyze the implications of demand uncertainty on the profit loss for the two systems and
show how the vertical interaction in the decentralized system is effecting the changes in profit loss.
In particular we explain the intricate relationship between the supplier pricing and the retailer’s
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order quantities and how the changing levels of demand volatility impact the decentralized system’s
loss due to strategic customers.
There are many possible directions that this research can evolve towards in the future. As
we mentioned earlier the opportunity to replenish before the second period provides flexibility to
the retailer. In contrast carrying inventory also provides leverage for the retailer on the second
period wholesale price. One interesting extension would be to investigate the value of this second
period replenishment when retailer incurs a holding cost for the unsold inventory in period one
and selling to a mixture of customers that some are myopic and some are forward looking. One
natural extension to the model with demand uncertainty would be to investigate the existence and
the performance of the coordinating contracts for the underlying supply chain that we considered.
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APPENDIX A
Explicit Statement of Period 2 Equilibrium Values
In the main text, equilibrium 2 values are stated in terms of period 1 quantities. This is
because those expressions are obtained by backward induction. By plugging in equilibrium values of
period 1 variables into those expressions, we can derive explicit expressions for period 2 equilibrium
outcomes. These are stated in the following table.
Table A.1: Summary of the period 2 equilibrium values
Region θ¯ c2 p2 Q2
NC
δ ≤ 1621 34 3δ8 9δ16 316
16
21 < δ
2(4−3δ)
16−15δ
δ(4−3δ)
16−15δ
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ)
4−3δ
2(16−15δ)
RQC
δ ≤ 0.249 34 0
δ > 0.249 8
5
√
16−5δ +
2
5
δ(4(
√
16−5δ+4)−5δ)
5(16−5δ)
3δ(4(
√
16−5δ+4)−5δ)
10(16−5δ)
2
5
√
16−5δ +
1
10
RPC δ ≤ 45 34 3δ4 0
SQC
δ < 12 1− 12(2−δ) 0
1/2 ≤ δ < 199−3
√
137
218
5−4δ
7−5δ 0
199−3√137
218 ≤ δ < 0.754 34 3δ8 9δ16 316
0.754 ≤ δ 43(1−K2) 23δ(1−K2) δ(1−K2) 1−K23
SPC
δ ≤ 1− 1√
17
2(6−5δ)
16−13δ
2δ(5−4δ)
16−13δ
δ(11−9δ)
16−13δ
1−δ
16−13δ
δ > 1− 1√
17
2−δ
4−3δ
δ(6−5δ)
2(4−3δ)
δ(10−7δ)
4(4−3δ)
2−3δ
4(4−3δ)
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APPENDIX B
Proofs
The proofs are presented in the order their corresponding results appear in the paper.
B.1 Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Since c2 > 0, the constraint in (2.9) binds. So we can write p2 in terms of
Q2, where p2 = δ(1 −Q1 −Q2). Plugging this result into the optimization problem in (2.2) leads
to
Q∗2 = arg max
Q2
−δQ22 − (c2 − (2(1−Q1)− θ¯)δ)Q2 + δ(1−Q1)(Q1 + θ¯ − 1) (B.1)
which is a concave function of Q2. First-order condition yields optimal (p2, Q2) in part (i) of Lemma
1.
Optimization problem in (2.3) then yields the following.
c∗2 = arg maxc2
1
2δ
(−c22 + δ(2(1−Q1)− θ¯)c2) (B.2)
First-order condition gives the optimal c2 in part (ii) of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. The retailer’s total profit in equation (2.12) can be written as:
ΠR(Q1, θ¯, Qˆ1) = −3δ
4
Q21 −
(
1− 13δ
16
)
θ¯2 − 3δ
4
θ¯Q1 (B.3)
−
(
c1 − 3δ
2
)
Q1 − 1
2
δ(1− θ¯)Qˆ1 + 1
4
(2(2− δ)θ¯ − δ).
Hessian of equation (B.3) is
 −3δ2 −3δ4
−3δ
4 −2 + 13δ8
 , and the eigenvalues of the Hessian are
− 1
16
(
16− δ +
√
256− δ(800− 769δ)
)
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and
− 1
16
(
16− δ −
√
256− δ(800− 769δ)
)
.
Since both of the eigenvalues are non-positive, equation (B.3) is jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯). Hence,
KKT conditions and equation (2.14) fully characterize the solution, which yield the regions and
optimal values in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. To find the supplier’s best response to the retailer’s optimal strategies
we need to analyze all three cases in Proposition 1.
For case (i) in Proposition 1, ΠS =
1
18δ(8−7δ)
(−2(32− 25δ)c21 − 9δ(12− 11δ)c1), which is a
concave function of c1.
dΠS
dc1
∣∣∣
c1=
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ)
= 2342 +
2
56−49δ − 848−45δ > 0 for δ < 4/5. Hence, optimal c1
is not in the interior of this region.
For case (ii), in Proposition 1, ΠS =
1
2(16−9δ)2
(−32c21(8− 5δ) + 2c1(8− 5δ)(16− 3δ) + (4− 3δ)2δ),
which is a concave function of c1.
dΠS
dc1
∣∣∣
c1=
8−3δ
8
= − 8−5δ16−9δ < 0 and dΠSdc1
∣∣∣
c1=
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ)
=
1
9
(
7− 1616−9δ − 2416−15δ
)
, which is greater than 0 for δ ≤ 1621 , and less than 0 for δ > 1621 . Thus the
solutions in two cases of Proposition 2 follow from this region.
ΠS is continuous at the boundaries and is equal to
δ
8 for case (iii) in Proposition 1, thus the
above solutions are globally optimal.
Proof of Lemma 2. Similar to proof of lemma 1 both of the profit functions are concave and
first order conditions yield the results.
Proof of Proposition 3. Retailer’s objective function is jointly concave in Q1, p1 and KKT con-
ditions yield the optimal values and the regions.
Proof of Proposition 4. Supplier’s objective function is concave in each part and quasiconcave
overall, hence the first order condition yield the result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Following propositions 2 and 4 there is one cutoff point for δ hence we
have two cases to consider. Below we present the proof for the result for supplier’s profit. Proof for
the supply chain and the retailer profits are similar. When δ ≤ 1621 the difference ΠNC
M
S − ΠNCS =
(8+δ)2
64(8−δ) − 8+3δ64 = d
2
16(8−d) , which is positive. When δ >
16
21 ,
d
(
ΠNC
M
S −ΠNCS
)
dδ =
2028
25(32−25d)2 +
4
(8−d)2 −
99
3
7(8−7d)2 − 453111200 > 0, so the difference function is increasing and
(
ΠNC
M
S −ΠNCS
)∣∣∣
δ= 16
21
= 2399 > 0,
hence ΠNC
M
S > Π
NC
S .
Proof of Lemma 3. For the centralized system, we can write (2.2) as
p∗2 = arg max
p2∈S2
[p2(θ¯ − p2/δ)].
First order condition gives p∗2 =
δθ¯
2 .
Correspondingly, Q∗1 = 1 − θ¯∗ and following (2.4), p∗1 = (1 − δ)θ¯∗ + θ¯2 . Now we can write the
seller’s pricing problem in terms of the target consumer segments, similarly to (2.12) as
θ¯∗ = arg max
θ¯
(−1 + 3δ
4
)θ¯2 + (1− δ
2
)θ¯.
First-order condition leads to θ¯∗ = 2−δ4−3δ . Plugging this result into the above expressions for p1 and
p2 yields the optimal prices in Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 4. We can write (2.17) as
p∗2 = arg max
p2∈S2
[p2(p1 − p2/δ)].
First order condition gives p∗2 =
p1
2 . Now we can write the seller’s pricing problem as
p1∗ = arg max
p1
(−4 + δ
4
)p21 + p1.
First-order condition yields the result.
Proof of Corollary 2. ΠNCC −ΠNC
M
C = − δ(8−(8−δ)δ)4(4−δ)(4−3δ) < 0. Hence the result follows.
B.2 Proofs of Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 5. If the seller commits to a maximum quantity of Qmax to sell in 2 periods
then following (2.9) p∗2 = δ(1−Qmax) and Q∗2 = Qmax−Q1. As is similar to the proof of Lemma 3,
Q∗1 = 1− θ¯∗. With these optimal values and by (2.4), we can write the seller’s first period problem
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as
(Q∗max, θ¯
∗) = arg max
(Qmax,θ¯)∈Qmax≥1−θ¯≥0
(−δQ2max − (1− δ)θ¯2 + δ(Qmax − θ¯) + θ¯) ,
which is jointly concave in (Qmax, θ¯). First-order condition results in
1
2 for both of the decision
variables, which gives the optimal p1 in Lemma 5.
Proof of Theorem 1. ΠNCC =
(2−δ)2
4(4−3δ) and Π
QC
C = Π
PC
C =
1
4 . Thus, the value of commitment is
δ(1−δ)
4(4−3δ) , which is always positive.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof follows from the discussion following the Lemma 6 in the text.
Proof of Lemma 7. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we have the following objective function
for the retailer in second period.
ΠR,2 = −δQ22 − (c2 − (2(1−Q1)− θ¯)δ)Q2 + δ(1−Q1)(Q1 + θ¯ − 1) (B.4)
Then first part of (3.1) gives
dΠR,2
dQ2
∣∣∣
Q2=Qmax−Q1
≥ 0, which, is the same as
δ(2(1−Qmax)− θ¯))− c2 ≥ 0. (B.5)
Because commitment binds, p∗2 = δ(1−Qmax) and Q∗2 = Qmax−Q1, thereby the inequality in (B.5)
binds, which gives c¯2 = c
∗
2 = δ(2(1−Qmax)− θ¯)). To have the retailer’s second period actions to be
consistent at this price, the second part of (3.1) needs to hold with the following supplier objective
in the second period.
ΠS,2 =
1
2δ
(−c22 + δ(2(1−Q1)− θ¯)c2) . (B.6)
Therefore,
dΠS,2
dc2
∣∣∣
c2=c¯2
≤ 0, yields
Qmax ≤ Q1 + 1
2
− θ¯
4
. (B.7)
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Proof of Proposition 5. The retailer’s objective function in (3.3) can be written as follows.
ΠR(Qmax, Q1, θ¯) = δQ
2
max − (1− δ)θ¯2 + (δ(2(1−Qmax)− θ¯)− c1)Q1 + (1− δ)θ¯ − δ(1− θ¯)Qmax.
(B.8)
Observe that the objective function above is a quadratic concave function of Qmax. So the op-
timal Qmax must be at one of two end points of the feasible region. Thus, one can separate the
optimization problem defined in (3.3-3.4) into two cases; where in the first case Qmax = Q1 and
in the second case Qmax =
Q1+1
2 − θ¯4 . The global optimal solution can be found by comparing the
solutions to these two cases of the problem. Hence, in the following we present the solutions of the
two cases explicitly.
Case A: When Qmax = Q1, the objective function reduces to the following.
ΠR,A(Q1, θ¯) = −(1− δ)θ¯2 − δQ21 + (1− δ)θ¯ − (c1 − δ)Q1. (B.9)
Hessian of (B.9) is
 −2(1− δ) 0
0 −2δ
 with the eigenvalues −2(1− δ) and −2δ, which are
non-positive. Hence, (B.9) is jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯). KKT conditions characterize the
solution for every c1 and δ, which gives Q
∗
1 =
1−c1
2 ,θ¯
∗ = 1+c12 .
Case B: When Qmax =
Q1+1
2 − θ¯4 , the objective function in (B.8) reduces to the following.
ΠR,B(Q1, θ¯) = (−1 + 13
16
)θ¯2 − δ
4
θ¯Q1 − 3δ
4
Q21 + (1−
δ
2
)θ¯ + (δ − c1)Q1 − δ
4
. (B.10)
Hessian of (B.10) is
 −(2− 13δ8 ) −δ4
− δ4 −3δ2
 with the eigenvalues
− 1
16
(
16− δ +
√
256− δ(800− 641δ)
)
and
− 1
16
(
16− δ −
√
256− δ(800− 641δ)
)
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, which are non-positive. Hence, (B.10) is jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯). KKT conditions char-
acterize the solution for every c1 and δ. So, for c1 <
2δ
16−15δ , Q
∗
1 =
1
60
(
36− 40c1δ − 6+5c16−5δ
)
,
θ¯∗ = c1−4δ+62(6−5δ) ; for
2δ
16−15δ ≤ c1 < 8−3δ8 , Q∗1 = 8(1−c1)−3δ16−5δ , θ¯∗ = 8(1+c1)−2δ16−5δ ; and for c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 ;
Q∗1 = 0 ,θ¯∗ = 1. Here, the first solution is in the interior of the feasible region S
′
1, which
is given in (2.15); the second is the one when the upperbound in S
′
1 binds and the last one
follows when both the upper and lowerbound in S
′
1 bind.
Now to find the global optimal solution we need to compare the solution in case A to the three solu-
tions in case B. Define Π∗R,Bj j : 1, 2, 3 as the objective values of the case B problem corresponding
to the three solutions described above respectively.
Π∗R,A −Π∗R,B1 =
1
8δ(6− 5δ)
(−(16− 5δ(5− 2δ))c21 + 4δ(1− δ)c1 + 2(1− δ)δ2) , (B.11)
which is a concave function of c1. When c1 = 0, it is greater than zero. The only positive c1 root
to this function is r¯1 =
(
2(1−δ)+√2
√
(6−5δ)(3−2δ)(1−δ)
)
δ
16−5(5−2δ)δ . To determine whether the first solution in
case B is the global solution we need to check if the c1 cutoff point for that solution is greater than
the c1 root of the difference function. However, r¯1 >
2δ
16−15δ since δ <
1
90
(
95−√385), so the first
solution in case B is not the global solution.
Now consider the second solution in case B,
Π∗R,A −Π∗R,B2 =
δ
4(16− 5δ)(−c1(2 + 5c1) + 3− δ), (B.12)
which is a concave function of c1. It is greater than 0 for c1 = 0 and the only positive c1 root to
this function is r¯2 =
√
16−5δ−1
5 . However, r¯2 <
8−3δ
8 since δ <
16
9 . Hence, for c1 <
√
16−5δ−1
5 the
global solution follows from part A and for
√
16−5δ−1
5 ≤ c1 < 8−3δ8 the global solution is given by
the second solution of case B. This leads to the first two parts of Proposition 5.
Now consider the third solution in case B,
Π∗R,A −Π∗R,B3 =
1
4
(1− c1)2 − δ
16
, (B.13)
which is a convex function of c1. It is greater than 0 for c1 = 0. The c1 root smaller than 1 is
r¯3 = 1−
√
δ
2 . However,
8−3δ
8 > r¯3, since δ <
16
9 . Hence, the global solution for c1 >
8−3δ
8 , is given by
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the third solution in case B. This yields the solution in part (iii) of Proposition 5, which completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. To find the best response of supplier to optimal retailer strategies we
have to analyze the supplier problem for each case of Proposition 5.
For the first case in Proposition 5, ΠS =
1
2(1 − c1)c1 and first-order condition yields optimal
c1 =
1
2 for δ <
3
4 . For δ ≥ 34 , the solution is at the boundary.
For the second case in Proposition 5, ΠS =
((4−δ)2−2c1(8−3δ))(16c1+δ)
2(16−5δ)2 , which is a concave function
of c1.
dΠS
dc1
∣∣∣∣
c1=
√
16−5δ−1
5
=
1
(16− 5δ)2
(
128 +
32
5
(
1−√16− 5δ
)
(8− 3δ)− δ(72− 11δ)
)
< 0.
Hence optimal c1 for this case is
√
16−5δ−1
5 .
For the third case in Proposition 5, ΠS =
δ
8 .
Now, as the overall ΠS function is not quasiconcave, we need to compare the solutions in the
three cases above to find the global optimal. First, note that the third case is always dominated.
Hence, we need to compare only the first two cases. The difference between the profits of the first
two cases is as follows:
16
(
113− 28√16− 5δ)+ δ (4 (5δ + 22√16− 5δ)− 693)
200(16− 5δ) , (B.14)
which is equal to 1200 and
1583−944√3
3000 < 0 for δ = 0 and δ =
4
5 respectively. Hence, there exists at
least one δ value, which makes the difference equal to 0. To show that there is at most one such δ,
we need to show that this difference is decreasing. The derivative of (B.14) is
(152− 5δ(248− 55δ))−√16− 5δ(512− 5δ(32− 5δ))
50(16− 5δ)5/2 , (B.15)
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where the denominator is positive. Define N(δ) as the numerator of (B.15) then;
N(δ) = (152− 5δ(248− 55δ))−√16− 5δ(512− 5δ(32− 5δ))
< (152− 5δ(248− 55δ))− 3(512− 5δ(32− 5δ))
= −8(173 + 5δ(19− 5δ))
< 0
Thus, (B.14) is decreasing and setting it equal to zero leads to below equation, which explicitly
characterizes δ¯1.
δ =
16
(
113− 28√16− 5δ)(
693− 4 (5δ + 22√16− 5δ)) . (B.16)
Following the above discussion there exist a δ¯1 ∈ [0, 45 ] that solves (B.16). Thus, when δ ≤ δ¯1
global optimal comes from case 1 and for δ > δ¯1 global optimal follows from case 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Following Propositions 2 and 6, we have two cutoff points for δ hence,
there are three cases to consider. Below we present the proof for each case separately.
• When δ ≤ δ¯1, ΠNCS = 8+3δ64 and ΠRQCS = 18 . ΠNCS ≥ ΠRQCS since δ > 0. ΠNCR = 16+3δ256 and
ΠRQCR =
1
16 . Π
NC
R ≥ ΠRQCR since δ > 0. The result for total supply chain profit follows
immediately.
• When δ¯1 < δ ≤ 1621 , ΠNCS = 8+3δ64 , ΠRQCS =
1
50(16−5δ)
(
(142− 5δ)δ − 352 + 2(56− 11δ)√16− 5δ). Thus,
ΠNCS −ΠRQCS =
14464− (δ(215δ + 4344) + (3584− 704δ)√16− 5δ)
1600(16− 5δ) (B.17)
The denominator of (B.17) is greater than 0. To show that the numerator is also positive,
let N1(δ) be the numerator of (B.17). Now,
d3N1(δ)
dδ3
= 600(55δ−72)
(16−5δ)5/2 , so the second derivative is
decreasing. In addition d
2N1(δ)
dδ2
∣∣∣
δ=δ¯1
= −970.47 and d2N1(δ)
dδ2
∣∣∣
δ= 16
21
= −430 − 3915
√
21
32 . Hence,
N1(δ) is a concave function of δ for δ ∈ (δ¯1, 1621 ]. Minimum of N1(δ) is then attained at one
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of the boundary points: N1(δ¯1) = 275.30 and N1(
16
21) =
256000
441
(
19− 4√21). So N1(δ) > 0,
which shows that (B.17) is positive for δ ∈ (δ¯1, 1621 ].
For the retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR =
16+3δ
256 and Π
RQC
R =
1
100
(
52− 5δ + 12√16− 5δ).
Thus,
ΠNCR −ΠRQCR =
395δ + 768
√
16− 5δ − 2928
6400
. (B.18)
Let N2(δ) be the numerator of (B.18). Then
d2N2(δ)
dδ2
= − 4800
(16−5δ)3/2 . So N2 is a concave
function of δ and it is positive at both of the boundary points. Hence, (B.18) is positive.
The result for total profit follows from the above analysis.
• When 1621 < δ ≤ 45 , then
ΠNCS =
δ(56− 3(34− 15δ)δ)
(16− 15δ)2
and
ΠRQCS =
1
50(16− 5δ)
(
(142− 5δ)δ − 352 + 2(56− 11δ)√16− 5δ
)
.
Thus,
ΠNCS −ΠRQCS =
(B.19)
−2(56− 11δ)√16− 5δ(16− 15δ)2 + 3δ(5δ(5(362− 135δ)δ + 3536)− 53504) + 90112
50(16− 15δ)2(16− 5δ)
The denominator of (??) is positive. Let us define N3(δ) as its numerator. Then,
d4N3
dδ4
=
375
8(16− 5δ)7/2 (−(γ1 + γ2) + δ(γ3 + γ4)) (B.20)
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where parameters γ1, γ2, γ3 and γ4 are defined below.
γ1 = 2048
(
7201 + 10368
√
16− 5δ
)
,
γ2 = 600
(
7175 + 10368
√
16− 5δ
)
δ2,
γ3 = 15360
(
919 + 1296
√
16− 5δ
)
,
γ4 = 1125
(
385 + 576
√
16− 5δ
)
δ2.
It is clear that γ1 > γ3 and γ2 > γ4. Hence, (B.20) is negative. This means that the third
derivative of N3 is decreasing, and
d3N3
dδ3
∣∣∣
δ= 4
5
= 2090525
6
√
3
−31500 > 0. So, third derivative of N3
is always positive, which means second derivative of the function is always increasing. Now,
d2N3
dδ2
∣∣∣
δ= 4
5
= 158640 − 946100
3
√
3
< 0. Hence, N3 is a concave function δ. However, at both of
the boundary points N3 is positive, hence the numerator of (??) is positive; the result thus
follows.
For the retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR =
(4−3δ)(64−3(44−23δ)δ)
4(16−15δ)2 and Π
RQC
R is the same as in
case two above. Thus,
ΠNCR −ΠRQCR =
1
100
(
25(4− 3δ)(64− 3δ(44− 23δ))
(16− 15δ)2 + 12
√
16− 5δ + 5δ − 52
)
(B.21)
Note that
d(ΠNCR −ΠRQCR )
dδ = − 150
(
9 + 88
(16−15δ)2 +
15√
16−5δ − 512(16−15δ)3
)
< 0. Hence, the dif-
ference function is decreasing in δ. The values at the boundary points are 96
√
21−431
1050 and
2(15
√
3−26)
125 , which are positive and negative respectively. Hence, the function crosses 0 once.
The value of δ that makes the difference in (B.21) equal to 0 is given by the following, which
is approximately equal to 0.799.
δ =
6
(
576− (16− 15δ)2√16− 5δ)
5(824 + 135(2− 3δ)δ) (B.22)
Here, equation (B.22) explicitly characterizes δ¯2.
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For the supply chain profit in this case the following gives the difference between the profit of
the two scenarios.
4
375
(
20 + 3
√
16− 5δ − 128− 39(16− 15δ)
(16− 15δ)2 −
96 + 78
√
16− 5δ
16− 5δ
)
(B.23)
The second derivative of (B.23) is −15
(
9216
(16−15δ)4 − 936(16−15δ)3 + 78(16−5δ)5/2 + 1(16−5δ)3/2 + 256(16−5δ)3
)
.
The second term in parentheses is less than the first term, as δ > 1639 ; hence the second deriva-
tive is negative. So, the difference function is a concave function of δ; however, it is positive at
both of the boundary points, thus, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 8. We first show that optimal Qmax is never less than 1/4.
When Qmax <
1
4 , (3.7) holds and the retailer’s profit is given by (B.8). The decision variables
for retailer’s period 1 problem are Q1 and θ¯ and the feasible region is defined by (3.6) and (3.5).
Observe that (B.8) is linear with respect to Q1, so in the optimal solution Q1 must either be equal
to 1− θ¯ or Qmax. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, we can separate the problem into two parts,
find the solution for each part and compare them to find the global solution. Hence, the following
is the solution to the retailer’s optimization problem.
(i) When 1 − (2 − δ)Qmax < c1 < 1 − 3δQmax, retailer action and optimal values are the same
as part (i) in Proposition 7.
(ii) When c1 ≤ min(1− (2−δ)Qmax, 1−3δQmax), retailer action and optimal values are the same
as part ii in Proposition 7.
(iii) When c1 ≥ max(1− (2− δ)Qmax, 1− 3δQmax), retailer sells the product only in period 2 and
it does not carry inventory between periods, where Q∗1 = 0, p∗1 = 1− δQmax and θ¯∗ = 1.
Now, let’s consider the supplier’s profit in response to the above retailer actions to see if there is
an equilibrium with Qmax <
1
4 . Supplier profit for case (i) above is the following.
ΠS =
(B.24)
−c21(2− 3δ)− (1−Qmax(2− δ))δ(3− 4Qmax − (4− 5Qmax)δ) + 2c1
(
1− 6Qmaxδ − (2− 9Qmax)δ2
)
4(1− 2δ)2 .
108
Equation (B.24) is jointly concave in (c1, Qmax), First-order condition gives
{
4−δ(6−δ)
4(2−3δ) , 1/4
}
for c1
and Qmax respectively. Hence, optimal Qmax is not less than
1
4 for this case.
Supplier profit function for case (ii) above is c1Qmax; the solution is straightforward where
Qmax values that maximize this function in the given range are
{
1
2(2−δ) ,
1
2(1+δ)
}
for δ < 1/2 and
δ ≥ 1/2 respectively. Clearly, these values are are not less than 14 for the given δ ranges.
Finally supplier profit function for case (iii) above is δQc(1 − 2Qc) and first-order condition
gives 14 for Qmax. Thus, equilibrium commitment quantity is never less than
1
4 .
Next we show that equilibrium commitment quantity never exceeds 12 . Assume there exists an
equilibrium with Qmax =
1
2 + 1 where 1 > 0 and (3.7) holds, thus commitment binds. From (3.6),
Q1 ≥ 13 . Assume at equilibrium Q1 = 13 + 2, where 2 ≥ 0. Then Q2 = 16 + 1 − 2. In addition,
following Lemma 7, p2 = δ(
1
2 − 1) and c2 = δ((1 − 21) − θ¯). Then following (B.8), we can write
retailer’s profit function as follows.
Π¯R = −(1− δ)θ¯2 +
(
1− δ
(
5
6
− 1 + 2
))
θ¯ +
1
12
(δ(1− 21)(1− 6(1 − 22))− 4c1(1 + 32))
(B.25)
dΠ¯R
d2
= −c1 + δ((1− 21)− θ¯) = −c1 + c2.
Since c1 ≥ c2, Π¯R is decreasing in 2, hence in order to maximize profit, 2 must be equal to 0.
Then from (3.6) and (3.7), θ¯ = 23 − 41. dΠ¯Rd1
∣∣∣
2=0,θ¯=
2
3
−41
= −2δ1, so Π¯R is decreasing in 1, hence
in order to maximize profit 1 must be 0 as well. However, these yield Π¯R =
4(2−3c1)−δ
36 and by
setting c1 =
8−δ
12 supplier can always extract retailer’s surplus. Retailer can get a better profit by
deviating from this strategy thus, when Qmax ≥ 12 commitment does not bind.
When commitment does not bind retailer’s profit is given by (2.12) and the equilibrium is
presented in Propositions 1 and 2. The same equilibrium holds if total quantity is equal to 12 .
Equilibrium total quantity in a no-commitment model is 716 for δ ≤ 1621 and 20−21δ32−30δ for δ > 1621 , which
is less than 12 . Thus, when supplier commits to quantity for any equilibrium with Qmax >
1
2 there
is an equivalent equilibrium with Qmax =
1
2 , which yields the same payoffs to all parties (supplier,
retailer and customers).
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Proof of Proposition 7. When commitment binds, ie. (3.7) holds, the retailer’s profit is given
by (B.8). The decision variables for retailer’s period 1 problem are Q1 and θ¯ and the feasible region
is defined by (3.6), (3.5) and (3.7). Observe that (B.8) is linear with respect to Q1, so in the
optimal solution Q1 must either be equal to 1 − θ¯, 2Qmax − 1 + θ¯2 or Qmax. Similar to the proof
of Lemma 8, the optimization problem can be divided into cases according to above Q1 values and
the global solution can be found by comparing each individual solution. Below, we summarize the
solution to retailer’s optimization problem when commitment binds.
(i) The quantity commitment binds strictly, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
carries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1−c1−3δQmax
2(1−2δ) , p
∗
1 =
1+δ(1−c1)+δ(Qmax(1+δ)−3)
2(1−2δ) and
θ¯∗ = 1+c1−δ(4−3Qmax)2(1−2δ) , when δ < 1/2,
1−c1
2−δ < Qmax <
5−3c1−4δ
8−7δ .
(ii) The quantity commitment binds strictly, the retailer sells the product only in period 1 with
Q∗1 = Qmax and p∗1 = θ¯∗ = 1−Qmax, when
a) δ < 1/2, Qmax ≤ 1−c12−δ ,
b.1) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 ≤ 2(1−δ)(5δ−1)23−25δ , Qmax < K1,
b.2) δ ≥ 1/2, c1 > 2(1−δ)(5δ−1)23−25δ , Qmax < 4−3c1−2δ7−5δ .
(iii) The quantity commitment binds weakly, the retailer sells the product in both periods and it
does not carry inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
1
3(4Qmax − 1), p∗1 = 13(4 − δ − Qmax),
and θ¯∗ = 43(1−Qmax), when max(4−3c1−2δ7−5δ , 5−3c1−4δ8−7δ ) ≤ Qmax ≤ 10+3c1−14δ4(4−5δ) .
(iv) The quantity commitment binds weakly, the retailer sells the product in both peri-
ods and it carries inventory between periods with Q∗1 =
4Qmax(4−3δ)−6(1−δ)
4(2−δ) , p1∗ =
2+(1−δ)(4δ−c1)−2δ(4−3δ)Qmax
2(2−δ) and θ¯
∗ = 2−c1+2δ(1−2Qmax)2(2−δ) , when max(K1,
10+3c1−14δ
4(4−5δ) ) < Qmax.
When the commitment does not bind ie., (3.7) does not hold the retailer’s profit is given by
(B.3). The solution for this optimization problem is given in Proposition 1. From the feasible
regions listed there, we need to find where (3.7) is violated. Below, we summarize the solution to
the retailer’s optimization problem when commitment does not bind.
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(i) Retailer sells the product in both periods and it carries inventory between periods with
Q∗1 =
11
14− c1(112−91δ)+6δ21δ(8−7δ) , p∗1 = 12− 4(5−4δ)c1−9δ(1−δ)6(8−7δ) , and θ¯∗ = 3(4−3δ)+2c13(8−7δ) , when c1 ≤ 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) ,
Qmax ≥ 142
(
33− 14c1δ − 2(6+7c1)8−7δ
)
.
(ii) Retailer sells the product in both periods and it does not carry inventory between periods
with Q∗1 =
8(1−c1)−3δ
16−9δ , p
∗
1 =
(4−δ)(4+4c1−3δ)
2(16−9δ) , and θ¯
∗ = 8(1+c1)−6δ16−9δ , when
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) < c1 ≤ 8−3δ8 ,
Qmax ≥ 12 + 2(1−3c1)16−9δ .
(iii) Retailer sells the product only in period 2 and it does not carry inventory between periods,
where Q∗1 = 0, and θ¯∗ = 1, when c1 ≥ 8−3δ8 .
To find the global optimal to the retailer’s first period problem, we need to compare the
solutions to the subproblems presented above. This gives the regions and the optimal values in
the Proposition 7. Note that the first two cases in the solution where commitment binds and last
two cases in the solution where commitment does not bind remain the same in the global solution.
The only comparisons need to be done are between the cases (iii), (iv) of commitment binding
solution and case (i) of commitment non-binding solution where we find the thresholds K2 and K3
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 8. One has to analyze ΠS in each region to find the optimal (c1, Qmax).
For the first case in Proposition 7, supplier profit is given in (B.24), which is jointly concave in
(c1, Qmax) for δ < 1/2. However, following first order condition there is no interior solution in this
region. In addition ΠS is continuous on the boundary points, hence the optimal solution cannot be
in this region.
For the second case in Proposition 7, ΠS = c1Qmax. One can find optimal (c1, Qmax) by
first solving for Qmax then for c1. Clearly optimal Qmax must be at the upper bound. For δ ≤
1/2, Qmax =
1−c1
2−δ yields c1 = 1/2, and for δ > 1/2, Qmax =
4−3c1−2δ
7−5δ yields c1 =
2−δ
3 . No
solution comes from Qmax = K1 because, when upper bound is K1 then (2(2 − δ)(1 − δ))1/2 −
2(1 − δ) < c1 < 2(6δ−5δ
2−1)
23−25δ and δ > 5/7. ΠS(Qmax = K1) is a concave function of c1 and
dΠS(Qmax=K1)
dc1
|c1=(2(2−δ)(1−δ))1/2−2(1−δ) > 0, also
dΠS(Qmax=K1)
dc1
|
c1=
2(6δ−5δ2−1)
23−25δ
= 2(4−5δ)(13−11δ)(7−5δ)(25δ−23) > 0.
For the third case in Proposition 7, ΠS =
2δQ2max
9 +
4(3c1−δ)Qmax
9 +
2δ−3c1
9 , which is a convex
function of Qmax. Hence, optimal Qmax must be at one of the boundary points. We analyzed
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lower bound in case 2. When Qmax =
1
2 +
2(1−3c1)
16−9δ for δ ≤ 1621 , c1 = 16−3δ32 . If Qmax = K2 then
for δ > 71−
√
241
75 , c1 = arg maxc1 ΠS(K2, c1). When Qmax =
10+3c1−14δ
4(4−5δ) , ΠS is a quadratic convex
function of c1 and both of the boundary points are analyzed above. However, the two δ regions
given above intersect. Hence, to find the solution of this case one needs to compare the solutions
at each of the Qmax boundary points. Define c¯1 = arg maxc1 ΠS(K2, c1). Then the value of δ that
solves the following explicitly characterizes δ¯3.
ΠS(K2, c¯1)−ΠS(1
2
+
2(1− 3c1)
16− 9δ ,
16− 3δ
32
) = 0
ΠS(K2, c¯1)− 8 + 3δ
64
= 0 (B.26)
For the fourth case in Proposition 7, ΠS =
8δ(1−δ)2Q2max
(2−δ)2 −
(4−3δ)c21
8(2−δ)2 +
(8−12δ+5δ2)Qmaxc1
(2−δ)2 −
3(1−δ)2(2c1−δ(3−8Qmax))
2(2−δ)2 , which is a convex function of Qmax, hence optimal Qmax must be at one of
the boundary points. The only boundary left for analysis is when Qmax = K3, which is a concave
function of c1. However,
dΠS(Qmax=K3)
dc1
|c1=C > 0 hence no solution follows from this case.
Solutions for the last two cases in Proposition 7 are same as in Proposition 2, which are
superseded by the solution from case 3. Hence, no solution comes from the last two cases.
Thus, to find the optimal (c1, Qmax) one needs to compare the solutions given in cases 2 and
3 above, which gives the result in Proposition 8.
Proof of Lemma 9. There may be two scenarios where supplier makes a commitment in period
1. The first scenario is when it makes a commitment only in period 1 and the second is when it
makes separate quantity commitments in both periods. Proving that supplier does not benefit from
the former scenario is easy, we skip that and present the proof for the latter.
The analysis for the scenario when supplier makes a commitment only in period 2 is presented
in Section 3.5. However, in this case since supplier makes a commitment in both of the periods
Lemma 10 holds. In addition since we are only interested in the commitment binding solutions it
is sufficient to consider only the cases where (3.13) is satisfied. Moreover, customers’ belief about
the first period quantity ie. Qˆ1 is Q1max and in order there would be an equilibrium this should
also be the optimal first period quantity chosen by the retailer. Hence the following is the retailer’s
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first period optimization problem.
max
Q1,θ¯
[1− θ¯]p1(θ¯, Q1max, Q2max)−Q1c1 + ΠR,2(θ¯, Q1, Q2max)
s.t. Q2max <
1
4
(2(1−Q1)− θ¯),
Q1 ≤ Q1max
(Q1, θ¯) ∈ S′1.
Note that retailer’s objective function is jointly concave in Q1 and θ¯, so KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient. The following are retailer’s equilibrium strategies.
(i) When c1 ≤ δ(3−4Q1max−δ(3−4Q1max+Q2max))2(1−δ) and (1−δ)(1−2Q1max)δ ≤ Q2max ≤ (1−δ)(3−4Q1max)8−7δ ,
the retailer sells the product in both periods and it carries inventory between periods where
Q∗1 = Q1max, p∗1 =
1
2 (1 + δ(1− 2Q1max −Q2max)) and θ¯∗ = 1−δ(1−Q2max)2(1−δ) .
(ii) When c1 ≤ 1 − (2 − δ)Q1max − δQ2max and Q2max ≤ max
(
1−Q1max
4 ,
(1−δ)(1−2Q1max)
δ
)
the
retailer sells the product in both periods and it does not carry inventory between periods
where Q∗1 = Q1max, p∗1 = 1−Q1max − δQ2max and θ¯∗ = 1−Q1max.
Following Lemma 10 and the above regions and optimal values for the retailer we can solve for
supplier’s optimization problem in terms of c1, Q1max and Q2max. Note that supplier’s objective
function is linear and increasing in c1, hence the optimal c1 is at the boundary. This simplifies
the solution and the optimal comes from the second region given above where c∗1 =
1
2 , Q
∗
1max =
2−δ
2(4−3δ) and Q
∗
2max =
1−δ
2(4−3δ) , which is the same optimal solution when supplier makes a quantity
commitment only in period 2, which is presented in Section 3.5. Therefore, supplier does not
benefit from making a quantity commitment in first period when it makes a quantity commitment
in second period.
Proof of Theorem 3. The result for supplier profit follows from the fact that supplier can al-
ways match the no-commitment scenario profit by committing to an arbitrary large non-binding
quantity. Hence, we only need to prove the results for retailer and supply chain profits. Following
Propositions 2 and 8, we have four cutoff points for δ, so there are five regions. Below we present
the proof separately for each region.
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When δ < 1/2, ΠSQCS =
1
4(2−δ) . Then, Π
SQC
S − ΠNCS = δ(2+3δ)64(2−δ) , which is positive. ΠNCR = 16+3δ256
and ΠSQCR =
1−δ
4(2−δ)2 . Therefore, Π
NC
R −ΠSQCR = δ(12+δ(4+3δ))256(2−δ)2 , which is also positive.
For the supply chain profit in this case (ΠSQCS + Π
SQC
R ) − (ΠNCS + ΠNCR ) = δ(4+3(4−5δ)δ)256(2−δ)2 , which
is positive because δ < 4/5.
When 1/2 ≤ δ < 199−3
√
137
218 , Π
SQC
S =
(2−δ)2
3(7−5δ) . Π
NC
R is the same as the previous case and
ΠSQCR =
2+δ(9−5δ(3−δ))
3(7−5δ)2 . Thus,
ΠSQCR −ΠNCR =
δ(6− 5δ(3− δ))− 14
768(7− 5δ)2 (B.27)
The denominator of (B.27) is clearly positive. Define N1(δ) as the numerator of (B.27).
dN1
dδ =
6 − 15δ(2 − δ) > 0 for 1/2 ≤ δ < 199−3
√
137
218 . So, N1(δ) is increasing. However, N1(
1
2) < 0 and
N1(
199−3√137
218 ) > 0. Therefore, (B.27) crosses zero only once for the δ range of this case and is
given by the solution to the following equation, which is the value δ¯4 in Theorem 3.
δ =
14
6− 5δ(3− δ) (B.28)
For the supply chain profit in this case,
(ΠSQCS + Π
SQC
R )− (ΠNCS + ΠNCR ) =
δ(6− 5δ(3− δ))− 14
768(7− 5δ)2 (B.29)
The denominator of (B.29) is clearly positive. Define N2(δ) as the numerator of (B.29). Then,
d2N2
dδ2
= 2(874 − 1125δ) > 0 since δ < 8741125 . So, first derivative of N2(δ) is increasing but
dN2
dδ
∣∣∣
δ= 199−3
√
137
218
< 0. So. N2 is decreasing. Because, N2(
199−3√137
218 ) > 0, the result follows.
When 199−3
√
137
218 ≤ δ < δ¯3, ΠSQCR = ΠNCR , hence the results immediately follow.
When δ¯3 ≤ δ < 1621 , we show that for every feasible c1 and optimal Qmax, ΠSQCR > ΠNCR . Define
the difference function ΠSQCR −ΠNCR
∣∣∣
Qmax=K2
= ∆1ΠR(c1) then,
∆1ΠR(c1) =
(B.30)
256c21(192− δ(332− 143δ))− 384c1δ(224− δ(400− 179δ)) + 9δ(3072− δ(6592− δ(4672− 1107δ)))
2304(8− 7δ)2δ ,
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which is a convex function of c1, and from case (iii).b.2 of Proposition 7, Kc < c1 ≤ 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) . The
smaller c1 root for ∆1ΠR = 0 is
3
(
4δ(224−δ(400−179δ))−(8−7δ)√δ
√
δ(32128−δ(36596−13693δ))−9216
)
16(192−δ(332−143δ)) , which
is greater than 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) for δ¯3 ≤ δ < 1621 . Since c∗1 is less than this boundary, ∆ΠS > 0 for optimal
c1.
The result for supply chain profit for this case follows from the above.
When δ ≥ 1621 , similar to the previous case, we show that for every feasible c1 and optimal Qmax,
ΠSQCR > Π
NC
R . Define the difference function Π
SQC
R −ΠNCR
∣∣∣
Qmax=K2
= ∆2ΠR(c1), then,
∆2ΠR(c1) =
(B.31)
(3(4− 3δ)δ − 2c1(16− 15δ))(24(1− δ)δ(176− 3δ(105− 47δ))− c1(12− 11δ)(16− 13δ)(16− 15δ))
18(16− 15δ)2(8− 7δ)2δ ,
which is a convex function of c1. The smaller c1 root for ∆2ΠR = 0 is
3δ(4−3δ)
2(16−15δ) , however, optimal
c1 is less than this value. Hence ∆ΠS > 0 for optimal c1.
The result for supply chain profit for this case follows from the above.
Proof of Lemma 10. This proof is similar to proof of Lemma 7. First part of Equation (3.12)
gives δ
(
2(1−Q1 −Q2max)− θ¯
) − c2 ≥ 0. Note that ΠR,2 is given by the equation (B.4) in the
proof of Lemma 7. Since commitment binds the inequality above binds. Hence, c¯2 = c
∗
2 =
δ
(
2(1−Q1 −Q2max)− θ¯
)
. Plugging this into the second part of Equation (3.12) with ΠS,2 in
equation (B.6) gives Q2max ≤ 14(2(1−Q1)− θ¯).
Proof of Proposition 9. When Q2max =
1
4(2(1−Q1)− θ¯) the objective function given in (3.14)
is the same as the no commitment objective given by (2.12), which is explicitly stated by equation
(B.3) in the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore, when finding the solution of retailer’s objective in
the region when commitment binds we can restrict the feasible space to where the inequality in
(3.13) is strictly satisfied.
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Following Lemma 10 we can formulate retailer’s period 1 problem in terms of order quantity
Q1, commitment Q2max and target consumer segment [θ¯, 1] in period 1 as in the following:
max
Q1,θ¯
p1(θ¯, Qˆ1, Q2max)[1− θ¯]−Q1c1 + ΠR,2(θ¯, Q1, Q2max)
s.t. Q2max <
1
4
(2(1−Q1)− θ¯),
Qˆ1 = Q
∗
1
(Q1, θ¯) ∈ S′1.
Note that S
′
1 is defined in (2.15). The retailer’s total profit in equation (3.14) can be written as
the following.
ΠR(Q1, θ¯, Qˆ1) = δ
(
Q22max + θ¯ −Q1(Q1 + θ¯ − 2)− 1
)− (1− θ¯)(δ(Qˆ1 +Q2max + θ¯ − 1)− θ¯)− c1Q1.
(B.32)
Hessian of ( B.32) is
 −2δ −δ
−δ −2(1− δ)
, where the eigenvalues of the Hessian are −1 −
√
1− δ(4− 5δ) and −1 +√1− δ(4− 5δ). Both of the eigenvalues are non-positive for δ ≤ 4/5,
hence (B.32) is jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯).
We showed that retailer’s objective function in the no-commitment scenario is jointly concave
in the Proof of Proposition 1. Given the two functions are continuous at the boundary and both
jointly concave, and the overall problem is quasiconcave; KKT conditions together with the belief
consistency equation fully characterizes the solution, which yield the regions and the optimal values
in Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 10. ΠS defined by all the parts of the proposition 9 is not quasiconcave.
Therefore, to find the global optimal we need to analyze each part separately.
For the first part of the proposition 9, ΠS =
1
4
(
c1
(
3− 2c1δ
)
+ c1(4−5δ)Q2max1−δ − 8δQ22max
)
, which
is a jointly concave function of (c1, Q2max). First order condition gives
48(1−δ)2δ
48−δ(88−39δ) ,
3(1−δ)(4−5δ)
48−δ(88−39δ) for
c1 and Q2max respectively. However, these values do not satisfy the feasible region defined in first
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part of the proposition 9. In addition, ΠS is continuous in both of the boundaries of the feasible
region therefore global optimal solution does not come from this part.
For the second part of proposition 9, ΠS =
(1−c1)c1+δQ2max(1−δ−(4−3δ)Q2max)
2−δ , which is also a
jointly concave function of (c1, Q2max). First order condition gives c
∗
1 =
1
2 and Q
∗
2max =
1−δ
2(4−3δ) .
These values satisfy the feasible region defined in second part of the proposition 9. Hence, unless
any other solution from the remaining parts gives a better objective value this is the global optimal
point.
For the third part of the proposition 9, ΠS = δ(1−2Q2max)Q2max, which is a function of Q2max.
Hence the optimal solution has to be at the boundary but ΠS is continuous at this boundary between
parts (ii) and (iii) of proposition 9 and part (ii) has an interior solution. Therefore, the global
solution cannot come from part three.
For the fourth part of the proposition 9, ΠS =
c1(6(1−δ)−c1)−2c1(8−9δ)Q2max+16(1−δ)δQ22max
8(1−δ) , which
is a quadratic convex function of Q2max. Therefore, the solution has to be at one of the boundaries.
In addition, both of the boundaries are continuous. First boundary is the one with part (i), which
is dominated. We analyze the second boundary in the next part.
For the fifth part of the proposition 9, ΠS = (1 − 4Q2max)c1 + 2δQ22max, which is a quadratic
convex function of Q2max. Hence, the solution has to be on the boundary. The boundary with part
(ii) of the proposition 9 is continuous. Since there is an interior solution in that part no solution can
come from this boundary. The boundary with the fourth part of proposition 9 is also continuous,
however never produces a solution.
The sixth and seventh parts of the proposition 9 are functions of c1 so we can consider only
the solutions at the Q2max boundaries, however both are dominated at those regions.
Therefore the solution in Proposition 10 follows.
Proof of Theorem 4. The result about the supplier profit follows from the Corollary 3. We only
need to prove the results about the retailer and supply chain profits.
Following Propositions 2 and 10 there are two cutoff points for δ below we present the proof
for each case separately.
When δ ≤ 1621 , ΠSQC2R −ΠNCR = − (28−9δ)δ256(4−3δ) , which is clearly negative. (ΠSQC2S + ΠSQC2R )− (ΠNCS +
ΠNCR ) =
δ(20−19δ)
256(4−3δ) , which is clearly positive.
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When δ > 1621 ,
d(ΠSQC2R −ΠNCR )
dδ =
1
100
(
23 + 176
(16−15δ)2 − 25(4−3δ)2 − 1024(16−15δ)3
)
, which is greater than
0, hence the difference function is increasing. However, the difference is negative at both end points
of the feasible region hence the result follows. The proof for the supply chain result is similar.
Proof Corollary 3. Following Propositions 8 and 10 we have four cutoff points for δ. Below we
present the proof separately for each region. For every region ΠSQC2S =
2−δ2
4(4−3δ) .
When δ < 12 , Π
SQC
S =
1
4(2−δ) and Π
SQC2
S −ΠSQCS = (1−δ)
2δ
4(2−δ)(4−3δ) , which is clearly positive.
When 1/2 ≤ δ < 199−3
√
137
218 , Π
SQC2
S −ΠSQCS = δ(82−δ(85−27δ))−2212(7−5δ)(4−3δ) , which is an increasing function.
In addition it is positive at both end points of the feasible region.
When 199−3
√
137
218 ≤ δ < δ¯3 ΠSQC2S −ΠSQCS = δ(12−7δ)64(4−3δ) , which is clearly positive.
When δ¯3 ≤ δ, ΠSQC2S − 15 = δ(12−5δ)−620(4−3δ) > 0 since δ > 15
(
6−√6). For every Qmax and for every
c1 in the region defined by the case (iii).b.2 of Proposition 7 ie. Kc < c1 ≤ 3δ(4−3δ)2(16−15δ) in order for
ΠSQCS − 15 > 0 we need δ > 1210
(
265−√9745) and Qmax > 1− 3c1δ + 3
√
10c21+δ−5c1δ
δ2√
10
> 920 . However
K2 <
9
20 in that region. Therefore Π
SQC
S <
1
5 and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5. To find the equilibrium in simultaneous quantity commitment scenario, it
is sufficient to compare the equilibriums of individual quantity commitment scenarios and identify
the case when retailer would deviate from supplier’s quantity commitment equilibrium. In other
words retailer would deviate from supplier’s quantity commitment equilibrium when restricting the
equilibrium commitment quantity further and when this action increases its profit. This happens
when δ ≤ δ¯1 where equilibrium commitment quantity in retailer’s quantity commitment is 14 which
is less than corresponding equilibrium commitment quantity in supplier’s quantity commitment,
which is 12(2−δ) . In addition, in this range Π
RQC
R > Π
SQC
R because
1
16 <
1−δ
4(2−δ)2 . Therefore, the
Theorem 5 follows from Propositions 6 and 8.
B.3 Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 11. See the proof of Lemma 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. See the proof of Theorem 1.
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Proof of Lemma 12. Supplier sets c∗2 = p2. Then, as in the proof of Lemma 1, the optimization
problem in (2.2) can be expressed as the following.
Q∗2 = arg max
Q2
−δ (Q1 − (1− θ¯)) (Q2 +Q1 − 1) (B.33)
which is a convex and decreasing function of Q2. Hence, Q
∗
2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 11. Since the retailer commits to p1 and p2, the marginal customer, which
is given by (2.4), can be written as θ¯∗ = p1−p21−δ . In addition following Lemma 12 and the fact that
c1 > 0, the constraint in (2.9) binds. Hence, we can write Q
∗
1 = 1 − p2δ . Plugging these into the
optimization problem in (2.5) leads to
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = arg max
(p1,p2)∈S1
[p1 − (p1 − p2)
2
1− δ +
(c1 − p2)p2
δ
− c1], (B.34)
where S1 becomes {(p1, p2) : δp1 ≥ p2}. However, dΠR,1dp2
∣∣∣
p2=δp1
= c1δ > 0, so optimal p2 is equal to
δp1, which means that the retailer sells only in period one. Then the pricing problem reduces to
p∗1 = arg maxp1
(p1 − c1)(1− p1). (B.35)
First-order condition gives p∗1 =
1+c1
2 and Q1 =
1−c1
2 .
The supplier’s pricing problem in the first period is the following:
max
c1
c1(
1− c1
2
) (B.36)
First-order condition gives c∗1 =
1
2 .
Proof of Theorem 7. Following Propositions 2 and 11, we have one cutoff point for δ, so there
are two different cases to consider. Below we present the proof for each case.
When δ ≤ 1621 , ΠNCS = 18 + 3δ64 and ΠRPCS = 18 , hence the result follows because δ ≥ 0.
For the retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR =
1
16 +
3δ
16 and Π
RPC
R =
1
16 , hence the result follows
because δ ≥ 0.
The result for supply chain profit follows from the above.
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When δ > 1621 , Π
NC
S =
δ(56−3(34−15δ)δ)
(16−15δ)2 and Π
RPC
S =
1
8 .
ΠNCS −ΠRPCS =
δ(928− 3δ(347− 120δ))− 256
(16− 15δ)2 (B.37)
The denominator of (B.37) is positive. The numerator is a concave function of δ because the second
derivative is 6(360δ − 347) < 0 as δ ≤ 45 . However, the numerator is positive at the boundaries,
hence (B.37) is also positive.
For retailer profits in this case, ΠNCR =
(4−3δ)(64−3(44−23δ)δ)
4(16−15δ)2 and Π
RPC
R =
1
16 .
ΠNCR −ΠRPCR =
768− 3δ(800− δ(821− 276δ))
16(16− 15δ)2 (B.38)
The denominator of (B.38) is positive. The numerator is a concave function of δ because the second
derivative is 4926− 4968δ < 0. However, the numerator is positive at the boundaries, hence (B.38)
is positive.
The result for supply chain profit follows from the above.
Proof of Lemma 13. The proof of this result is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and it is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 12. The regions differ, depending on the value of Q∗2 (which is a function
of Q1 and θ¯).
When Q∗2 > 0, the retailer profit in (4.3) and Lemma 13 lead to the following,
ΠR = −(1− 3δ
4
)θ¯2 − (c1 − c2)Q1 − 1
4
(2c2 − 2θ¯(2− δ)− c
2
2
δ
). (B.39)
When Q∗2 = 0, the retailer profit in (4.3) reduces to (1 − θ¯)p1(θ¯) − c1Q1. Because no units are
sold in period 2 in this case, p∗1(θ¯) = θ¯. These observations lead to the following retailer objective
function
ΠR = (1− θ¯)θ¯ − c1Q1. (B.40)
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In both of the regions ΠR is jointly concave in (θ¯, Q1) and ΠR is quasiconcave across these two
regions. Hence, KKT conditions are sufficient to characterize the optimal solutions in these regions
which yield the stated parts in the Proposition 12.
Proof of Proposition 13. To find the supplier’s optimal policy, we need to analyze the supplier’s
profits in each of the cases in Proposition 12, where we follow the order (i), (iv), (iii) and (ii) on
account of the ease of proving the result.
For case (i), ΠS =
−c2(c2−δ)
2δ , which is a function of c2. So, the optimal c2 is at the upper bound
of the region, which is also in case (ii). Hence, there is no solution in case (i).
For case (iv), ΠS =
(1−c1)c1
2 , which is a function of c1. So, the optimal c1 is at the upper bound
of the region, which is also in case (iii). Hence, there is no solution in case (iv).
For case (iii), ΠS = c1− c1c2δ , which is a convex and decreasing function of c2. So the optimal c2
must be at the lower bound, which is also in case (ii). In addition ΠS is continuous at the boundary
between the regions of cases (iii) and (iv) so the global solution cannot be in case (iv).
For case (ii), the following is the supplier profit
ΠS =
−c22(4− δ) + c2δ(2 + 6c1 − δ) + 4c1δ(1− c1 − δ)
2δ(4− 3δ) , (B.41)
which is jointly concave in (c1, c2). In addition ΠS is continuous at both of the boundaries of the
regions between cases (i) and (iii). Thus, KKT conditions for case (ii) are sufficient to characterize
the global optimal solution, which leads to the part (i) and (ii) of the Proposition 13.
Proof of Theorem 8. Following Propositions 2 and 13, we have two cutoff points for δ. Thus,
there are three cases to consider. Below we analyze the result for each of the three cases.
When δ ≤ 1− 1√
17
, ΠNCS =
8+3δ
64 and Π
SPC
S =
4−δ(2+δ)
2(16−13δ) . Therefore,
ΠNCS −ΠSPCS =
δ(8− 7δ)
64(16− 13δ) , (B.42)
which is always greater than 0.
For retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR =
16+3δ
256 and Π
SPC
R =
32−δ(54−δ(24−δ))
2(16−13δ)2 , therefore,
ΠNCR −ΠSPCR =
δ(1024− δ(1616− 635δ))
256(16− 13δ)2 . (B.43)
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Here, the denominator of (B.43) is positive. The term in parentheses in the numerator is also
positive because its derivative is 2(635δ − 808) < 0, so it is decreasing but its value at δ = 1− 1√
17
is 217
(
683 + 173
√
17
)
. Hence, (B.43) is positive.
Result for the supply chain profit follows from above.
When 1− 1√
17
< δ ≤ 1621 , ΠNCS is the same as the previous case and ΠSPCS = δ(6−5δ)
2
8(4−3δ)2 , thus,
ΠNCS −ΠSPCS =
128 + δ((480− 173δ)δ − 432)
64(4− 3δ)2 . (B.44)
The denominator of (B.44) is positive. Let us define N1 as the numerator. Then N1 is a decreasing
function of δ, because dN1dδ = −432 + 960δ− 519δ2, which is concave where the maximum occurs at
δ = 1621 with a value of −272147 . However, N1(1621) = 90889261 . Hence, N1 is positive, so is the (B.44).
For the retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR is the same as the previous case and Π
SPC
R =
64+δ((156−47δ)δ−172)
16(4−3δ)2 , therefore
ΠNCR −ΠSPCR =
δ(2416− δ(2424− 779δ))− 768
256(4− 3δ)2 . (B.45)
The second derivative of (B.45) is − 3(8−5δ)
2(4−3δ)4 , so it is a concave function of δ, however it is positive
at both of the boundary points, δ = 1− 1√
17
and δ = 1621 . Hence, (B.45) is positive.
The result for supply chain profit follows from the above.
When δ > 1621 , Π
NC
S =
δ(56−3(34−15δ)δ)
(16−15δ)2 and Π
SPC
S is the same as the previous case, therefore
ΠNCS −ΠSPCS =
δ(2− 3δ)
8(64− 9δ(12− 5δ))2 (δ(2880 + δ(−2642 + 795δ))− 1024). (B.46)
The fraction in (B.46) is negative because δ > 23 . Let us define N2(δ) as the second term in (B.46).
d2N2
dδ2
= −5284 + 4770δ, so N2 is concave. dN2dδ
∣∣∣
δ= 4
5
= 8965 , so maximum of N2 occurs at the upper
bound of δ, but N2(
4
5) = −9625 . So, N2 is negative and therefore (B.46) is positive.
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For the retailer’s profit in this case, ΠNCR =
(4−3δ)(64−3(44−23δ)δ)
4(16−15δ)2 and Π
SPC
R is the same as in the
previous case. Thus,
ΠNCR −ΠSPCR =
δ(4096 + δ(δ(21932− 3δ(4532− 1041δ))− 15552))
16(64− 9δ(12− 5δ))2 (B.47)
We claim that (B.47) is positive. Its denominator is positive. It is straightforward to show that its
numerator decreases in δ and at δ = 4/5 it is positive.
The result for supply chain profit follows from the above.
Proof of Proposition 14. Since, supplier commits to c2 before retailer orders the first period
quantity retailer has no incentive to carry inventory. Therefore, Q∗1 = 1 − θ¯∗. Also, since retailer
commits to p1 and p2 at the beginning of period 1 the marginal customer, θ¯ becomes
p1−p2
1−δ . Plug-
ging these into retailer’s objective function, it becomes
δp1(1−c2−δ−p1)−c1δ(1−δ−p1+p2)+(c2+2δp1)p2−p22
(1−δ)δ ,
which is jointly concave in p1 and p2. KKT conditions yield the following strategies for the retailer.
(i) When c2 ≤ c1 + δ − 1, the retailer sells only in period 2 where p∗1 = 2+c2−δ2 and p∗2 = c2+δ2 .
(ii) When c1 + δ− 1 < c2 < δc1, the retailer sells in both periods where p∗1 = 1+c12 and p∗2 = c2+δ2 .
To characterize the equilibrium we need to solve the supplier’s problem. Supplier maximizes
c1(1− θ¯∗) + c2(θ¯∗ − p
∗
2
δ
)
where p∗1, p∗2 and θ¯∗ are given above. This gives the optimal solution c∗1 =
1
2 and c
∗
2 =
δ
2 , which forces
retailer to sell only in period 1 by making second period price too high. Therefore the equilibrium
becomes the same as the one in Section 4.2.
B.4 Proofs of Chapter 5
Proof of Lemma 14. Since retailer sets p2 before supplier sets second period wholesale price,
supplier has no incentive to set c2 smaller than p2. This results ΠR,2 = δ(1 − Qmax)(Q1 + θ − 1)
and ΠS,2 = δ(1−Qmax)(Qmax −Q1).
Proof of Proposition 15. Following marginal customer equation and Lemma 14 retailer’s first
period objective is ΠR,1 = Q1(δ(1−Qmax)− c1) + (1− δ)θ− (1− δ)θ2, which is a linear decreasing
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function with respect to Qmax. Hence, Qmax should be at the lower bound. Substituting Qmax
with Q1; Π1,R becomes jointly concave with respect to Q1 and θ, and first order condition yields
the result.
Following retailer’s best response ΠS,1 =
1
2(1 − c1)c1, where first order condition yields c∗1 =
1
2 .
Proof of Theorem 9. The following characterizes the optimal values when supplier commits to
both a maximum total quantity and the wholesale prices: Q∗max =
5−4δ
16−13δ , c
∗
1 =
16−δ(14−δ)
2(16−13δ) , c
∗
2 =
2δ(5−4δ)
16−13δ , and Π
SPQC
S =
4−δ(2+δ)
2(16−13δ) .
First let’s show that this profit is not better than what supplier gets from a quantity commit-
ment only. We do this by showing ΠSPQCS < Π
NC
S , since by Theorem 3 Π
NC
S ≤ ΠSQCS . Following
Proposition 2 when δ ≤ 1621 ; ΠNCS − ΠSPQCS = δ(8−7δ)64(16−13δ) , which is clearly positive. When δ > 1621 ;
ΠNCS =
d(4−3δ)(14−15δ)
(16−15δ)2 where second derivative is
48(32−75δ)
(16−15δ)4 , which is negative since δ >
32
75 . Hence,
ΠNCS is concave in this region. In addition it is equal to
9
56 and
4
25 at the boundaries respectively.
Therefore ΠNCS ≥ 425 but ΠSPQCS < 425 since δ < 125
(
27−√29).
Second let’s show how we determined above optimal values. Without loss of generality we can
consider supplier makes an overall quantity commitment on top of it’s price commitment. Instead
of characterizing the full equilibrium we determine when quantity commitment binds. Following
Lemma 13 in Section 4.3 this happens when δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c22δ = Qmax −Q1. Using retailer objective
function given by Equation (B.39) in the proof of Proposition 12 we find the corresponding retailer
optimal prices and the region: θ¯ = 2(1−Qmax)− c2δ , Q1 = 1− θ¯ when c2 ≤ δ, 12(1− c2δ ) ≤ Qmax ≤
1− c2δ and c1 ≤ 3− 5δ2 +
(
5
2 − 2δ
)
c2 − (4− 3δ)Qmax.
Substituting these in the supplier objective and maximizing in the given region yields the values
presented above.
Proof of Theorem 10. Following the analysis in Section 3.5, in order for the supplier’s second
period quantity commitment to bind first part of the (3.12) need to be satisfied. Hence when
Q2max ≤ δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c22δ , Q∗2 = Q2max, p∗2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q2max) and
ΠR,2 = δ(1−Q1 −Q2max)(Q1 − (1− θ¯))− c2Q2max.
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When Q2max >
δ(2−2Q1−θ¯)−c2
2δ commitment is ineffective and the period 2 equilibrium is the
same as the supplier’s price commitment scenario. Retailers period 1 choices determine whether
the commitment in period 2 will bind. Let’s characterize retailer’s response assuming that the
commitment always binds. Note that this is not the best response of the retailer and for some
values of the wholesale prices this solution is actually dominated by the commitment does not bind
case.
Assuming commitment binds then ΠR,1 = (θ¯− δQ2max− c1)(1− θ¯)+(δ(θ¯−Q2max)− c2)Q2max.
Note that this uses the fact that Q1 = 1 − θ¯ since c1 and c2 are set before retailer orders Q1.
ΠR,1 is quadratic concave in θ¯ and the first order condition yields the following optimal values and
strategies.
(i) Quantity commitment strictly binds, retailer sells the product in both periods and θ¯∗ =
1
2(1 + c1 + 2δQ2max) when,
a) c2 ≤ c1 + δ − 1 and Q2max ≤ 1−c12δ ,
b) c2 > c1 + δ − 1 and Q2max ≤ (c1+1)δ−2c22δ(2−d) .
(ii) Quantity commitment weakly binds retailer sells the product in both periods and θ¯∗ =
c2+2δQmax
δ when, c2 > c1 + δ − 1 and (c1+1)δ−2c22δ(2−d) < Q2max ≤ δ−c22δ .
(iii) Quantity commitment strictly binds and the retailer sells the product only in period 2 and
θ¯ = 1 when, c2 ≤ c1 + δ − 1 and 1−c12δ ≤ Q2max ≤ δ−c22δ .
Assuming above is the retailer’s response let’s characterize the supplier’s optimal solution. Since
commitment binds ΠS,1 = c1(1− θ¯∗) + c2Q2max, which is linear increasing in Q2max. Therefore in
optimal solution Q2max has to be at the upper bound. This simplifies the optimization problem
and the solution is as follows, which correspond to case (i.b) of above retailer response.
(i) c∗1 =
8−5δ
16−9δ , c
∗
2 =
2δ(5−3δ)
16−9δ , when δ ≤ 15−
√
33
12 .
(ii) c∗1 = c∗2 =
1
2 − 12−δ + δ, when δ > 15−
√
33
12 .
Note that this supplier optimal solution does not constitute the true equilibrium, because when
characterizing retailer’s response we assumed that the solution always comes from the commitment
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binding region. Therefore, the equilibrium supplier objective value is dominated by this solution.
To complete the proof we need to show that optimal supplier objective corresponding to above is
not better than the suppliers objective from the case when supplier commits only to second period
quantity, ie. SQC2, which is given by Proposition 10 in Section 3.5; ΠSQC2S =
2−δ2
4(4−3δ) .
Following Proposition 10 and above supplier response there are two cases. For case (i) above
ΠSQC2S − ΠSPQC2S = δ(22−δ(28−9δ))4(4−3δ)(16−9δ) > 0, since δ ≤ 4/5. For case (ii) above ΠSQC2S − ΠSPQC2S =
8(2−δ)2(2−δ2)−4(3−2δ)2δ(4−3δ)
32(4−3δ)(2−δ)2 . Clearly the denominator is positive. The numerator is also positive
since;
8(2− δ)2 (2− δ2) > 4δ(3− 2δ)2(4− 3δ)
8(3− 2δ)2 (2− δ2) > 4δ(3− 2δ)2(4− 3δ)
8(3− 2δ)2(4− 3δ) > 4δ(3− 2δ)2(4− 3δ)
8 > 4δ
where in above we make left hand side smaller in each step, which completes the proof.
B.5 Proofs of Chapter 6
Proof of Lemma 15. This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 1. The constraint given
by the Set (6.2) binds thus p2 = 1 − Q1 − Q2. With this p2, the following becomes a concave
optimization problem of Q2.
(p∗2, Q
∗
2) = arg max
(p2,Q2)∈{(p2,Q2):Q1+Q2≥1−p2}
[p2(θ¯ − p2)− c2Q2]
First order condition yields the optimal values in part (i) of the Lemma 15.
Similarly with above optimal values the following becomes a concave optimization problem in
c2.
c∗2 = arg maxc2
c2Q
∗
2,
where the first order condition gives the optimal c2 in part (ii) of the Lemma 15.
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Proof of Proposition 16. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Following
Lemma 15 retailer’s profit function can be written in terms of Q1 and θ¯, which has an Hessian
equal to
 −38(5− 4d) −34
−34 −32
. Therefore, the objective function is jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯) and
KKT conditions fully characterize the equilibrium presented in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 17. Each part of the supplier’s optimization problem corresponding to the
cases presented in Proposition 16 are concave with respect to c1. Since each of these subproblems
has one variable and one parameter, δ, defining the optimal solution is straightforward. However,
the overall objective function is not quasiconcave.Therefore one needs to compare the solutions
from each case, where the result follows from comparing the cases (i) and (ii).
Proof of Lemma 16. See proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Proposition 18. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 5. Retailer’s
profit function can be written as the following
(Qmax − 1 + θ¯)(Qmax + (1− δ)(1− θ¯))−Q1(θ¯ + c1 + 2(Qmax − 1)),
which is a quadratic convex function of Qmax. Hence the optimal Qmax must be at one of the two
end points of the objective function. Following the proof of Proposition 5 we separate the problem
into two case where Case A refers to the case when Qmax is at lower bound ie. Qmax = Q1 and
Case B refers to the case when Qmax is at upper bound ie. Qmax =
Q1+1
2 − θ¯4 . In both cases the
resulting functions are jointly concave in (Q1, θ¯) so KKT conditions characterize the local solutions.
To find the global solution we compare the local solutions, where the threshold Kc2 is the positive
root of the difference function of the local interior solutions of the Cases A and B.
Proof of Proposition 19. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 6. We follow
the same approach. Since overall supplier profit function corresponding to the strategies presented
in Proposition 18 is not quasiconcave we need to analyze each case separately. To find the global
solution we compare the solutions from each case. Note that in each case supplier profit function is
concave in c1, which makes the subproblems easy to characterize. We skip the details and present
only the result. Solutions from cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 18 dominate the rest. Specifically
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when delta is smaller than the first root of the following equation, which characterizes δ¯5,
261− 2δ(307− 2δ(98− δ(15− 2δ))) = 0, (B.48)
optimal solution comes from the second case of Proposition 18.
Proof of Lemma 17. The proof of this result is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and it is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 20. This proof is very similar to the Proof of Proposition 12. There are
two strategies for the retailer depending on the value of Q∗2, which is a function of Q1 and θ¯.
When Q∗2 > 0, the retailer profit in (4.3) and Lemma 17 lead to the following,
ΠR = −1
4
(3− 2δ)θ¯2 +
(
1
2
(2 + c2 − (1 + c2)δ)
)
θ¯ +
1
4
(c2(c2 + 2δ − 4(1−Q1))− 4c1Q1). (B.49)
When Q∗2 = 0, the retailer profit in (4.3) is the same as equation (B.40), which is given in the Proof
of Proposition 12.
In both of the regions ΠR is jointly concave in (θ¯, Q1) and ΠR is quasiconcave across these two
regions. However, no solution comes from the second part and KKT conditions on the first part
gives the regions presented in the Proposition 20.
Proof of Proposition 21. To find the supplier’s optimal policy we need to analyze the supplier
function in each case of the Proposition 20. Supplier function from the first case is a function
of c2 since θ¯
∗ = 1 in that case. Supplier function from the second case is jointly concave in c1
and c2 therefore overall optimization problem is quasiconcave. KKT conditions give the result in
Proposition 21.
Proof of Theorem 11. The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
Specifically we need to compare two piecewise functions of δ and determine whether the difference
is positive or negative.
First case of the Theorem 11 follows from Propositions 17 and 19. We will show the proof of
the result for the supplier profit, the proof for the results for retailer profit and the supply chain
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profits are similar. Following Propositions 17 and 19 we have two cutoff points for δ so three regions
to consider.
When δ < δ¯5 the difference Π
NC
S −ΠRQCS can be written as the following.
ΠNCS −ΠRQCS =
24δ(1680− 6283δ) + 32δ3(6578− 4157δ) + 16δ5(2187− 130δ)
128(6− 5δ)(33− 26δ) (3(33− 46δ) + 4δ2(8 + 3δ)) (B.50)
Observe that all parts of the denominator of (B.50) are positive except 33 − 46δ when δ > 3346 .
However, 4δ2(8 + 3δ) > 3(46δ − 33) in that range, hence the denominator is positive. Similarly,
all parts of the numerator of (B.50) are positive except 1680 − 6283δ when δ > 16806283 . However, in
that region the numerator is decreasing and positive at both end points of the region. Therefore,
ΠNCS > Π
RQC
S in this region.
When δ¯5 ≤ δ < 1132(127−
√
817) the difference function can be written as the following.
ΠNCS −ΠRQCS =
9
64
(
58− 127δ + 66δ2
(6− 5δ)(33− 26δ)
)
(B.51)
The denominator of (B.51) is clearly positive and the numerator is decreasing and has one root
which is the boundary point 1132(127−
√
817). Therefore, ΠNCS > Π
RQC
S in this region.
When δ ≥ 1132(127−
√
817) the two profit functions are equal. Therefore, ΠNCS = Π
RQC
S in this
region.
Second case of the Theorem 11 follows from Propositions 17 and 11, which is very similar to
above second δ region hence they are omitted.
Proof of Theorem 12. Proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 8. Following
Proposition 17 and 21 we have two cutoff points for δ. Below we present the proof for the result
for supplier profit. Proofs for retailer and the supply chain profit are similar and they are omitted.
When δ < 1132(127−
√
817) the following is the difference between the supplier profits.
ΠNCS −ΠSPCS =
96(12− 35δ) + 8δ2(373− 102δ)
128(6− 5δ)(33− 26δ)(3− 2δ) (B.52)
Clearly the denominator of (B.52) is positive. The numerator of (B.52) is positive when δ <
δ¯6 ≈ 0.659 which is given by the root of the following equation. Hence equation (B.53) explicitly
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characterizes δ¯6.
δ2 =
12(35δ − 12)
373− 102δ (B.53)
When δ ≥ 1132(127−
√
817), ΠNCS =
9
64 < Π
SPC
S =
4−3δ
8(3−2δ) , since δ <
4
5 .
Proof of Lemma 18. This proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 1 given Q1 = 1− θ¯.
Proof of Proposition 22. Following Lemma 18 and the fact that Q1 = 1 − θ¯, retailer’s profit
funtion is concave in θ¯ and the KKT conditions yield the result.
Proof of Proposition 23. Overall supplier’s profit function is quasiconcave corresponding to
both cases of Proposition 22 is quasiconcave. Hence KKT conditions yield the result.
Proof of Proposition 24. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 7, we suffice to give
a sketch in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 25. This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 8, we suffice to give
a sketch in the main text.
Proof of Theorem 13. Below we present the proof for each case separately.
The proof for retailer’s quantity commitment result: Following Propositions 6 and 23 we have
two cutoff points for δ. When δ ≤ δ¯1 the difference ΠNCS − ΠRQCS = δ(8+δ)64(8−3δ) , which is clearly
positive. The difference ΠNCR −ΠRQCR = 27δ(192−δ(112−19δ))6912(8−3δ)2 is also positive since 192 > δ(112− 19δ)
∀δ. When δ > δ¯1 the difference ΠNCS −ΠRQCS =
(896−256
√
16−5δ−δ(456−96
√
16−5δ−55δ))2
1600(16−5δ)2(8−3δ) , which is also
clearly positive. Also, the difference ΠNCR − ΠRQCR = 325
√
16− 5δ + 8
27(8−3δ)2 +
671δ
11520 − 499110800 , where
the second derivative is 16
(8−3δ)4 − 34(16−5δ)3/2 < 0. So the difference function is concave but positive
at both end points therefore the difference is positive, which completes the proof for case (i) of the
Theorem 13.
The proof for retailer’s price commitment result: Following Propositions 11 and 23 we have
the differences ΠNCS − ΠRPCS and ΠNCS − ΠRQCS , the same as the first part of the above proof hence
positive and completes the proof for case (ii) of the Theorem 13.
The proof for supplier’s quantity commitment result: To complete the proof we need to compare
the profits. Following Proposition 23 and Proposition 25; when δ < 1/2 the difference for supplier
profits ΠNCS −ΠSQCS = − δ(48−(18−δ)δ)64(2−δ)(8−3δ) < 0, because denominator is clearly positive and the numerator
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is also positive since δ ≤ 4/5. For retailer profits d(ΠNCR −Π
SQC
R )
dδ =
19
2304 +
1
2(2−δ)3 +
16
9(8−3δ)3 −
1
4(2−δ)2 > 0, so the difference is increasing but
(
ΠNCR −ΠSQCR
)∣∣∣
δ=0
= 0, hence ΠNCR > Π
SQC
R .
The result for the supply chain profit when δ < 1/2 follows from these. When δ ≥ 1/2, for the
supplier profits
d(ΠNCS −ΠSQCS )
dδ =
59
960 +
4
3(8−3δ)2 − 35(7−5δ)2 > 0, so the difference is increasing, however(
ΠNCS −ΠSQCS
)∣∣∣
δ=1/2
= − 1574992 and
(
ΠNCS −ΠSQCS
)∣∣∣
δ=4/5
= − 432800 , so ΠNCS < ΠSQCS . For the retailer
profits,
d(ΠNCR −ΠSQCR )
dδ = − 67311520 − 65(7−5δ)2 + 169(8−3δ)3 + 185(7−5δ)3 < 0, so the difference is decreasing.(
ΠNCR −ΠSQCR
)∣∣∣
δ=1/2
= 10475778752 and
(
ΠNCR −ΠSQCR
)∣∣∣
δ=4/5
= − 47778400 , so the difference becomes zero
once in this delta range. The delta value when the difference function is zero is given by the solution
to the following equation, which explicitly characterizes δ¯7.
3
256
(
7− 5δ
8− 3δ
)2
=
(2− δ)(1 + 5δ(1− δ))
1024− δ(576− δ(32 + 19δ)) (B.54)
Therefore, ΠNCR ≥ ΠSQCR when δ ≥ δ¯7. For the supply chain profit,
d((ΠNCS +Π
NC
R )−(ΠSQCR +ΠRQCR ))
dδ =
− 9
5(7−5δ)2 +
7
2304 +
4
3(8−3δ)2 +
16
9(8−3δ)3 +
18
5(7−5δ)3 < 0, so the difference function is decreasing. However,(
(ΠNCS + Π
NC
R )− (ΠSQCR + ΠRQCR )
)∣∣∣
δ=1/2
= − 14017778752 therefore ΠNCS + ΠNCR < ΠSQCR + ΠRQCR , which
completes the proof for case (iii) of the Theorem 13.
The proof for supplier’s price commitment result: To complete the proof we need to compare
the profits. Following Propositions 12 and 23 when δ ≤ 1 − 1√
17
then difference ΠNCS − ΠSPCS =
δ(δ(288−109δ)−192)
64(8−3δ)(16−13δ) < 0, because the denominator is clearly positive and the term in parenthe-
sis in the numerator is a concave increasing function with derivative 288 − 218δ but the value
at upper bound is −1017
(
33 + 7
√
17
)
. For the retailer profit in this delta range
d(ΠNCR −ΠSPCR )
dδ =
4363
389376 +
45
169(16−13δ)2 − 169(−8+3δ)3 + 64169(−16+13δ)3 > 0, so the difference function is increasing but(
ΠNCR −ΠSPCR
)∣∣
δ=0
= 0, thus ΠNCR > Π
SPC
R . For the supply chain profit in the same delta range,
d2((ΠNCS +Π
NC
R )−(ΠSQCR +ΠRQCR ))
dδ2
= 2
13(16−13δ)3
(
19− 9616−13δ
)
+ 8
(8−3δ)3
(
1 + 28−3δ
)
> 0, so the difference
function is convex.
(
(ΠNCS + Π
NC
R )− (ΠSQCR + ΠRQCR )
)∣∣∣{
δ=0,δ= 1
3
,δ=1− 1√
17
} =
{
0,− 11153
8467200
,
59061
√
17− 241757
735488
}
≈ {0,−0.0013, 0.0024}
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So the difference function becomes 0 once. The delta value when the difference function is 0 is
given by the solution to the following equation, which explicitly characterizes δ¯8.
64δ(512− 3δ(624− 775δ)) = (74912− 12641δ)δ4 (B.55)
Therefore, ΠNCS + Π
NC
R ≥ ΠSPCS + ΠSPCR , when δ ≤ δ¯8. The proof for the results when δ > 1− 1√17
is similar and omitted, which completes the proof for the case (iv) of the Theorem 13.
B.6 Proofs of Chapter 7
Proof of Lemma 19. The proof of the first part of Lemma 19 is the same as the proof of the
first part of Lemma 1.
For the second part, observe that supplier’s profit is linear in F2 thus it can set F2 as much as
retailer’s profit is nonnegative. Hence it sets F2 =
c22+δ
2θ¯2−2c2δ(2(1−Q1)−θ¯)
4δ . Given this value then
supplier’s profit is a concave function of c2 and first order condition yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 26. Retailer’s profit function is jointly concave in Q1 and θ¯ and KKT
conditions yield the result.
Proof of Proposition 27. Similar to the proof of Lemma 19 supplier’s profit is linear in F1. So
it sets F1 =
(2(1−c1)−δ)2
8(2−δ) . Given this supplier’s profit is concave in c1 and first order condition gives
the result.
Proof of Proposition 27. Supplier’s profit is linear in F1, also. So it sets F1 =
(2(1−c1)−δ)2
8(2−δ) .
Given this, supplier’s profit is concave in c1 and first order condition yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 20. Proof of optimal second period wholesale price and commitment condition
is the same as in the proof of Lemma 7. Then F ∗2 follows from plugging these values into the retailer
objective function.
Proof of Proposition 28. The retailer’s objective function in (3.3) can be written as follows.
ΠR(Qmax, Q1, θ¯) = (1− θ¯)(θ¯ − δ(Qmax + θ¯ − 1))− c1Q1,
132
which is a jointly concave function of Qmax, Q1 and θ¯. KKT conditions yield the result.
Proof of Proposition 29. Supplier’s profit function is linear in F1 so she sets F1 =
1
4(1 − c1)2.
Given this supplier’s profit is concave in c1 and first order condition yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 14. Both of the supplier profits are the same as the centralized profits there-
fore the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 30. The fact that Qmax ≤ 12 due to the same reasoning as described in
Lemma 8 and the proof is along the same lines.
Both parts of the retailer’s objective function are jointly concave in Q1 and θ¯ so KKT conditions
characterize the solutions for each part. Comparing each solution yields the regions in Proposi-
tion 30. Specifically K5 is the root of the difference function of the objective values of parts (iv)
and (v).
Proof of Proposition 31. Supplier’s objective function is linear and increasing with respect to
F1. Hence we can set it to the upper bound for each of the five cases. Then case 2 is jointly
concave with respect to c1 and Qmax in addition continuous at each boundary. All of the objective
functions other than second case reduce to a function of one variable. Hence KKT conditions yield
the result.
Proof of Theorem 15. Both of the supplier profits are the same as the centralized profits there-
fore the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 32. First part of the proof is the same as the first part of the proof of
Proposition 11. Second part follows from the Proof of Proposition 29.
Proof of Theorem 16. Both of the supplier profits are the same as the centralized profits there-
fore the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 33. We need to analyze the supplier’s optimization problem in each case
of Proposition 12. In every case supplier’s profit is linear and increasing with respect to Fi so it
sets those to the upper bound.
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For case (ii), supplier sets F1 =
(1−δ−c1+c2)(4−4c1(1−δ)−(4+c2)δ+δ2)
(4−3δ)2 and F2 =
((2+2c1−δ)δ−c2(4−δ))2
4δ(4−3δ)2
that gives objective function
((2−δ)2−4c21)δ+4c2δ(1+c1−δ)−c22(4−3δ)
4δ(4−3δ) , which is jointly concave in c1 and
c2.
Observe that after substituting the corresponding Fi values; all of the other cases results in a
univariate function of either c1 or c2. Therefore, the overall objective function is quasiconcave. In
addition each function is continuous at the corresponding boundaries. Hence KKT conditions yield
the result.
Proof of Theorem 17. Both of the supplier profits are the same as the centralized profits there-
fore the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
B.7 Proofs of Chapter 8
Proof of Lemma 21. This proof is very similar to the Proof of Lemma 1. Since Equation 8.10
binds we can write p2 in terms of Q2 in optimization problem (8.2). Then first order condition
gives optimal Q2 and corresponding p2. Using these with the optimization problem in (8.3) and
first order condition gives the results.
Proof of Proposition 34. Following Definition 1 the retailer’s optimization problem given by
(8.5) constitutes a piecewise nature, where each piece is a quadratic function of Q1 and θ¯ with
parameters h,α, δ and c1. In addition due to Equation 8.7 it is not continuous on the boundaries
defined by each of the cases. To find the optimal solution we treat each case as an individual
constrained optimization problem and compare with each other to find the global optimal solution.
Below we present the local optimal values and how they are driven implicitly in terms of the
inequalities rather than c1 to keep the exposition short.
Case (i) Objective function, which is given below is not quasi concave,
− 3
4(1− α2)Q
2
1 −
(
2
(
α2 − 1) (4c1 − δ + 2h− 6) + (α2 − 1) (3δ + 2)θ¯ − 2δQˆ1
8 (α2 − 1)
)
Q1+
1
16
(α(8− 6δ) + 6δ − 7)θ¯2 +
(
α(α(5δ + 4h− 4) + 6) + 2δQˆ1 − 5δ − 4h+ 10
8(α+ 1)
)
θ¯−
α2(δ + 2h) + 3α+ δ(Qˆ1 − 1)− 2h+ 3
4(α+ 1)
134
KKT conditions are not sufficient to define the optimal solution for this case but are necessary.
Optimal solution is as follows:
(i.a) Q1 =
(α2−1)(α(8c1+8h−6)+8c1+2δ−7)
3α(4α+4δ−1)−8δ+15 , θ¯ =
2(α(α(−4c1−4h+9)+5δ+4h−1)+4c1−3δ+4)
3α(4α+4δ−1)−8δ+15 , when
3α(α−3δ+5)+3δ−4α(3α+1)h−4
4(α+1)(3α+1) ≤ c1 ≤ 6α−2δ−8αh+78α+8
(1.b) Q1 = 0, θ¯ = 1, when
−8αh+6α−2δ+7
8α+8 < c1 ≤ 1
(i.c) Q1 =
1−α2
3α+1 , θ¯ =
4α
1+3α , when c1 ≤ min
(
−9ad+14a+3d−4
12a2+16a+4
, −12α
2h+3α2−9αδ−4αh+15α+3δ−4
12α2+16α+4
)
Case (ii) Objective function, which is given below is not quasi concave.
− 3Q
2
1
8(α+ 1)
+
Q1
(
−(α+ 1)(5δ − 2)θ¯ − 2(α+ 1) (8c1 − δ + 4h− 6)− 2δQˆ1
)
16(α+ 1)
+
1
32
θ¯2(−10(α− 1)δ + 13α− 11) +
θ¯
(
(α+ 1)(−7δ + α(7δ + 8h− 2)− 8h+ 14)− 2(α− 1)δQˆ1
)
16(α+ 1)
+
δ − α(α(δ + 4h+ 3) + 6) + 4h+ (α− 1)δQˆ1 − 3
8(α+ 1)
KKT conditions are not sufficient to define the optimal solution for this case but are necessary.
Optimal solution is as follows:
(ii.a) Q1 = − (α+1)(α(16c1+16h−3)+16c1+6δ−11)3α−16δ+27 , θ¯ = 2(8(α+1)c1+8αh−5δ+8)3α−16δ+27 when
c1 ≤ min
(
5δ+α(6α−17δ−8(3α+1)h+30)−8
8(α+1)(3α+1) ,
15δ2−94δ+4h(α(25−6δ)+16δ−27)+112
8(3αδ−11α−13δ+13)
)
(ii.b) Q1 =
1−α2
3α+1 , θ¯ =
4α
3α+1 when
−17αδ+28α+5δ−8
24α2+32α+8
≤ c1
Case (iii) Objective function, which is given below is jointly concave.
− 3Q
2
1
4 (1− α2) −
1
4
Q1
(
3θ¯ + 4c1 + 4h− 6
)
+
3
16
(4δ− 5)θ¯2 +
θ¯
(
− (α2 − 1) (5δ + 4h− 7)− 2δQˆ1)
4 (α2 − 1) +
h+
1
2
δ
(
Qˆ1
α2 − 1 + 1
)
− 3
4
Optimal solution is as follows:
(iii.a) Q1 = −(α
2−1)(2c1(4δ−5)+δ(8h−7)−6h+8)
3α2−10δ+12 , θ¯ = −
2(α2(6c1+6h−9)+4δ(c1+h)−6c1+9δ+6(h−2))
9α2−30δ+36 , when
3α(8−7δ)−2h(3α(α−4δ+3)−10δ+12)
6(α+1)(α+4)−4(6α+5)δ ≤ c1 ≤ 3(α(3α+7δ−8)−3δ+4)−2h(3α(2α+4δ−3)−8δ+15)2(3α(2α+4δ−5)−8δ+9)
135
(iii.b) Q1 =
(1−α2)(7−2δ+2α(3−4h)−8(1+α)c1)
15−8δ−3α(1−4(α+δ)) , θ¯ =
2(4(1−α2)c1+(9−4h)α2−(1−5δ−4h)α+(4−3δ))
12α2−3(1−4δ)α+(15−8δ) , when
max
(
3(α(3α+7δ−8)−3δ+4)−2h(3α(2α+4δ−3)−8δ+15)
2(3α(2α+4δ−5)−8δ+9) ,
3α(α−3δ+5)+3δ−4α(3α+1)h−4
4(α+1)(3α+1)
)
≤ c1 ≤
7−2δ+2α(3−4h)
8(1+α)
(iii.c) Q1 =
1−α2
3α+1 , θ¯ =
4α
3α+1 , when c1 ≤ 3α(α−3δ+5)+3δ−4α(3α+1)h−44(α+1)(3α+1)
(iiii.d) Q1 = 0, θ¯ = 1, when c1 >
7−2δ+2α(3−4h)
8(1+α) .
Case (iv) Objective function, which is given below is jointly concave.
− 3Q
2
1
8(α+ 1)
−1
8
Q1
(
3θ¯ + 8c1 + 8h− 6
)− 1
32
θ¯2(3α−20δ+27)+
θ¯
(
(α+ 1)(3α− 7δ − 8h+ 11) + 2δQˆ1
)
8(α+ 1)
+
1
8
(
−3α+ 8h+ δ
(
2− 2Qˆ1
α+ 1
)
− 3
)
Optimal solution is as follows:
(iv.a) Q1 = −(α
2−1)(4(α−1)c1−13δ+4(αh+h+4))
12(α(α+2)+2)−2(11α+9)δ , θ¯ =
−α(4α(c1+h−3)+9δ+8h−8)+4c1−5δ−4h+8
6(α(α+2)+2)−(11α+9)δ , when
max
(
α(48−39δ)−4h(α(3α−11δ+9)−9δ+12)
12(α+1)(α+4)−4(11α+9)δ ,
−5δ+α(12α+17δ−4(3α+4)h−24)−4h+8
4(α−1)(3α+1)
)
≤ c1 ≤
3α2+αδ−2α+2δ−2(α+1)2h−2
2(α2−1)
(iv.b) Q1 = − (α+1)(α(16c1+16h−3)+16c1+6δ−11)3α−16δ+27 , (¯θ) = 2(8(α+1)c1−5δ+8αh+8)3α−16δ+27 , when
c1 ≤ min
(
5δ+α(6α−17δ−8(3α+1)h+30)−8
8(α+1)(3α+1) ,
3α−6δ−16αh+11
16α+16
)
(iv.c) Q1 =
1−α
2 , θ¯ = 1, when c1 ≤ 3α
2+αδ−2α+2δ−2(α+1)2h−2
2(α2−1)
iv.d Q1 =
1−α2
3α+1 , θ¯ =
4α
3α+1 , when
5δ+α(6α−17δ−8(3α+1)h+30)−8
8(α+1)(3α+1) ≤ c1 ≤ −5δ+α(12α+17δ−4(3α+4)h−24)−4h+84(α−1)(3α+1) .
Now that we have found all the local optimal solutions we need to compare and figure out the
global solution and corresponding c1 region, which is a very tedious task. However, if c1 > 3/10
number of comparisons decreases significantly. Given this comparing Case (iii) and (iv) yields the
result.
Proof of Proposition 35. Following Proposition 34 supplier’s optimization problem is a concave
function of c1 and first order condition yields the result. Note that c
∗
1 is indeed greater than 3/10.
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However, to complete the proof that this is the equilibrium we need to show that there is not
any other better option for the supplier if c1 < 3/10 and retailer chooses its best response from
any of the local optimal solutions provided in the Proof of Proposition 34. We show this without
finding the global solution for the case when c1 < 3/10 for the Retailer’s response. For all the
possible cases we write the corresponding supplier problem find its optimal solution subject to the
c1 constraint defined by the retailer’s action. However, there is not such solution when c1 < 3/10,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 18. Follows from segments in Definition 2 and the partial derivative with
respect to α.
Proof of Corollary 4. Follows from partial derivatives of optimal profit values with respect to
α and δ.
Proof of Lemma 22. Liδ > Liα ⇔ Πi(α, 0) > Πi(0, δ). For part (i) ΠS(α, 0) decreases with h.
Solve ΠS(α, 0)|h=1/4 −ΠS(0, δ) = 0 in terms of δ. Resulting α expression always smaller than 1/4,
hence the result follows. Similar argument works for case (ii).
Proof of Theorem 19. Follows from the proof of Lemma 22.
Proof of Corollary 5. Follows from partial derivatives of the equilibrium values with respect to
δ.
Proof of Theorem 20. Follows from comparing fractional loss measures for retailer and supplier.
Proof of Corollary 6. Follows from the partial derivatives of the fractional loss measures for
supplier and retailer with respect to δ.
Proof of Lemma 23. Similar to the Proof Lemma 21 therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 36. Following Definition 5 We write the corresponding objective function
for the firm and first order condition yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 21. First part follows from partial derivative of µ with respect to α. Second
part follows from comparing µ and µC .
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Proof of Corollary ??. Follows from partial derivatives with respect to α and δ
Proof of Lemma 24. Write ΠC(α, 0) > ΠC(0, δ), where ΠC(α, 0) decreasing with respect to h.
When h is 1/4 show that δ < 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 22. Follows from Lemmas 22 and 24.
Proof of Corollary 8. Follows from partial derivatives of decisions with respect to δ.
Proof of Theorem 23. Follows from comparing the relative loss measures.
Proof of Theorem 24. Follows from partial derivatives of Ωδ measures with respect to α.
Proof of Corollary 9. Follows from partial derivatives of Q1, which is given in Proposition 34
and second period Q2 values given by Lemma 21.
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